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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation questions the role and policy functions of  local content 
requirements(LCR) in the FDI in the automotive industry and how it should be regulated 
in the international forum governing multilateral trade and economic affairs.  Among 
many factors influencing the FDI inflow to the country, what would be the most important 
factors, and will LCR of  the host country deter inward foreign investment? Further, does 
the LCR help industrial development of  host country pursuant to its policy goal?  To give 
answers to these questions, the dissertation analyzes FDI’s determinants in the automotive 
industry, and the impact of  LCR on the industrial development in the host country.  
Finally, it attempts to give implications and suggestions for the national policy makers and 
also for the delegations for future multilateral investment treaty.  We first question the 
logic of  current WTO rule that prohibits LCR alleging its trade and investment distorting 
effect.  Then, it suggests how investment should be regulated in the multilateral system 
without prejudice to the development of  industry in the less developed countries. 
There have been many researches on the FDI theories and determinants, but in 
this dissertation we focused on the industry specific elements, namely automotive industry.  
From the empirical work covering 42 automobile producing countries, we found that 
generally market size or demand force was the foremost FDI determinant in the 
automotive industry, although different patterns of  FDI were witnessed across regions. 
Also, LCR’s linkages effect with local industry and spillovers to the productivity 
enhancement was demonstrated through panel data analysis.  Thus, confirming the 
economic role and benefits of  LCR to the host country, and limitations of  the current 
framework disparaging its contribution for development, it concludes that LCR needs to be 
regulated in other multilateral venue.  Here, multilateral investment treaty is suggested as 
an alternative to the WTO system, although it would be tough and challenging task for the 
global community. 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
Automotive industry constitutes the crucial part of  a state’s industry, not only for 
its relative importance in the national economy, but also for its contribution to the 
development of  related industries.  Automobile is a mechanical yet complex apparatus.  
It is the product of  collaboration and convergence of  diverse state-of-the-art technologies: 
mechanical engineering, electronic engineering, ergonomics, dynamics, material science, 
industrial design, and many more.  Simply speaking, a car is made of  30,000 parts.  In 
terms of  industry scope, it ranges from steel industry, materials industry, parts and 
component industry, design industry, assembling industry, marketing and so on.  Thus, 
automotive industry virtually refers to the union of  all above mentioned industries.  Due 
to its forward and backward linkage effect, countries have contrived to foster automotive 
industry, both developing and developed countries.   
Generally, manufacturing automobiles requires large initial investment and fixed 
cost.  Thus, automotive industry is characterized by increasing returns to scale.  
Theoretically, it would be the most effective for the firms to produce cars in the home 
country and export them to foreign markets worldwide.  In that case, the world would 
have just a handful of  countries producing automobiles, around 10 countries at most.  
However, it has not been the case in the real world.  Since 1990s, the most notable change 
in the automotive industry was geographical fragmentation in the production activity of  
multinational corporations, i.e. growing overseas production.  Global vehicle 
manufacturers have actively been building production facilities outside their home country, 
and now more than 30 countries which do not have national vehicle manufacturer are 
producing cars in its territory.   
To promote domestic industry, the hosting governments sometimes provided 
incentives for the foreign investors or regulated their operations by industrial policies and 
requirements.  The policies were mostly regulations on local contents constituting a 
vehicle.  The principal aim of  these requirements was to indigenize the foreign 
establishments in its local industry.  If  there were no requirements on local contents, 
firms again would export all necessary parts and components or modules from home 
country to the foreign assembly sites rather than produce or procure them locally.  There 
would be limited forward linkage effect for the host country since plant will be nothing 
more than an assembly line.  Thus, many governments enforced performance 
requirements such as local content requirements, and vehicle manufacturers were resistant 
thereto.  There have been six WTO dispute cases regarding this issue.  As for the 
investment policies, automotive industry is the most sensitive and affected industry. 
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 Hence, global automotive industry nowadays is characterized by multinationality 
of  vehicle makers at the firm level, proliferation of  FDI at the country level, and 
investment measures such as local content requirements at the policy level.  
 
1. Understanding the FDI in the Automotive Industry 
 
1) Overview  
 
(1) Growing Trend of  Overseas Production  
 
In fact, the overseas production has been increasing in almost every industry in the 
form of  foreign direct investment for the past couple of  decades.  In general, when 
vehicle exports to a certain market increase beyond a certain extent, some portion of  the 
volume switches to local production.  Thus, usually the major players in the automotive 
industry are producing not just in their country of  nationality, but in many places where 
they find significant demand.  Thus, ‘fragmentation of  Multinational Enterprises’ has 
been going on in the automotive industry.  Undergoing frequent M&As1 and numerous 
vehicle manufacturers disappearing from the history, the map of  automotive industry 
changed a lot and now it is taking the shape of  globalized industry.  
As a matter of  fact, overseas investment and production in the automotive industry 
is not a new phenomenon. It has been going on from the outset of  20th century: the two 
leading manufacturers of  the United States, GM and Ford have expanded overseas 
production since 1910s in Europe.  Now, overseas production became the major business 
strategy among global players2, and Japanese automobile companies have their plants in 
Thailand, the United States, Brazil, as well as in Japan.  Not only Japanese but almost 
every global maker is producing outside its territory of  nationality, although the level of  
globalization would be all different both in absolute and relative terms.  There are two 
direction of  globalization in the automotive industry: i) overseas production vis-à-vis 
domestic production is increasing in both absolute term and relative term, and ii) it is 
spread to more manufacturers.  US firms and European firms were the first generation 
overseas producers, and then Japanese firms took the lead, and now there are many more 
late movers, notably Korean firms and recently Indian and Chinese firms.  
                                            
1 M&A was very active in the automotive industry in 1960s and 1990s.  Compared to early 1960s and 
the end of 2000, number of auto makers in the world almost halved.  For detail, see the Appendix I. 
2 The first movement of overseas production was made by mostly US makers in the early 20th century in 
Europe. 
 3 
The two way map in the next page shows these changes.  Horizontal axis indicates 
the production units, and the vertical axis indicates the proportion of  overseas production 
against the total production.  As the company locates in the upper side of  the map, the 
share of  its overseas production is large, and thus it can be said that the company is more 
globalized.  The first graph shows makers’ position in 2004, and the second graph was 
mapped based on 2008 data.  By comparing the two graphs, it can be found that almost 
every firm moved to upper right direction, i.e. growth based on globalization.  In 2004, 
companies tend to gather around within the down left side in the map, whereas in 2008 
they were more scattered and moving towards the right direction. 
Also, developing country’s makers like Proton (Malaysia) and Tata (India), in its 
initial development stage, usually belong to this quadrant.  However, globalization in these 
emerging makers is progressing very fast.  See how Tata went straight up to its place in 
2008 compared with 2004.  Tata motor’s surprising speed of  globalization is mainly owing 
to cross-border M&A: it recently acquired former Ford brands, Jaguar and Landrover.  
Chinese makers are not shown in this map, but some of  them are also globalizing very fast 
after the Global financial crisis in 2008, especially Chery and Geely Motors.  
 
<Figure I-1>Distribution of Automakers by Production capacity and the ratio of 
overseas production (2004 & 2008) 
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Source: reorganized from FOURIN(2006, 2010) 
 
(2) Theory of  FDI and MNC   
 
i) Classical Economic Theory: Factor Movement and Investment 
 
In the perspective of  traditional economics, the phenomenon of  overseas 
production or investment was viewed as movement of  factors, or more specifically 
movement of  capital.  In the traditional trade theory, countries produce goods according 
to their comparative advantage, in technology or factor endowments.  They then export 
thus produced goods to foreign countries.  As trade increases under free trade, the 
demand for abundantly endowed factor goes up, and consequently the concerned factor 
price goes up and eventually, factor price converges across countries.  This is the classic 
‘factor-price-equalization theorem.  In theory, there will be no need or motivation for 
foreign investment if  there are no trade barriers.  However, the real world is far from free 
trade situation and there is thin probability of  reaching free trade in the near future; 
therefore, there always will be gap in factor prices among countries.  In this sense, firms 
have dual incentives to invest in foreign country: to utilize the host country’s cheaper labor 
costs or lower interest rates, and to escape tariff  burden. 
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Mundell(1957) noted that there were growing overseas production by firms, and 
analyzed this production activity abroad as having lots to do with the disparity in factor 
price across countries, and also growing factor mobility.  He further found the substitutive 
relationship between trade and factor movement.  As impediments to trade rise, factor 
movement increased; increase in restrictions to factor movement stimulates trade.  His 
theory assumed perfect competition in the market and homogeneous production function, 
etc, modeling the two extreme cases of  perfect factor mobility but no trade, or factor 
immobility with free trade.  This was somewhat remote from the reality, but this provided 
with clues to many incidents in those days; increased protection in Britain in the nineteenth 
century stimulating capital exports and international trade growth in the interwar period 
when factor movement was highly restricted, etc.  
After Mundell’s classical economic interpretation on the overseas production, 
Kojima(1975) and Wong(1986) reinforced some substitutive relationship between foreign 
investment and international trade claimed by Mundell, but their research could be 
differentiated in that they noted foreign investment was not totally substituting trade, but to 
some point was complementing it.  As trade between two countries increased, firms of  
the exporting country made investments in the importing country, which reduced trade 
volume somewhat, but did not eliminate trade altogether.  This seemingly contradictory 
observation happens due to imperfect market and product differentiation.3 
Markusen(1995) added on the previous economists literature, keeping the 
association of  FDI with international trade, and studied the multinational firms and their 
investment with the tool of  equilibrium analysis.  He discovered that there was some 
missing point in the traditional theory.  He tried to incorporate industrial organization 
aspect into trade models, and give individual firms an important place in the theory.  
Among economists, Markusen was the most comprehensive theorist on multinational firms 
and FDI.  He also embraced business perspective in his analysis, referring to various 
business scholars, including Dunning.  Thus Markusen’s theory was different from the 
previous literature treating foreign investment and overseas production just as part of  the 
theory of  portfolio capital flows.  The capital, if  unrestricted, flows from where it is 
abundant to where it is scares.  However, in real life, individual firms’ foreign investment 
cannot be aggregated to a huge mass of  capital flowing freely around the globe.  The FDI, 
unlike portfolio investment requires complicated and sometimes bureaucratic process of  
decision making and the top management’s bold resolution because it is hard to revoke.  
                                            
3 The substitutional relationship between FDI and trade was evidenced in many cases: e.g. the decreasing 
export to Europe or the United States by Korean vehicle makers as local production increased.  However, 
export cannot go to zero, because there is limit in local production in terms of volume and number of 
models produced. 
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As Markusen recognized multinational companies had actual control and power in the 
international trade and investment, firms were given more leading role in the theory of  
FDI.  
In short, classical theories on FDI note that it is alternative to international trade, as 
one of  a mode of  foreign sales.  They explain why there have been FDI and overseas 
production, but do not really explain why certain firms in a certain industry are more 
engaged in FDI, how FDI in certain industry is different from those in other industries, 
where firms choose to make investment, etc.  Answers to these questions might be better 
addressed in the business theories, where firm’s behavior and decision making is the core 
topic of  research. 
 
ii) Management Literature 
 
As firm’s role in the transnational investment has been emphasized, there have 
been numerous researches on why firms engage in foreign operations.  This stream of  
research developed into theory of  Multinational Corporations(MNC). ‘Multinational 
Corporation’ refers to a corporation or an enterprise that manages production or delivers 
services in more than one country.  These studies usually started where in reality they find 
seemingly contradiction or weakness in the traditional economic approach on FDI.  As 
MNCs increased in number globally, this approach gained persuasion.  The fundamental 
difference between economic approach and management approach is that classical FDI 
theory explains motivation or advantage in a country or location, whereas MNC theory 
finds these factors are created by firm.   
Hymer(1976) pointed out the shortcoming of  interest rate theory, that is factor 
cost of  capital as the motivation of  direct investment.  He found rationale of  overseas 
production in that multinational firms seek to grasp central control and ownership of  the 
foreign operations because by doing so the firm can monopolize the advantage and it can 
control the price and output to maximize profit.  Reluctance to licensing or partnership 
with local company can be explained by his theory very well.  His theory extends to 
vertical integration.  With imperfect market, firms try to avoid using local market when 
procuring materials and factors of  production by appealing to horizontal or vertical 
integration or by finding another mechanism of  coordination.  He further argued that the 
firm would rather choose to integrate the foreign producer into their administrative 
structure.     
Vernon(1966) is well known for his product cycle theory, explaining the trade and 
foreign direct investment.  Vernon is an economist, but his theory had relevance with and 
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application utility in the business world and thus was widely recognized and appreciated in 
the managerial field.  The three stages of  product cycle are new product, maturing 
product, and standardized product.  In the initial stage, products are developed and 
produced in developed countries and from the second stage, less developed countries start 
producing the products and in the third stage, the production locus move to the less 
developed countries.    
Magee(1977) extended Vernon’s product cycle for individual product to industry 
technology cycle.  The industry technology cycle starts from the appropriability theory of  
the creation of  technology by multinational firms.  The appropriability theory suggests 
that MNCs are specialists in the production of  information which is less efficient to 
transmit through markets that they produce sophisticated technologies.  Each product   
Magee argued that firms specializing in the development, production and marketing of  
important experience good, new information.  Thus, his three stages of  industry cycle 
was invention, innovation, and standardization.  At the Invention stage, optimal firm size 
is small, and industry structure is very competitive.  At the Innovation stage, firms get 
larger and the industry structure is concentrated.  At the final stage, the goods are 
standardized and the appropriability declines.  Thus the industry structure becomes again 
competitive, prevailed by medium to small size firms.  Applying this theory to automotive 
industry, pretty much of  what have happened in the history of  automotive industry 
development can be explained.  Presumably, the global automotive industry is at the end 
of  second stage, about to move on to the third stage.  The appropriability of  technology 
is declining; new firms from the emerging markets are producing value cars at cheap price, 
and Korean makers have almost did catch up with the technology of  western makers.  
Still, the industry structure is concentrated, but going to be more competitive as a number 
of  makers are burgeoning, growing and catching up in the emerging markets.      
The most comprehensive and effective explanation was presented by John 
Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm: the most renowned theory on multinational firms.  He 
stated ownership-specific advantage, location advantage, internalization advantage as the 
determinants of  firm’s overseas production.  
 Ownership-specific advantage refers to the intangible assets such as technology, 
intellectual property, brand, marketing expertise, human resource, etc. that are source of  
the competitiveness of  the firm, and the capability to organize efficient production and 
sales system, by mixing these intangible assets with various tangible assets.  Firms with 
this kind of  advantage have incentives to achieve multinationality, which enhances 
operational flexibility by offering wider opportunities of  arbitraging, production shifting 
and global sourcing of  inputs.   
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Location advantage is the assets specific to a particular location.  For example, 
natural resources, cheap labor costs, incentives offered by the host country governments, 
trade barriers, and high demand growth are the location advantage of  developing countries.  
On the other hand, developed countries have the political and economic stability, 
infrastructure, and advanced technology, human resources as their location advantage.   
Lastly, internalization advantage signifies that when firms move ownership-specific 
advantages to foreign countries, it is more efficient for them to establish subsidiaries to 
internalize overall transactions, rather than trading with other firms or entering into 
contracts.  This explains why firms prefer direct investment to licensing or contract. 
 
2) Major Drivers of  FDI in the Automotive Industry 
 
Overseas production in the automotive industry is, in other words, dispersion of  
final assembly of  one manufacture.  For a couple of  reasons, global automobile 
manufactures place their production close to the end markets.  Here, these reasons are 
categorized and explained in three aspects: demand side, supply side, and political aspect.   
 
(1) Demand Side Motivations 
 
i)  Growing Demand in the Emerging Markets 
 
Perhaps, the increase in FDI could be better understood in the light of  growth of  
firms rather than a theory of  foreign investment.  When firms grow significantly in 
volume, domestic market is not enough anymore.  Growth speed slows as market is 
saturated and demand is not growing at the speed of  firm’s growth.  In order for the firm 
to keep growth, it needs larger market to sell its products.  Foreign market is the necessary 
and sufficient condition for a sustainable growth of  firms.  Countries in the period of  
‘motorization’ are the best target of  MNCs. 
 To this end, major portion of  FDI in the automotive industry is made by OEMs 
in the developed world to the developing countries.  China is the number one recipient of  
FDI by global OEM, and is followed by India and Brazil.  Recently, Russia is emerging as 
another big region receiving FDI by foreign OEMs.  Almost every major global producer 
have production base in Russia.  Historically, FDI into the developing countries were 
motivated by the easy access to natural resources and abundant labor force, but now 
vigorous FDI in the emerging markets including BRICs is mainly motivated by its market 
potential.   
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ii) High Protection of  the Automotive Industry and Barrier Circumvention 
 
However, these emerging markets are mostly protected by high tariff  barriers.  
Countries like India has prohibitive tariff  of  100%.  It is practically impossible to access 
this market by exportation.  Even when governments negotiate on free trade agreement, 
motor vehicle is usually the most controversial and sensitive sector in the manufacturing 
industry so that it usually remains to the last minute unsettled as a potential deal breaker, 
before concluding the agreement.   
Therefore firms choose overseas production to penetrate the market.  Generally, 
higher the tariff  is in a certain country, there are more incentives to make investment in the 
country.  Tariff  is the most direct cause of  overseas production, when regarding foreign 
investment as an alternative to exportation.   There is substutional relationship between 
export and overseas production.   
 
iii) Product Differentiation 
 
Vehicles, much more than other manufactured goods, are affected by the 
geographical location of  the market: natural environment such as climate and topography, 
consumer characteristics and preference, road and traffic regulations, income level and so 
on.  This distinct local preference led to great degree of  product differentiation in the 
automotive industry.4  Moreover, the world car in the 1980s and 1990s was not a big 
success. 5   It convinced firms that global vehicle market is far from homogenous.  
Knowing the segmented nature of  regional markets, the attempt of  ‘world car’ was running 
counter to this long-lived truth.  In order to satisfy many consumer needs and preferences 
with homogenous product, cars were over-engineered, which damaged the cost structure 
of  the company.  In fact, there is almost no truly global model: even world best selling 
cars like Ford Fiesta and Toyota Corolla are modified for the individual markets.  OEMs 
now tend to develop models specific to certain region or markets.6  They sometimes 
                                            
4 Mostly, passenger cars produced and sold by global makers are roughly categorized into three groups in 
most cases: global model, general model, and local model.  Global models cover almost every region, 
with minor modifications in the design and specifications in the different markets.  Honda Accord and 
Civic are exemplary global models.  General cars are sold in a couple of regions without big changes in 
the design.  On the other hand, local cars are customized to the specific region in terms of design and 
platform.  Good examples are VW’s Gol(South America) and Santana(Asia)4, Honda Pilot(North 
Ameirca) and Odyssey(North America).  Even global models have variations according to the market 
segments, consumer preference and income level, etc. 
5 Ford Mondeo and Fiat Palio are notable examples of World car. 
6 These are often witnessed in Europe, South America and almost every emerging markets.  Hyundai is 
producing Europe specific models: ‘i series.’ and Ce’ed.  Toyota’s product lineup in Europe is 
 10 
establish design centers in the overseas market such as China and India, to alter the design 
to fit the preference and needs of  local consumers.  Thus, it is anyway hard to achieve the 
maximum economies of  scale while producing all the different trims of  models even if  
production is concentrated in the home country.7 
Product differentiation in the automotive industry went further than the lineup 
strategy with diverse models.  Even within a model, there are slight modifications 
according to the local market’s culture, geography and consumer’s preference.  With many 
versions and trims, it is very hard to handle the production in one place.  It is better to 
locate production site near the end market to enhance flexibility of  production and contact 
and communication with the local market.  
 
(2) Supply Side Motivations 
 
i) Cost Reduction 
 
Vehicle manufacturers also make FDI to reduce production cost.  Since mid 
1990s, European makers have been shifting their production to Central and Eastern 
Europe, to exploit the cheap labor cost, and geographical vicinity to Western Europe.  
Spain used to be the major FDI recipient by these makers before.  Among the Eastern 
European countries, Poland was rated the most favorable location for vehicle production 
for its infrastructure, endowment with skilled labor force, and adjacency to Western 
Europe market.  Now most European makers have production facilities in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  Typically, these cost-cutting investments took place within region, in a 
few locations where input costs are low and supply is abundant.  This usually brought 
about regional cluster specializing in the production of  vehicles.   
 
<Table I-1 > Historical View of European Makers’ operation in Eastern Europe 
Maker Strategy Model 
VW 
Acquired Skoda (1991) 
Czech: Skoda production base 
Slovakia: VW 4WD 
Poland: VW small commercial vehicle 
Hungary: Engine 
Skoda Fabia 
(Saloon/HB/SW) 
Superb  
VW Polo/Golf/SLW 
                                                                                                                                
completely different from any other markets, e.g. Yaris, Auris, and Avensis, whose names are unfamiliar 
to even Japanese consumers.  India is overflowed with these local models: Hyundai Santro, Honda Jazz, 
Toyota Etios, etc.  Of course, these models are produced locally. 
7 To solve this inefficiency, OEMs usually leverage common platforms over multiple products, typically 
utilized by European manufacturers. 
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Renault 
Full-scale manufacturing since 1998 
Concentrated around Slovenia, Romania, Turkey 
Export Thalia from Turkey to Eastern Europe 
Brand divided into Renault and Dacia 
Renault Clio/Thalia, 
Symbol/Kangoo  
Dacia X 90 
PSA 
Full-scale manufacturing since 1998 
Brand divided into Peugeot and Citroen 
Czech: Joint venture with Toyota, supply base toward 
Western Europe 
Peugeot 206-106, 
Citroen C3, Peugeot 
Partner, Citroen 
Berlingo 
Fiat Established FAP(Fiat Auto Poland) in 1992, and produced mid-to-low price small car for Western Europe 
Palio/Weekend/Siena, 
Fiat Gingo 
Source: Global Insight 
 
ii) Efficiency Maximization 
 
The US makers are the biggest producer in North America including domestic 
market, but apart from the United States, they are the most committed investor and 
producers in Canada and Mexico.  GM has seven plants in Canada and Mexico, three in 
Canada and four in Mexico.  Ford is currently operating four plants in Canada and Mexico, 
two in each.  It was triggered by the regional integration: North American Free Trade 
Agreement(NAFTA).  Since NAFTA, automotive industry of  North America has been 
restructured.  GM and Ford has relocated some of  their vehicle assembly plants and 
engine or other component manufacturing plants to exploit the low labor costs and rents 
while maintaining proximity to the market and related value chains.  
 
iii) Advantage of  Internalization 
 
There can be many types of  international business in the automotive industry.  
<Table I-2> shows list of  various patterns of  international business in the automotive 
industry.  Subcontracting or KD production is prevalent typically in less developed 
countries such as Southeast Asian countries or Russia.  Recently, foreign investment has 
increased substantially.  Direct foreign investment includes joint venture and wholly 
owned subsidiary.8  Wholly owned subsidiary could be newly established operation or 
ownership by M&A.  The typical business term for the newly established subsidiary is 
Greenfield investment.  M&A is also frequent.  Exportation involves the lowest level of  
internalization, and as it goes from ⓓ to ⓜ, the degree of  internalization increases.   
 
                                            
8 Good example of joint venture is global manufacturers operating in China: Beijing-Hyundai, Shanghai-
GM, etc. 
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<Table I-2> Patterns of International Business in the automotive industry 
Export 
Indirect ⓐ Intermediary Trade by Exporters 
Direct 
ⓑ Export by Manufacturer to the Foreign Importer 
ⓒ Export via Foreign Subsidiary 
Internation
al Contract 
Technical 
Cooperation 
ⓓ Licensing and Franchising 
ⓔ Joint Technology Development 
Parts 
Production 
ⓕ Subcontract Production 
ⓖ KD Parts and Components Supply 
ⓗ Divided Production among Companies 
Complete 
Vehicle 
Production 
ⓘ Original Equipment Manufacturing, Consignment Production 
ⓙ Joint Production 
Foreign 
Investment 
Indirect ⓚ Portfolio Investment 
Direct 
ⓛJoint Venture 
Majority Ownership 
Newly Established 
vs. 
Equity Partnership Or M&A 
Equal Ownership 
Minority Ownership 
ⓜWholly Owned 
Subsidiary 
Newly Established vs. Acquisition 
Source: Korean Automotive Research Institute 
 
<Figure I-2 > Lifecycle in the mode of Market Entry  
Export
Licensing/    
KD
Assembly
FDI/            
CBU
Production
cycle
Sa
les
 vo
lum
e
Infant Growth Breakthrough Globalization
Domestic 
Sales
I Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ
 
Global OEMs usually go through four stages pertaining to its extension to the 
global market: domestic sales, export, licensing/KD assembly, and full-scale production via 
FDI.  Generally, firms keep raising the degree of  internalization in the foreign market 
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strategy.  This cycle often replicates in individual foreign markets.  
 
(3) Financial Motivation: to hedge exchange rate risk 
 
In fact, financial risk management was a very huge factor in the FDI decision, 
especially in the developed countries.  Automobiles are very sensitive to exchange rate 
than any other manufactured goods because car’s unit price is much higher compared to 
other products such as home appliances and computers, etc.  In countries adopting free 
floating exchange rate system, the exchange rates can be very volatile. Sometimes, exchange 
rate fluctuation can count around one third of  the production cost, which is way higher 
than the cost penalty caused by tariff.  Tariff  imposed on cars in the developed countries 
are usually less than 10%, but when the currency of  the exporting country appreciates 
against the importing country, the export price can jump up by 30% in the market country.  
Complete vehicles are one of  the most expensive consumer goods, and thus they are very 
vulnerable to exchange rate changes.  Therefore, vehicle manufacturers have incentive to 
produce cars in the market country to hedge the foreign exchange risk.  
Japanese OEMs’ have been vulnerable to the strong yen and exchange rate risk.  
In this background, Japanese OEM’s were one of  the earliest manufacturers to go abroad 
and engage in overseas production.  In 1985, overseas production of  Japanese makers 
were less than one million units, but in 2005 it ballooned 10 million units, more than ten 
folds in 20 years.  Their domestic production in 2009 was about 7.8 million units, 
overtaken by overseas production9.  Also, Japanese OEM’s recent poor performance in 
the US and European countries since 2009, right after the global financial crises, can be 
also partly understood by weakening price competitiveness due to high yen.10  
 
(4) Political Motivations 
 
Sometimes political motivations drives firms migrate to other region or countries.  
Sturgeon and Biesebroeck(2009) also pointed out that political pressures on automakers 
to build where they sell have encouraged the dispersion of  final assembly.  It is a minor 
motivation, and not a direct cause of  overseas production, but can play a certain role in 
                                            
9 In 2008, domestic production was almost the amount of overseas production, but in 2009 Japanese 
makers reduced domestic production sharply due to global economic downturn.  However, the growing 
overseas production caused the quality control issue, and the sensational ‘Toyota Recall’ was the backfire.  
10 Ironically, it became the alleged cause of fallout in the quality management, damaging the fame and 
trust of these global makers which won their recognition in the global market by its invariable quality and 
consumers’ confidence therein. This supposedly caused Toyota’s global recall incident pertaining to the 
accelerator pedal problem. 
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shaping the patterns of  FDI.  Automotive industry is one of  the most politically 
sensitive sectors among manufacturing industry.  It is often witnessed in the trade 
agreement negotiation that concessions on the automotive industry are concluded at  the 
last minute of  negotiation. 
 
i) External: Trade Pressure 
 
Usually, as export increase, firms face obstacles, mostly in the form of  trade 
dispute by the importing country governments for unbalanced trade or alleged unfair 
business activities, such as dumping.  This causes major uncertainties and cost for the 
company. 
 
<Figure I-3> Production in the US by Asian and non-Asian OEMs(million units) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Asian non-Asian
 
Source: Global Insight 
 
Japanese car makers were experiencing export-driven growth until 1970s, but since 
1980s export growth were decreasing because of  the trade conflicts with US and European 
countries due to Japan’s high exports volume and market share growth in that region.  As 
a solution to the growing trade imbalance, US and EU demanded Voluntary Export 
Restraint (VER) from Japanese manufactures in 1981, and thus Japan’s automobile export 
dropped starkly.  To tackle this situation, Japanese makers started overseas production, 
first in the United States in 1982 by Hondas. Ever since, production increased every year, 
so that in 1985, it was only 300,000 units per year, but the number doubled in three years 
and in 1995, it was over 2 million units.  In 1993, Japanese makers’ US production figure 
 15 
outnumbered their exports to the US market.   
 
ii) Internal Trade Union 
 
The political motivations can be found within the home country.  The stiffness 
of  trade unions in the automotive industry causes additional cost or uncertainty on the part 
of  the firm.  Labor in the automotive industry shows high tendency of  unionization.  
Besides, trade unions in the automotive industry are the most powerful unions, for example 
UAW(United Automobile Workers) in the United States, CGT(Confederation Generale du 
Travail) of  France, FIOM(Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurcigi) in Italy, and Korean 
Automotive Labor Unions, and many more, at the firm level, industry level and national 
level.  The authority of  each trade union is different by countries, but generally they have 
stakes and power in some important management decisions.  It is undisputable fact that 
these organizations are necessary for the healthy national economy and fair society, but in 
simple management aspect, they deteriorate operational flexibility and increase overall 
production costs.   
The cost-increasing effect of  harsh trade unions has caused many automotive 
manufacturing companies to migrate their production facilities to foreign countries with 
lower wage and welfare standards, and more employer friendly countries, mostly developing 
countries.  
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2. Policies and Measures on the FDI   
 
1) Performance Requirements in the Automotive Industry 
 
When multinational firms make foreign direct investment in a certain host country, 
they are subject to the laws and regulations, and the policy of  the host country.  Those 
can be divided to roughly two categories: pre-entry stage regulations and post-entry stage 
related regulations.  Among them, performance requirements fall under post-entry group 
and they are the most relevant measures in the foreign investors’ practical operation.  The 
definition of  performance requirements is, according to the definition of  UNCTAD, 
“stipulations requiring foreign investors to meet certain specified goals with respect to their 
operations in the host country.”  Throughout the 1970s, governments of  developing and 
developed countries alike have resorted to performance requirements as a means to 
promote industrial and economic development.  They were particularly common in the 
automotive, chemical and petrochemical, and computer and informatics sectors.  
Generally, host governments impose performance requirements on the foreign 
investment for the following policy objectives: to strengthen the industrial base and 
increase domestic value added, to create employment, for technology transfer and catch-up, 
to generate exports and thus maintain balance of  payments, etc.  If  there is one key word 
that can sum up all these objectives, it would be ‘development’.  Host governments adopt 
various performance requirements to enhance the benefit of  inward FDI, and thereby 
accelerate the industrial and economic growth and development. 
 
<Table I-3> Prohibited performance requirements in the TRIMs Agreement 
Types of PR Details 
Local Content 
Requirements 
The purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic 
origin or form any domestic source 
Trade Balancing 
Requirements 
An enterprise’s purchase or use of imported products is limited to 
an amount related to the volume or value of local products that it 
exports. Or import restrictions related to the enterprise’s volume 
or value of local production that it exports. 
Import Restrictions General import restrictions related to product used in local productions 
Foreign Exchange 
Balancing 
Requirements 
Measures that restrict an enterprise’s access to foreign exchange 
for imports to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows 
attributable to the enterprise. 
Domestic Sales 
Requirements 
The exportation of products is restricted in terms of particular 
products, volume or value of products, or volume or value of local 
production 
Source: UNCTAD 
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Here, various performance requirements especially relevant with automotive 
industry are explained.   They are roughly divided into four types.  First, at the pre-entry 
or point of  entry stage is joint ventures or domestic equity requirements.  Among the 
other three are in the post-entry stage: one is R&D and technology transfer requirements, 
which are qualitative requirements, and the other is local content requirements and export 
performance requirements which are somewhat quantity-oriented approach.   
 
(1) Joint Venture and Equity Ownership Requirements 
 
This is a compulsory joint venture or equity ownership requirement, mandating 
joint venture with local counterpart or limiting the full ownership of  the investment.  
Host governments use these requirements for a number of  reasons.  In some cases, they 
are implemented for national security or public interest reasons.  This explanation is more 
relevant with the those industries such as telecommunications, energy industry such as oil 
and electricity, natural resource such as steel and mining industry, transportations and 
financial industry such as banking and insurance.  However, it is usually not the case for 
general manufacturing industry.  The main practical rationale for this requirement is to 
enhance chances of  technology and knowledge of  the foreign investor being diffused to 
the local companies.  By forming one joint company, the local firms can have better 
access to the technology and various other intangible know-hows of  the advanced foreign 
firms. 
Evidently, in case of  India, there are several empirical and case studies reporting 
that domestic equity requirements have helped to promote the formation of  joint ventures, 
and consequently in some cases generated externalities in the form of  local learning and 
quick absorption of  knowledge brought in by the foreign partners.  
This kind of  requirements has rapidly disappeared. Now there is hardly any 
country imposing these requirements on FDI, at least in the automotive industry.  At the 
moment, only China is restricting foreign ownership.  For a global manufacturer of  
completely vehicles to operate in China, it has to organize a joint-stock company with a 
Chinese partner, which owns at least 50% of  the company’s equity11.  Thus, every global 
OEMs which have presence in China are represented by joint-venture company: FAW-
Volkswagen Automotive Co., GM-SAIC, Hyundai-Beijing, etc. In effect, it is plainly 
discernable that China’s local automotive industry is growing very fast, both in terms of  
scale and technology.  
                                            
11 WTO(2006) 
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(2) R&D and Technology Transfer Requirements 
 
Technology transfer is directly related to the industry development of  the host 
country.  Therefore, it has been the most important policy objectives of  host 
governments.  However, foreign investor firms are reluctant in transferring technology to 
local firms because they are afraid that those local companies can some day drag them in 
the global market with low price and equal quality.  Besides, R&D function of  global 
firms is in general concentrated in home countries, and therefore, investment host 
countries sometimes are degraded to a simple factory base, and ironically are retarded in 
technological development due to excessive reliance on FDI.  Thus, the policy option for 
the host government is either mandating the technology transfer requirements or offering 
incentives for investors to willingly transfer technology.  
Although mandatory application of  R&D and technology transfer requirements is 
not common in practice, some developing countries call for these requirements.  In China, 
foreign auto manufacturers are required to set up their own R&D departments along with 
the production facilities.  In India, R&D requirements may be imposed to ensure more 
investment in R&D for absorption and adaptation of  imported technology.  Russia 
recently imposed the requirement for investors to establish design center.  Southeast 
Asian countries were extensively adopting those requirements, especially on Japanese firms. 
 
(3) Local Content Requirements 
 
At the close of  the Uruguay Round, the only remaining prohibited TRIMs were 
local content and trade balancing requirements in the automotive industry.  Local content 
requirement(hereinafter referred to as LCR), or domestic content requirement, is the most 
useful tool among other performance requirements by incorporating local firms into the 
production chains of  foreign investors.  LCR has evolved from a very strict form of  
mandatory local content rule that require minimum percentage of  inputs from domestic 
sources, to a more flexible form which is a condition for the receipt of  an incentives such 
as tariff  exemption or subsidy.  One remarkable fact worth noticing is that LCRs have 
been enforced uniquely in the automotive industry, in most countries.  
Table below is a summary of  how countries enforced various local content 
requirements and the current state of  the rules.  Almost every developing country had 
once implemented local content requirements.  By 2005, the official requirements had 
been expired in most of  the countries.   
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<Table I-4> Local Content Requirements in Various Countries 
Country Local Content Rule 
Malaysia 
- Elimination of 11 items from Local Material Content Program in 2002.1. 
Remaining 19 items were abolished at the end of 2003. 
- Still, there is administrative guideline encouraging local content usage. 
Thailand In 2000, the local content requirement was abandoned, but CKD tariff was raised from 20% to 33%, offsetting the effect. 
Pakistan LCR has been used as a part of deletion program.  Used to link tariff exemptions with local content until 2005.  
Philippines In 2003, the local content requirement was abolished. 
Vietnam The official TRIMs are eliminated, but the Prime Minister decision stipulates that regular vehicles have to have a local content of above 60% by 2010. 
Cambodia Gradual indigenization is required, starting from 6% in the first year, to 65%, with yearly raise of 3%. 
India Local content requirements in law were phased out, except for companies established within Special Economic Zone.  
China New KD Rule provides that parts and components that have the character of complete car are subject to tariff for complete car. 
Russia 
In automotive industry alone, there are local content requirements.  For duty 
free treatment, foreign investor has to make investment of at least 250 million 
dollars and procure local content above 50%.  
For the preferential treatment on KD tariff(2%~12%) investor has to procure 
local content up to 30% within 54 months. 
Canada Local content requirement was abolished in 2001.  
Mexico 
Local content requirement was eliminated in 2004, and there are no formal 
requirements.  However, firms not satisfying the NAFTA Rules of Origin’s 
valued added criteria cannot export to the US or Canada duty free. 
Argentina 
Local content requirement was enforced until 2003.  
According to MERCOSUR Common Automotive Policy in force since August 2008, 
local content rate required for duty free treatment within the region is 30% for 
PV, 25% for trucks.   
Brazil Local Content Requirement is employed as investment incentives. 
Venezuela Local content over 33%, 3% tariff reduction 
Iran According to local content rates, tariff is discriminated. 
Egypt 
Incentive measures in the form of customs duty reductions(until 2005) 
Local Content Required(%) Reduction in Import duty(%) 
20 25 
30 30 
40 40 
50 50 
60 60 
Over 65 75 
All excise duties incurred on local inputs are also refunded. 
Source: WTO 
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(4) Export Performance/Trade Balancing Requirements 
 
Export obligations or trade balancing requirements have been often applied in 
countries promoting export-led growth.  The main objectives of  the host governments by 
imposing export performance requirements could be simply expanding the exports, to 
diversify the export destination countries, or to balance payments to foreign countries.  
On the other hand, Brazil, Mexico and Thailand used export requirements for triggering a 
burst of  export-focused investments.  Thailand, by imposing export requirements on 
foreign affiliates, prompted Japanese automobile producers to integrate Thailand into their 
global production networks.  Rodrik(1987) and Greenaway(1991) found that in the 
presence of  oligopolistic behavior and tariff  distortions, export performance requirements 
can benefit host countries by reducing payments to foreign owners, reducing output in 
excess supply and by shifting profits to locally owned firms.   
  
<Table I-5> Export Obligations in major Countries 
Country Export Obligation 
Indonesia There are trade balancing requirements, but not contingent upon investment. 
Thailand When producing in the Special Economic Zone, 100% of the products should be exported for duty-free treatment. 
Philippines Foreign firms in the free trade area are supposed to export 7% of production. 
India Producers locating in SEZ or export-oriented firms are required to accomplish the designated export performance under MOU with Indian government.  
China Used to impose export obligation in some industries. Now, there is practically no export obligation. 
Mexico Export obligations are only applied to companies in Maquiladora, allowing domestic sales based on the previous year’s export volume.  
Argentina 
Export obligation is limited to automotive industry. Originally, imported parts 
are considered locally procured when three times of the import value(FOB) is 
exported. This rule was abolished in 1983 and the ratio of import and export 
was relaxed to 1:0.5 in 1991, 1:0.8 in 1992, 1:1 in 1993.   
Brazil Export performance is required with regard to Export Promotion Program. 
Chile 
Exemption from customs duties for imports of CKD and SKD for vehicle 
assembly, provided that they are offset by exports of domestic components of 
equivalent value within 12 months. 
Uruguay For each US dollar of exports, they may import at a tariff that is 13%p lower than the tariff applicable to new vehicles assembled in the place of origin. 
Egypt 
Under Article 102 to 106 of the Customs Law, the duty drawback scheme allows 
a full refund of customs duties paid on imports of inputs and components used 
in the manufacture of finished products provided that the finished products are 
exported to a free zone within two years of the date of payment of the duties.  
Source: WTO 
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2) Disputes concerning Automotive Industry  
 
Thus, various performance requirements were implemented in the automotive 
industry, and in most countries, local content requirements were implemented only in the 
automotive industry.  However, some of  the performance requirements are prohibited by 
TRIMs Agreement, and now most of  the TRIMs in other industry were eliminated as 
recommended and scheduled by the WTO.12   At the core of  these issues lie the 
conflicting interests between the foreign investors and the host country governments.  
The host government, providing the great value of  favors to the foreign investors, it wants 
to make sure that the foreign investor is contributing to the domestic industry and 
economy.   The term, ‘performance requirement’ can be understood in this context.  
As a matter of  fact, there were thirteen trade disputes in WTO regarding host 
country’s investment regulations, or more specifically performance requirements.  It is 
worth noticing that six of  them were addressing automotive industry.  Besides, the six 
cases are all that WTO disputes pertaining to the automotive industry.  This signifies that 
there is a close link between trade-related-investment-measures and automotive industry.   
 
<Table 1-6> WTO Disputes pertaining to Automotive Industry 
Case Name Case Number Invoked Agreement 
Brazil-Autos(1996) WT/DS51, WT/DS52, WT/DS65, WT/DS81 GATT, SCM, TRIMs 
Indonesia-Autos(1996) WT/DS54, WT/DS55, WT/DS59, WT/DS64 GATT, SCM, TRIMs  
Canada-Autos(1998) WT/DS139, WT/DS142 GATT, GATS, SCM, TRIMs  
India-Autos(1999) WT/DS146, WT/DS175 GATT, TRIMs 
Philippines-Autos(2000) WT/DS195 GATT, SCM, TRIMs 
China-Auto Parts(2006) WT/DS339, WT/DS340, WT/DS342 GATT, SCM, TRIMs 
Source: WTO 
 
These dispute cases provide fertile ground from which we can study and analyze 
the application of  legal principles dealing with investment measures.  Also, a couple of  
implications can be derived from this fact.  First, indigenization in the automotive 
industry is critical concern for the host country, and second, the current international trade 
regime is hostile toward the host country’s indigenization policy.   
 
                                            
12 This will be examined in more detail in Chapter IV.  
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3. Structure of  the Dissertation 
 
So far, we had overview of  FDI in the automotive industry: how they developed in 
what background and motivations.  Also, we have covered FDI-related policy 
environment and major issues thereupon.  In the policy perspective, the impacts of  
performance requirements are manifold.  In terms of  trade, they can influence trade flows 
by affecting competitive relationship between foreign and local products, and sometimes 
used to deter the investor’s roundabout export in order to shunt tariff  barrier of  the host 
country.  In the investment point of  view, they can influence investment flows in that they 
affect the decision of  foreign investor whether to make investments or not in a certain 
country.  They can also contribute to the production and development of  the host 
country.  The objective of  this dissertation is to verify the link between these policies and 
FDI, and also between the policy and the industry development.    
Thus, chapters ahead will look into each link. Chapter II, as an extension and 
development from Chapter I, will find out which factors are significant in determining the 
FDI location in the automotive industry with empirical analysis.  Finding out the 
determinants, characteristics and peculiarity of  automotive industry will be considered.  In 
addition to this, it will look at the link between LCR and FDI inflow, whether LCR has 
investment distorting effect. 
In Chapter III, LCR’s role in the host country’s view and investor perspective will 
be both investigated.  Almost every developing country has employed local content 
regulation as a policy tool, and what are the rationale beneath.  Also, how LCR can 
influence in shaping the foreign OEM’s presence in the host country in terms of  value 
chain networks.  Here, we also investigated whether the LCR has accomplished its 
development objective, empirically substantiating the correlation between local content 
requirements and the industrial development of  the host country; whether they provide 
positive effect on the industrial development.  
Lastly, in Chapter IV, we have reviewed how FDI is regulated in the existing 
multilateral trade system, specifically with respect to the trade-related investment measures; 
and what are the limitations and controversies of  the current system.  Then, the current 
system condemning the LCR would have to be under second thought.  Further, it 
discusses how investment should be regulated in the multilateral system, not through the 
glass of  trade-oriented regime, and without prejudice to the development of  industry in the 
less developed countries.  
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Chapter II. Determinants of  FDI Location in the Automotive Industry 
 
1. Overview 
 
1) Literature Review 
 
(1) Determinants of  FDI 
 
The modern research on the theory of  transnational corporations and FDI can be 
categorized to roughly two groups: first, why firms go abroad to produce, i.e. the 
background and motivation of  FDI, and second stream is where they make investment i.e. 
the location determinants of  FDI.  This type of  research focuses on external variables 
affecting the firm’s decision.   
Dunning’s four types of  direct foreign investment, resource-seeking, market-
seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic-asset-investment, can effectively show both 
motivation and geographic determinant of  FDI.  First, resource-seeking FDI refers to 
location advantage in supply factor.  This type of  FDI is the oldest form of  MNC 
involvement to cut down production cost, utilizing the abundant natural resources and 
cheap labor, typically in developing countries.  On the other hand, market-seeking FDI 
refers to demand factor: market size, growth, trade openness, etc. Market-seeking 
investment became major motive for investing in the manufacturing sector in the 
developing countries in the 1960~70s.  Generally, market-seeking investment in 
manufacturing industry is a substitute for exporting from the home country, often due to 
trade barriers in host countries.  Thus, Dunning’s theory reverts to classical theory of  
factor movement stimulated by tariff  barriers impeding final goods trade.  Further, it has 
trade-reducing effects on the end-products, but trade-creating effects in inputs or 
intermediate goods used in production.  Significant transport costs, differences in 
consumer tastes and the need to adapt a product to local conditions and inputs can be 
other causes of  market-seeking investment.  Efficiency-seeking FDI means location 
advantage for certain value chain.  This type of  investment occurs when MNCs locate 
part of  their value–added chain abroad in order to improve the profitability of  their overall 
operations.  This has been the major motivations for Japanese investment in Southeast 
Asia, the United States investment in Mexico and Central America, and European 
investment in Central and Eastern Europe.  Finally, strategic-asset-seeking investment 
usually takes place at an advanced stage of  the globalization when firms invest abroad in 
order to acquire intangible assets such as technology, marketing capabilities, brand, and 
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distribution networks.  These four categories provide with the comprehensive framework 
for FDI determinant studies.  In the real business practices, FDIs are not based on a 
single motivation, but usually combination of  two or more types. 
There is growing volume of  empirical researches on the determinants of  FDI, i.e., 
firms’ decision where to locate their investment.  Size of  the economy such as GDP and 
population has proven to be the most relevant factor to induce FDI in most of  the 
empirical studies(Root and Ahmed(1978); Schneider and Frey(1985); Lucas(1993); Barrel 
and Pain(1999); Drabek and Payne(2001); Nunnenkamp(2002))   
Also, many empirical studies examined the impact of  labor costs.  Schneider and 
Frey(1985) researched on the effects of  GDP, infrastructure quality, labor cost, and country 
risk(political instability).  They found that these variables all affected firm’s investment 
decision.  Labor cost is one of  the supply factors of  the FDI including abundance in the 
natural resource, which can be categorized to the resource-seeking FDI.  In fact, labor 
cost is a high priority factor taken into consideration when automotive manufacturers make 
decisions on the overseas production location.   
Although many of  the research on the determinants on FDI put more weight on 
the economic variables than policy variables, there are some studies that focused on 
political or social elements as determinants of  FDI.   Corporate tax, and average tariff, 
integration with global economy, denoted by the number of  RTAs are widely accepted in 
the literature as having an effect on the FDI inflow (Gotopoulos and Louri(2002)). 
Openness of  the host country was frequently used as a variable.  Asiedu(2001) 
rightly pointed out that impact of  openness on FDI depends on the type of  investment.  
When investments are market-seeking, trade restrictions can have a positive impact on FDI 
because when foreign firms seek to serve local markets with high trade barriers, they need 
to set up subsidiaries in the host country to jump high tariff.  It is exactly the case of  
many vehicle manufacturers, deciding to make fixed investments in the developing 
countries, generally less open economy.  Moreover, when the foreign company once 
makes investments in the host country with high barriers, they are also under protection 
from imports of  competitors from 3rd countries. 
Integration with global economy, frequently indicated by the number of  RTA can 
be understood as a policy variable, but its market-size effect was emphasized in many 
researches.  Jaumotte(2004) investigated whether the market size of  a regional trade 
agreement is a determinant of  FDI received by countries participating in the RTA.  In 
order to test for a regional market size effect, the model introduced an alternative measure 
of  market size which takes the value of  the regional market size for countries belonging to 
the RTA.  In that case, when a country is not a member of  any RTA, its market size in the 
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model is identical to the domestic market size.  Of  course, positive correlation between 
the RTA market size and FDI was found.  However, it has limitations in that the RTA 
effect can be exaggerated for those small size countries with many RTAs.  Also, it should 
be noted that not all the RTAs have reached perfect state of  liberalization.     
Aswicahyono and Hill(1995) examined foreign ownership as a determinant of  
investment by examining manufacturing sector of  Indonesia.   
On the other hand, Wheeler and Mody(1992) and Lipsey(1999) conducted similar 
empirical studies, and they included tariffs and other trade barriers among the variables.  
However, they did not find specific importance from this variable as a determinant of  FDI.  
Nunnenkamp(2002) also concluded that non-traditional determinants such as cost factors, 
complementary factors of  production and openness to trade have typically not become 
more important with preceeding globalization.  In many studies including Drabek and 
Payne(2001), Lucas(1993), Barrel and Pain(1999), corporate tax and investment regulations 
were found to be less meaningful in deciding FDI.  
Besides macroeconomic factors and policy factors, competing firm’s strategy can 
also be a determinant.  Knickerbocker(1973) made a very insightful finding from the 
actual investment decision of  MNCs.  He noticed that it was not just locational variable 
that might determine the spatial distribution of  economic activity, but the strategies of  
firms in response to these variables and to the anticipated reaction of  their competitors.  
His observation can well explain the automotive manufacturers’ behavior in these days; 
why firm’s FDI are usually concentrated in a couple of  locations to form a kind of  focal 
point of  investment.  Firm 1 chooses a country as its location of  FDI, soon to be 
followed by other firms.  China, India, and Russia are the notable examples of  this 
phenomenon.  Instead of  finding other underinvested country, so called ‘blue ocean’ as 
business community put it, they are flocked together in the same country.  One possible 
explanation is that by following the leader in the FDI, firms can reduce uncertainty, risks 
and various costs.  Knickerbocker argued that oligopolists who wish to avoid destructive 
competition would normally follow each other into new markets in order to safeguard their 
own market position.  
More and more researchers are including the policy variables and business 
environments in their model.  Some empirical studies proved that these variables have 
certain impact on FDI, while some showed little influence on the FDI flow.  Yet, the most 
significant variables are economic factors: generally, market size and growth potential have 
been the most decisive factors in firm’s FDI decision. 
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(2) LCR as a Hindrance to FDI 
 
Quite recently, especially at the time around establishment of  WTO, local content 
requirement have entered the center of  FDI research theme.  Arguably, it was intended to 
seek economic justifications with regards to the prohibition of  performance requirements 
in the TRIMs Agreement.  However, less attention has been paid to the local content 
requirements in terms of  FDI determinant aspect.  They rather paid more attention to the 
negative effect of  LCR on trade.   
Among the early researches demonstrate the relationship between LCR and FDI 
was Root and Ahmed(1978).  They tested 44 economic, social, political, and policy 
variables for their significance in determining the attractiveness of  a country as an 
investment recipient, using multiple discriminant analysis.  Among the policy variables, 
there were corporate taxation, tax incentive laws in terms of  complexity, and also tax 
incentives in terms of  liberality, attitude toward joint ventures, limitations on foreign 
personnel, and local content requirement.  Of  the six policy variables, only corporate 
taxation turned out to be significant discriminator.  Local content requirements as well as 
other variables did not have substantial influence on the investment determination.   
Grossman(1981) conducted a theoretical work showing the role and effect of  
content protection and content preference.  He discerned that content protection was like 
a tariff  protection for the domestic intermediate goods and subsidy for the foreign investor.  
Content preference scheme, as we call it, local content requirements, also works like a 
subsidy to the final goods producer, but for the local intermediate goods industry, it may or 
may not provide protection.  Thus, content protection and content preference scheme 
brought resource allocation effect in terms of  domestic content.  However, he warned 
that this policy may not achieve its original objective to raise the level of  value added and 
overall output in the local intermediate goods industry, if  the local industry is under 
monopoly.  
Qui and Tao(2001) showed that LCR affects the firm’s modes of  entry to a market: 
export or FDI.  Their argument was that FDI is more likely to be adopted for a lower 
LCR.  They also asserted that less efficient firms are more likely to adopt the FDI mode 
than more efficient firms in case employment is the main source of  FDI benefit to the 
host country.  Yet, they conditioned that when technological upgrading is the main benefit 
to the host country, the local content rate can be higher for the more efficient firms. Their 
first argument shows that LCR can exert adverse impact on the FDI in the host country, 
and secondly, high LCR usually attract only less competitive firms to the host country. 
Overall, they concluded that LCR is a negative factor in terms of  FDI inflow. 
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At least, their second argument seems not really valid in the business world.  In 
fact, the most efficient firms are intensively engaging in overseas production.  It is 
because overseas production means higher risk for the investor than production at home 
country.  Operating the overseas plants without hitch and yielding decent level of  profits 
are something that firms with low efficiency and low competitiveness cannot manage.  
Besides, there are many counterexamples showing that local content requirements are not 
the sufficient condition for firm’s decision to choose between FDI and export.  For 
instance, there are many foreign firms building production facilities in China and Russia 
even though their local content requirement is tight.  Sometimes, firms adopt mixed 
strategies, FDI and export at the same time. 
More recently, there was a survey project done by European Round Table of  
Industrialists(ERT).  In the survey, 28 countries were scored ranging from 0 to 6 
according to the restrictiveness of  performance requirements.(0 for the most liberal 
countries and 6 for the most restrictive).  One of  the many interesting finding was the 
already low level of  performance requirements.13  Moreover, there was little link between 
the index of  performance requirements and the FDI stocks per capita.  The coefficient of  
LCR was statistically insignificant, which was the opposite to the firm belief  that 
performance requirements are impediments to inflow of  FDI.   
Surprisingly, there has been little evidence that LCR had negative determinant of  
FDI.  In fact, there were many examples showing that FDI was more prolific in countries 
with tighter LCRs.  One possible explanation to this seemingly contradiction is that there 
are other determinants with more direct influence on the FDI.  Another explanation is 
that countries imposing LCR usually offset the costs with other incentive offers for the 
foreign investor: i.e. government incentives and grants might have surpassed the cons of  
LCR.  Some scholars see the incentive competition to attract FDI is more distorting and 
detrimental to the FDI and economic welfare. Moran(1999) maintained that economic 
costs from host government incentives to the foreign investors and the performance 
requirements are equivalent.   
                                            
13 Average score was below 2 in 1992 and it declined to below 1 in 1999. 
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2) Observations on the Automotive Industry 
 
(1) Oligopolistic Structure: Imperfect Competition  
 
Before discussing the FDI determinants in the automotive industry, it is 
recommended that we understand the characteristics and particularity of  automotive 
industry shown in its historical development. 
Automotive industry requires large initial investment for building production 
facilities, and research and development, advertising, etc.  Therefore, economies of  scale 
are important in the automotive industry, in terms of  production and other management 
activities.  In this background, global manufacturers kept building large scale production 
facilities, and this further drove firms into much more fierce competition, and firms lacking 
in scale economy or competitiveness were weeded out, resulting in the oligopolization of  
the industry structure.  Many small size companies and brands were sold to surviving 
mass production brands.14  While the number of  makers has been decreasing since 
existing makers are merged and acquired by more efficient makers, there are far less new 
entrants into the industry due to the high entry barriers of  automotive industry: high 
capital cost and R&D necessity, etc.  
There was international oligopolization theory in the automotive industry.  It was 
predicted that there would be only 8~10 manufactures remaining through the 1980s, which 
did not happen yet.  With regards to the oligopolization of  automotive industry, Fujimoto 
presented three scenarios about what the world automotive industry is going to look like.   
 
i) Growing competition drives out marginal companies 
ii) Countries build higher barriers against other regions, thus forming blocs 
iii) Companies form multi-layered global network 
 
i) has been going on in the global automotive industry for the past decades: even 
GM was bankrupt in the aftermath of  Global Financial Crisis.  ii) is true in a figurative 
way, though it cannot literally happen because raising trade barriers over its binding level is 
against the international obligation under WTO.  Indeed, countries are forming regional 
blocs to protect its regional economy from competition from other blocs: examples are EU, 
ASEAN, Mercosur, etc.  In fact, Fujimoto picked iii) among these scenarios, as most 
probable one.  This perhaps describes the current status of  FDI by global companies.  
                                            
14 As of August 2009, Porsche was the only remaining premium brand that has been sustaining 
autonomy when it was finally acquired by Volkswagen Group. 
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<Table II-1> Number of World Automotive Manufacturers from 1960s to 2000s 
Car Maker 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
GM      
Ford      
Chrysler      
AMC      
Jeep      
Stude Baker      
American Total 6 4 4 3 2 
Ope(2)      
Vauxhall (2)      
BMW      
Mercedes-Benz      
VW      
Audi      
Porche      
Seat      
NSU      
Renault      
Citroen      
Pugeuot      
Simca/Talbot      
Alban      
Fiat      
Ferrari      
Avalt      
Auto Bianca      
Lancia      
Alfa Romeo      
Maserati/Tetomaso      
Innocenti      
Ramborghini      
Autstin/Maurice/BL      
AEC      
Jaguar      
Guy      
Conpentri Climax      
Reyland      
Triamph      
Rover      
Rolce-Royce      
Roots      
Lotus      
Aston Martin      
Volvo      
Saab      
Western Europe Total 35 22 17 12 6 
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Toyota      
Nissan      
Matsuda      
Honda      
Mitshubishi      
Daihatsu      
Suzuki      
Fuji Heavy Industry      
Isuzu      
Prince      
Hino      
Japanese Total 10 9 9 9 5 
Hyundai      
Daewoo      
Kia      
Samsung      
Tata      
Mahindra & Mahindra      
Proton      
Perodua      
FAW      
Dongfeng Motors      
SAIC      
Chang’an Motors      
Beijing Motors      
Geely      
Chery      
Other Asian Total3) 6 7 12 15 12 
Grand Total 57 42 42 39 25 
Source: updated from Fujimoto (1995) 
Note: 1) M&Aed firm is not counted.  
     2) Opel and Vauxhall were acquired by GM in 1920s. 
3) Currently, almost 120 local makers exist in China. Only major makers are listed. 
 
The table shows reduction in the number of  auto makers and it evidently shows 
clear trend of  oligopolization.  In forty years, the number of  automobile manufacturers 
halved.  Oligopolization takes place first in a country, and then in a region and finally in 
the global market.  In the United States, there were 324 automobile makers in 1920.  
Now only 3 of  them are left.  In china, it is known that almost 120 local makers are 
operating.  Eventually, most of  them will disappear and only major players will survive.  
This restructuring and oligopolization is accelerated by M&A among makers.  Mergers & 
acquisition occurred frequently in the automotive industry, especially in 1960s and late 
1990s.  As was shown in the table in the previous section, number of  makers decreased 
sharply from 1960s to 1970s, and once again from 1990s to 2000s. 
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<Table II-2> History of M&A in the Automotive Industry 
year 
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm 
Type of M&A 
Company  Nationality Company  Nationality 
1965 VW Germany Audi Germany acquired 90% 
1966 Nissan Japan Prince Japan Merger 
1968 Fiat Italy Auto-bianca Italy Acquired 100% 
1969 Fiat Italy Lancia Italy Acquired 100% 
1974 Peugeot France Citroen France merger 
1978 PSA France Talbot France Merger 
1986 VW Germany SEAT Spain Acquired 100% 
1987 
Fiat Italy Alfa Romeo Italy Acquired 100% 
Chrysler US AMC US merger 
1989 
Ford US Jaguar UK Acquired 100% 
GM US Saab Sweden Acquired 50% 
1990 VW Germany Skoda Czech Acquired 70% 
1994 BMW Germany Rover UK Acquired 100% 
1996 Ford US Mazda Japan Acquired 33.4% 
1998 
Hyundai Korea Kia Korea  
Proton Malaysia Lotus England Acquired 80% 
Daimler-Benz Germany Chrysler US Merger 
1999 Ford US Volvo Sweden Acquired 
2000 
Ford US Land Rover Germany(BMW) Acquired 
Renault France Samsung Korea Acquired 70% 
Daimler- 
Chrysler Germany Mitsubishi Japan Acquired 34% 
2002 GM US Daewoo Korea Acquired 51% 
2005 SAIC China Ssangyong Korea Acquired 50% 
2007 Cerberus US Chrysler US Acquired 80% 
2008 Tata India Jaguar Land Rover US(Ford) 
Acquired 
 
2009 Volkswagen Germany Porche Germany Acquired 
2010 Geely China Volvo US(Ford) Acquired 
Note: Cerberus Capital Management is a private equity fund, not OEM. 
 
As a consequence of  this oligopolization, almost every world leading auto maker is 
mega-corporation.  There are more than 100 vehicle manufacturers on the globe, and 
about half  of  them are mass production firms and global Top 10 makers are producing 
more than 70% of  the total global production, and global Top 5 are producing about half  
of  total global production.  This concentrated firm structure by the global oligopolization 
much affected the unique feature and characteristic of  automotive industry, and 
consequently influenced the shaping of  FDI and value chain system.  To sum up, scale 
economies of  automotive industry contributed to what it now looks like, i.e. oligopolistic 
 32 
structure, and this again brought about the unique FDI pattern of  automotive industry. 
 
<Figure II-1> World vehicle production share by top 10 makers (%) 
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Source: Marklines(2008) 
 
(2) Production Pulled by Demand 
 
FDI in the automotive industry is concentrated into roughly three regions: Asia, 
North America, and Europe.  The reason why FDI is rushing to these regions is because 
they are the biggest sales markets.  Until 1990s, the relative importance of  Asia has been 
weaker than Europe and North America.  In the early years, FDI has been more active in 
the Western hemisphere.  However, as sales in Asia ballooned during the past decade, FDI 
is rushing to this region.  Production in Asia has almost doubled during the past decade, 
18 million units in 2000 to over 30 million units in 2009.  From <Figure II->, it can be 
confirmed that global production in Asia takes almost half  of  the global production in 
2009.   
By comparing the two graphs in the next page, it can be found that vehicles are 
mostly produced where they are sold, although it does not match perfectly.  Sales in Asia 
in 2009 were about 20 million units, while production was over 30 million units.  
Production growing faster than sales signifies that Asia is the production base for the 
global market.  At any rate, overall production follows sales distribution in general.   
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<Figure II-2> World Vehicle Sales by Region from 1995-200915(million units) 
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<Figure II-3> World Vehicle Production by Region from 1995-2009(million units) 
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15 The sales in Asia has been increasing, except in 1998.  The slide in this year was due to the Asian 
financial crisis that hit hard Korea and most of the ASEAN countries.  
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This might seem like a natural phenomenon, but it is often not the case in other 
industries.  Sturgeon(2009) also noted on the distinctive feature of  globalization in the 
automotive industry.  He compared automotive industry with other globalized industries 
such as apparel and electronics industry which shows global-scale patterns of  integration; 
e.g. Apple’s iPods are sold worldwide while they are produced and supplied from a few 
assembly plants in China.  On the other hand, plants of  auto makers are more scattered 
around the world. 
Besides, this looks contradictory to the characteristic of  the automotive industry: 
increasing returns to scale.  The fragmentation of  production units by region or market 
base is disadvantageous to realize the economies of  scale.  If  the location is broken down 
to country level, it might look a little different, but at the regional level, it can be concluded 
that production base pretty much follows the market.   
 
(3) Relatively High Local Content Rate 
 
Pertaining to the reason why local content in the automotive industry is higher 
than other manufacturing industries, especially electronics, Kuroiwa(2006) sympathized 
with Baba(2005) in that there are three primary factors:  transportation costs, industry 
architecture, and industrial or trade policy of  the host government.   
Parts and components used in motor vehicles are much larger and heavier than 
those used in electronic goods.  That is, higher transportation costs affect assemblers and 
OEMs’ decision to procure parts and components from local supplier.  Trim parts such as 
injection moldings are cheap and easy to produce but bulky so that its transportation costs 
are high.  In general, bulky items such as pressed bodies, chassis, or plastic injections are 
better produced locally.  Engines are both large and heavy so that they are also often 
produced or assembled locally.16   
Thus, when vehicle manufacturers build plants in a foreign country it usually 
accompanies suppliers to be located in the vicinity.  Usually, most of  the major tier-1 
suppliers join the overseas production.  Thus, global OEMs build their supply networks in 
the overseas production base.  On the other hand, electronic companies’ FDI do not 
bring many subcontractors to the foreign production base.  They mostly import parts and 
intermediate goods from various global suppliers from all over the world.   
 
                                            
16 On the other hand, electronic components such as ECU(Electronic Control Unit) or airbags are small 
in volume and expensive: so their unit price is high whereas unit transportation cost is low. Those are 
ideal items for shipment.  Usually, electronic parts and important functional components are imported 
from home country. 
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<Table II-3> Local content rates in the Automotive and Electronics Industry 
Industry Local Content IND PHI THA MAL SIN AVE 
Automotive 
Industry 
Local 
Content(90) 77.8 66.6 53.7 56.8 53.2 61.6 
ASEAN 
Content(90) 78.3 67.2 55.0 57.5 57.1 63.0 
Local 
Content(00) 83.7 66.4 59.8 68.5 58.7 67.4 
ASEAN 
Content(00) 84.5 71.5 61.9 72.2 63.5 70.7 
Electronics 
Industry 
Local 
Content(90) 66.1 52.2 40.5 56.2 47.3 52.5 
ASEAN 
Content(90) 69.2 58.4 51.2 64.6 55.5 59.8 
Local 
Content(00) 80.6 34.5 39.1 36.6 50.1 48.2 
ASEAN 
Content(00) 82.4 42.7 50.8 53.8 61.0 58.1 
Source: Asian International Input-Output Tables (1990, 2000) 
 
<Table II-3> adds evidence to this observations.  Comparing local content rates 
between automotive and electronic industry in the same country at the same year, it is 
always higher in the automotive industry in all countries.  
Secondly, as for the industry architecture, Kuroiwa cited example of  Toyota’s 
JIT(Just-In-Time) production system17 which necessitates geographical proximity. Timely 
coordination between parts supplier and assembler is crucial part of  JIT, and thus 
promotes local procurement.  This kind of  production system is common not only in 
other Japanese OEMs but also in Korean OEMs18.  Perhaps, this is the underlying reason 
why Japanese makers, in general, show high localization in the overseas production 
compared to American or European Makers.  
Architecture of  the automotive industry is another reason. 19  These days, 
modularization is in progress in automotive industry.  However, automotive industry’s 
architecture is more integral rather than modular compared to electronic industry, and parts 
                                            
17 Just-in-time production system is an inventory strategy that reduces in-process inventory, producing 
quality products through the elimination of waste, inconsistencies, and unreasonable requirements on the 
production line.  
18 Hyundai, with its JIS(Just-in-sequence) system which is almost identical to the JIT, exhibits also high 
rate of local content rate.  JIS is a supply management skill that emphasizes sequence as well as time.  
19 Fujimoto (2004) classified industries into three types according to their architecture: closed integral 
industry, closed modular industry, and open modular industry.  Typical examples of closed integral 
architecture include automotive industry, motorcycle industry, and game software industry.  The two 
most common closed modular industries are main frame computer and Lego.  Lastly, open modular 
architecture is observed in PC system, internet products, bicycles, and financial products.    
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and components of  motor vehicles are not readily substituted by other suppliers.  
Therefore, when OEMs manufactures in foreign countries, they often continue to purchase 
parts and components from their home countries.  To shift the supply channel, they need 
time to build relationship with local suppliers or they rather choose to be accompanied by 
the home country suppliers. 
 
3) Raising Questions and Hypotheses 
 
As previously mentioned, Dunning found that there were four types of  direct 
foreign investment: resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic-
asset-investment.  Among the various elements in resources including raw material, 
intermediate goods, labor cost, etc, labor cost would be the most relevant variable.  
Market-seeking activity is well understood intuitively.  Market related variables are sales 
volume, GDP, annual economic growth and so on.  Efficiency here indicates efficiency in 
the production.  Resource is generally an important factor for MNCs when choosing the 
location of  overseas production, but in the automotive industry its significance is relatively 
limited.20  
However, in the real cases, consideration on labor cost comes next to market 
related factors.  Firms first choose the region or targeted market based on the market size 
and potential of  growth, and then picks the plant site considering other various factors. 
Thus, resource is the secondary consideration in case of  automotive industry. 
For example, when Hyundai/Kia decides to build production plant in Czech and 
Slovakia, the decision is based on the fact that those two countries are abundant with 
skilled labor at cheap cost among European countries, but this decision comes next to the 
preceding decision of  choosing Europe as the firm’s next target market.  In other words, 
market related variables are macroscopic factors which firms consider when establishing 
the business strategy, whereas labor costs and other resource related variables are more 
microscopic factors, considered when working out the concrete action plan. 
For MNCs manufacturing automobiles, the most important motivation would be 
market-seeking behavior.  In practice, this type of  behavior can be divided to two 
subgroups; basically, when firms try to enter the market for its size and growth potential, 
and another scenario is when the targeted market is highly protected and thus hard to 
penetrate by export.  Developing countries usually raise high trade barriers in automotive 
sector for a number of  reasons.  Thus local production is a useful and sometimes the only 
                                            
20 For example, firms in the electronics industry usually consider resource factors first, such as labor 
costs, rents, access to raw materials, and then the market size.   
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viable option for multinational auto makers in entering these markets.  Almost every 
global manufacturer is rushing to China and India to build plants.   
Besides, there came another type of  market-seeking activity.  Recently, bilateral 
and regional integration has been proliferating among many developing countries as well as 
developed countries.  By building production facilities where regional bloc is formed or 
expected to be formed, auto makers can enjoy enlarged market, exporting vehicles duty 
free to the country’s free trade bloc.  Kia and Hyundai Motor Company’s Slovakia and 
Czech plants are the instance.  Czech and Slovakia were not members of  EU at the 
moment of  Kia/Hyundai’s decision to build Greenfield plants in these countries, but they 
were expected soon to be admitted to the European Union and in 2004, they became the 
members of  EU.  Kia Motors Slovakia started production in December 2006, and 
Hyundai Czech plant construction began in April 2007.  Vehicles produced in these 
Central European plants are exported to Western Europe as well as other Eastern 
European countries.   
Efficiency-seeking investments are typically vertical investment: FDI in the 
intermediate goods in foreign countries to supply complete vehicle assembly plants in other 
locations.  Strategic-asset-seeking investment does not yet explain much about overseas 
production in the automotive industry. systematic division in the parts and components 
industry, and strategic partnership between foreign investor and local maker. 
   
Hypothesis 1 
Market related factors are the most significant determinant in the automotive 
manufacturers’ FDI. 
 
It is generally believed that investment restrictions affect foreign direct investment 
in a negative way, deterring FDI inflow.  However, ironically, we see a host of  auto makers 
construct production facilities in developing countries where there usually are all kinds of  
trade and investment restrictions.  If  a host country’s market is attractive enough, 
investors can willingly take the terms and conditions of  investment that host country 
presents.  The investor will decide to invest in the host country regardless of  the existence 
of  any performance requirements as long as the gains from investment surpass the cost of  
satisfying the requirements; i.e. the equilibrium is determined where the value of  
investment equals cost of  entering the market. 
The matrix below shows firms’ behaviors under different markets and different 
investment environment.  Firms would plainly decide to make investments in an attractive 
market with FDI friendly environment; however, they would not make investment in an 
 38 
unattractive market, and it is less likely if  it is burdened with tight rules and regulations.   
However, it is not obvious in the case of  c and d.   
 
<Table II-4> Firm’s investment decision matrix 
 Tight regulations  Investor-friendly environment 
Attractive market c Invest 
Unattractive market Do not invest d 
 
Even under tight regulations, firms could invest in the country, if  the market is 
very promising.  On the other hand, even under investment friendly environment, firms 
could decide not to enter a market, if  it does not offer decent market opportunity.  One 
good example of  c is China.  In China, there are relatively high barriers to investors in 
the stage of  admission and operation as well.  Foreign firms are often required to build 
R&D facility, mainly aimed at technology transfer.  Also, local procurement is highly 
encouraged, and their ownership is restricted.  However, foreign manufacturers are willing 
to make investments in this market and indeed there are hardly any major auto makers not 
having presence in China because they are sure that it will pay off.21  On the other hand, 
countries with virtually no investment barriers but small market size scarcely attract foreign 
direct investments.   
Thus, what we can witness regarding the relationship between investment and 
regulatory environment in the real world is that market overrules rules.  Second 
hypothesis of  this empirical study are related to this observation. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Presence of  local content requirement in the host country does not adversely affect the 
FDI inflow to the country.  
 
If  we get both of  the expected results from the empirical analysis, we would be 
able to conclude that increasing returns to scale is the most important feature in the 
automotive industry.  This can also provide with underlying cause of  the oligopolistic 
structure of  global automotive industry.  
 
                                            
21 There are 22 foreign OEMs in China as of the end of 2009.  
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2. Empirical Verification in the Automotive Industry 
 
1) Methodology and data 
 
(1) Model and Variables 
 
To work on our two hypotheses, we need an econometric model to see what 
determines the inflow of  FDI to the country.  As we have already discussed, firms 
generally consider demand and supply conditions of  the host country when deciding FDI 
location.  These variables include market size, growth potential, labor costs, trade 
openness, business friendliness, etc.  Thus, inflow of  FDI is a function of  these variables: 
positive function of  market size, economic growth, trade openness, etc and negative 
function of  labor costs, level of  restrictions, corruption, etc. 
 
FDI=f(Market size, Growth, Wage, Trade openness, Business friendliness, …) 
 
Among these variables, market size and growth potential are the traditional 
variables in the gravity models of  international trade, although distance was not considered 
in this model.  Wage and other cost factors are reflection of  cost-minimizing and 
efficiency maximizing firm’s strategy.   Trade openness has relevance with FDI, in that 
there is substitutional relationship between FDI and trade.  Variables regarding business 
friendliness can include various institutional factors and general infrastructure.  Thus, we 
come up with our model: 
 
FDIi= ß0+ ß1GDPit+ ß2.Growthit                        (2.1) 
+ ß3.Wageit + ß4Taxit + ß5CPI  
+ ß6.Tariffit + ß7.PTAit +  
+ ß8LCR + εit 
 
The dependent variable FDI was measured by number of  foreign OEMs operating 
in country i during the year, instead of  FDI inflow to the country in dollar terms.  The 
reason I used number of  foreign OEMs over FDI inflow data is first, consistent cross-
country data on industry level FDI inflow in monetary term could not be found.  They 
were mostly presented in broader industry categories, and sometimes denominated in their 
national currencies.  Second reason is because the FDI inflows are usually captured by 
balance of  payment accounts, which understate capital spending of  foreign manufacturers 
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in the host country.  There have been cases in the existing literature where firm entry was 
used as dependent variable.22  
GDP is a proxy for market size.  It should exhibit significant positive sign, as 
growing demand and market opportunity was the primary motivation for global makers’ 
FDI.  In the similar context, GDP growth can be also a significant estimator because it 
signifies market potential.  Wage is the factor price that the firm employs in production 
activity.  It is expected to show negative coefficient because it is the cost of production. 
Tax denotes corporate income tax: this is also expected to show negative sign because this 
is also a sort of cost for the firm.  CPI is a corruption perceived index, indicating the level 
of corruption or transparency in the country.  Tax and CPI are barometer of  business 
environment of  the country.  Tariff  and PTA are variables related to openness to trade.  
Since tariff  is cost of  exportation, higher the tariff, firms have more incentives to make 
FDI in the country.  Therefore, positive coefficient is expected from tariff.  PTA is 
number of  countries that country i has preferential trade arrangement.  As value of  PTA 
is higher, firms have more incentives to make production base in that country to make use 
of  the network of  preferential trade relation with other countries.  LCR is an investment 
measure of  host country on the foreign investor.  It restricts investor’s supply chain 
management, and thus it could exert negative effect on the FDI.   
From this empirical analysis, we will figure out which determinant is the most 
crucial factor in firm’s decision to make FDI in a certain location.  It also tries to prove 
that investment regulation effect business friendly environment is much less than other 
factors such as macroeconomic conditions and market potentials, etc.  Further, it tries to 
show that those investment regulations have minimal effect on firms’ investment decisions.  
However, this study could be differentiated from previous studies in that the subject is 
confined to local content in the automotive industry and its impact on FDI inflow in the 
industry.   
Through this empirical work, the two hypotheses will be investigated; which 
determinants have most relevance with firms’ FDI decision; whether local content 
regulations adversely affect FDI inflow.   
                                            
22 Orr(1974) and Mata(1993)’s firm entry model postulated the relationship between the entry rate and 
other factors as such.  Geroski(1991) also used firm entry model in that rate of entry into a market is 
positively related to the level of expected post-entry profits, which depend on the level of barriers to entry 
and other structural factors of the market.  Following is the equation of the firm entry model: 
Ei= ß0+ß1Growthit+ß2.SIZEit+ ß3.AGEit + ß4.MNCit + ß5.MESit+εit 
This model was originally designed to estimate the indigenous firm entry by the inflow of FDI and other 
factors, but here we made some modifications to measure the relationship between foreign firm’s entry 
and other variables.  
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(2) Data and Sample 
 
(a) Number of  Foreign OEMs 
 
This data was obtained in the IHS Global Insight.  The number was counted based on 
foreign makers producing more than 100 units of  vehicles in the year.   
 
(b) Macroeconomic data  
 
GDP, per capita GDP, and annual GDP growth were obtained in IMF database.  GDP 
and GDP per capita are in current prices, whereas annual percentage change is based on 
real GDP.  GDP and GDP per capita in all countries are denominated in US dollar.  
GDP indicates market size, and GDP growth signifies growth potential of  the market.  
Both of  them are expected to show positive coefficient.  
 
(c) Average Wage in the Automotive Industry 
 
Wage includes all payments in cash or in kind paid to "employees" during the reference 
year in relation to work done for the establishment.  The average wage was calculated 
from the total wage and salaries paid in the automotive industry(ISIC 34) divided by the 
total number of employees in the industry.  
 
(d) Corporate Income Tax 
 
Corporate tax rate was mostly obtained in OECD database, and non-OECD member’s 
data was from various sources.  This variable can be a barometer showing the business 
friendliness of  the host country, and also it composes the cost of  the firm.  Therefore, 
this variable is expected to have negative coefficient.  
 
(d) CPI(Corruption Perceived Index) 
 
CPI is the extent of  corruption perceived by business people and country analysts, ranging 
from 0 to 10.  Higher the value, more transparent is the society.  It is surveyed and 
released annually by an international organization called Transparency International.  It 
can be also interpreted as barometer of  business friendliness.  It is expected to show 
positive correlation to the FDI.  
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(e) Tariff 
 
Information on tariff  was mostly found in WTO and in some cases, in national statistics 
sites on trade affairs.  Sometimes they offer weighted average of  tariffs within tariff  
chapter (in this case Chapter 87) based on the trade volume, but more countries do not 
report weighted average.  Here, only HS 8703(passenger vehicles) was used: excluding HS 
8702(buses), 8704(commercial vehicles) and other parts and accessories used to make HS 
8702, 8703, and 8704.  Under HS 8703, there are numerous tariff  lines based on engine 
types and engine displacements, and sometimes tariff  rates for each tariff  items are 
different.  In that case, the highest applied rate was used.  
 
(f) Number of  PTA 
 
The data regarding PTA was mostly obtained from the WTO website.  For countries that 
joined WTO later than the launch of  WTO in 1995, information regarding the PTA was 
not available.  In such cases, various national sources were complemented.  PTA include 
all forms of  economic integration arrangement whose degree of  integration is higher than 
Free Trade Agreement(FTA).  Thus, Customs Union and Economic Union are also 
counted.   
 
(g) Local Content Requirement 
 
Information on local content requirements was mostly found in WTO TPRM report, and 
various other policy documents of  individual countries.   As mentioned before, local 
content requirements were hard to present in numeric term.  More detailed information 
on how the LCR was actually implementation can be found in the Appendix II.  For the 
empirical analysis, it is represented as binary value, indicating the presence(1) or absence(0) 
of  the requirement.  Also, considering that it takes years for the policy to take full effect, 
we used lagged value by 3 years. 
 
Most of  the independent variables are pertaining to the national economy except 
(b) and (e).  The two variables are data specific to the automotive industry.  Existing 
studies on FDI determinant analyze the national economy or general manufacturing 
industry, or service industry as their object of  research.  However, narrowing the scope of  
the research to automotive industry, this study aims to show that FDI determinant in the 
automotive industry are distinguished from other industry. 
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The sample is in the form of  panel data of  covering 42 countries which produces 
vehicles and regularly publish production data. The countries not producing vehicles were 
excluded from the sample, because it can lead to paradoxical results like countries with 
favorable environment for investment have zero FDI.  Approximately 50 countries have 
automotive industry, but not all of  them provide with official data regarding the vehicle 
production. The time period of  analysis is from 1995 to 2006.  The reason the period was 
limited to 2006 is because as of  2010, not many data pertaining to automotive industry is 
available from 2007.   
 
<Table II-5> Summary Statistics 
 obs mean Std. dev. min value 
max 
value 
unit of 
measure 
No. of Foreign 
OEMs 504 6.359 4.666 0 22 Number 
GDP 504 756.559 1703.765 12 13399 Billion $ 
Wage 364 10767.38 10382.08 311.56 116274.1 US $ 
Growth Rate 504 3.66 3.35 -13 12 % 
LCR 504 0.34127 0.47460 0 1 Binary 
RTA 504 13.88 12.62 0 43 Number 
Tariff 442 37.22 54.49 0 300 % 
Corporate Tax 500 33.092 6.907 15 56.8 % 
 
<Table II-6> Correlation Matrix 
 fOEM GDP wage Growth LCR RTA tariff CPI Tax 
fOEM 1.000         
GDP* 0.105 1.000        
wage* -0.262 0.312 1.000       
Growth 0.130 -0.058 -0.139 1.000      
LCR 0.275 -0.395 -0.395 -0.059 1.000     
RTA -0.213 -0.127 0.393 -0.019 -0.431 1.000    
Tariff 0.417 -0.214 -0.381 0.042 0.407 -0.297 1.000   
CPI -0.429 0.204 0.516 -0.122 -0.464 0.435 -0.382 1.000  
Tax 0.033 0350 0.276 -0.112 -0.054 -0.137 -0.171 0.137 1.000 
Note: * In the correlation, this variable is included as ln(variable) 
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(3) Econometric Specification 
 
Since our goal was to find the determinant of  FDI among various economic and 
institutional variables with regards to the location, but not the time-series effect, we do not 
need to employ panel approach for our FDI model.  Basically, we used Pooled OLS.  
Since all the observations are single independent, there are some assumptions to be made 
when using pooled OLS.  
 
(1) E( )= 0, for all i and t 
(2) var( )= , for all i and t 
(3) cov( )= 0, for all i≠j and t≠s 
(4) cov( )= 0, for all i and t 
 
However, since our dataset is in panel structure, there remain a couple of  problems 
using pooled OLS.  It does not consider country specific effects, and therefore the 
composite errors can be serially correlated.  In that case, the pooled OLS method fails to 
address the issue of  unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity.  Therefore, to fix the 
heteroskedasticity problem, we used panel GLS and between effects method to see the 
genuine cross-country effect of  each variable. 
 
2) Result of  Regression 
 
(1) Basic Model 
 
From regressions using our basic model (2.1), we obtained similar results, but the 
number of  statistically significant variables were fewer in the between effects model than 
the other two equations.  GDP and tariff  were significant in all three equations at 1% 
level.  This can be interpreted that market size and trade barrier matters most for the 
multinational companies as FDI determinant.  Number of  PTA and LCR showed positive 
coefficient in all three equations, and PTA was significant in the Pooled OLS model, LCR 
in the Pooled OLS and Panel GLS.  Thus, number of  PTA also positively affected the 
FDI as expected.  Engaging in preferential trade agreement such as FTA has the market 
size boosting effect, since it enhances market access to other countries.  CPI was 
negatively related with FDI in all three equations, and significant in the first two regressions. 
This is contrary to our expectation; rather there were more FDI in less transparent 
countries.  Wage and tax showed negative coefficients as expected, but they were weak 
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estimator of  FDI. Growth rate, which was expected to be also an important factor, were 
not significant, either. 
 
<Table II-7> Regression Results of Basic Model(n=344) 
FDI (1)Pooled OLS (2)Panel GLS (3) Between Effects 
ln(GDP) 
1.541*** 
(0.172) 
1.637*** 
(0.083) 
2.071*** 
(0.577) 
GDP Growth 0.096 (0.064) 
0.027 
(0.031) 
0.259 
(0.319) 
ln(Wage) -0.424 (0.278) 
-0.149 
(0.153) 
-0.238 
(0.824) 
Tariff 0.035*** (0.005) 
0.041*** 
(0.003) 
0.040** 
(0.016) 
Tax -0.003 (0.031) 
-0.034* 
(0.017) 
-0.019 
(0.120) 
PTA 0.041** (0.017) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.041 
(0.071) 
CPI -0.597*** (0.111) 
-0.576*** 
(0.064) 
-0.416 
(0.353) 
LCR 1.818*** (0.549) 
1.436*** 
(0.290) 
3.508 
(2.291) 
R-square 0.4292  0.5253 
LR test - Chi-sq=1696.77 Prob(Chi sq)=0.0000 - 
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
From this result, it can be inferred that market size and cost of  export is the most 
significant factor, while wage and corporate tax level are not critical factors of  
consideration when firms make investment decision.  Since tariff  jumping behavior of  
firms can be interpreted as an attempt to enhance market access, tariff  can be also 
categorized as market related variable.  Thus, our first hypothesis was verified: market-
related factors are the most significant determinant in the automotive manufacturer’s FDI 
decision.  In other words, FDI in the automotive industry is demand-side-pulled 
investment rather than supply-side motivated.  Wage, corporate tax, and transparency are 
variables related to production cost, and they turned out to be not as influential as the 
above factors. 
In addition, it turned out that presence of  local content requirement does not 
negatively affect FDI.  It showed positive coefficient, and in some equations, they were 
significant.  This is more meaningful result, because here FDI is limited to car 
manufacturing industry.  It could be the case that LCR positively affects to FDI in the 
parts manufacturing industry, but negatively affects FDI in the car manufacturing industry.  
Thus, our second hypothesis was verified as well.  
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(2) Model with Interaction Variables 
 
By intuition, growth rate seem to be positive determinant for FDI because growth 
potential of  the market is important factor for global OEMs.  Global makers’ rush to 
China and India is primarily based on market size itself, but another important factor is 
motorization.  When a country enters into motorization stage, the demand soars.  In 
general, motorization begins when a country is industrialized or when there is growing 
middle class in the demography.  That is, motorization is highly related to growth rate or 
income level.  When a country’s economy grows at high speed, usually motorization 
follows: the United States in 1920s, Korea in 1970s, China since 2000, etc.  Thus, 
historically GDP growth is highly correlated with motorization.  However, it was not 
significant in our analysis.   
Then, we presume that growth rate alone is not a significant estimator of  FDI 
inflow, but it might have relevance when it is combined with market size.   In a fast 
growing country where market size is not large enough, motorization can still happen, but 
it is not an attractive factor so as to induce FDI.  Rather, firms will choose exportation to 
these markets.  Thus, we added interaction variable of  GDP and growth rate,  
ln(GDP)*Growth, in the Pooled OLS regression.  
 
<Table II-8> Regression with Growth Interaction Variables(n=344) 
FDI (1) (2) (3)  
ln(GDP) 
1.541*** 
(0.172) 
0.850*** 
(0.223) 
1.393*** 
(0.177) 
Growth 0.096 (0.064) 
-0.965*** 
(0.248) - 
Ln(GDP)*Growth - 0.210*** (0.045) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
ln(Wage) -0.424 (0.278) 
-0.215 
(0.269) 
-0.241 
(0.274) 
Tariff 0.035*** (0.005) 
0.038*** 
(0.005) 
0.035*** 
(0.005) 
Tax -0.003 (0.031) 
0.012 
(0.030) 
-0.002 
(0.030) 
PTA 0.041** (0.017) 
0.040** 
(0.017) 
0.036** 
(0.017) 
CPI -0.597*** (0.111) 
-0.619*** 
(0.108) 
-0.619*** 
(0.111) 
LCR 1.818*** (0.549) 
1.305** 
(0.537) 
1.749*** 
(0.535) 
R-square 0.4292 0.4584 0.4340 
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
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The interaction variable had positive effect on FDI inflow as we hypothesized.  
While coefficient of  ln(GDP)*Growth was significantly positive, the coefficient of  Growth 
instead turned to negative.  Therefore, in the equation (3), the original variable ‘Growth’ 
was dropped, and the interaction variable still showed significant positive coefficient, 
although the magnitude of  the coefficient decreased.  That is, firms decide FDI based on 
growth rate only when market size is big enough.  From this result, we find that growth 
rate is jointly significant with market size.  However, from a different angle, this is 
reinforcing evidence that market size is the primary consideration for FDI decision.   
Similar process was replicated with Wage variable.  Wage is certainly not a trivial 
factor in firm’s overall operation and investment decision.  As in the case of  growth rate, 
we suppose that wage alone is not significant, but it can be significant and relevant variable 
when combined with other variables, i.e. GDP.  Exactly the same thing happened here:, 
the interaction variable was significant and negative, while the original wage variable 
became positive in equation (2).  We drop the wage variable, and the interaction variable 
maintains the significant coefficient, while the magnitude decreased.  Again, wage was 
jointly significant with GDP.  This can be interpreted that firms decide to invest in a 
country not just because wage level is low, but when it is coupled with large size market.  
Wage is an important factor, but next to market size.  
 
<Table II-9> Regression with Wage Interaction Variables(n=344) 
FDI (1) (2) (3)  
ln(GDP) 
1.541*** 
(0.172) 
8.330*** 
(1.223) 
2.816*** 
(0.487) 
Growth 0.103 (0.064) 
0.027 
(0.062) 
0.067 
(0.064) 
ln(Wage) -0.312 (0.275) 
3.920*** 
(0.779) - 
Ln(GDP)*ln(Wage) - -0.763*** (0.132) 
-0.136*** 
(0.046) 
Tariff 0.035*** (0.005) 
0.036*** 
(0.005) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
Tax -0.007 (0.031) 
0.013 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.031) 
PTA 0.036** (0.017) 
0.031* 
(0.017) 
0.040*** 
(0.017) 
CPI -0.623*** (0.111) 
-0.622*** 
(0.106) 
-0.541*** 
(0.109) 
LCR 1.752*** (0.542) 
1.694*** 
(0.517) 
1.664*** 
(0.536) 
R-square 0.4265 0.4784 0.4389 
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 48 
(3) Regional Sample Model 
 
Regional distribution of  FDI has changed over the last century.  In the early years, 
FDI has been more active in the Western hemisphere.  FDI proliferated first in Europe, 
and was followed by North America including the United States since1980s.  Recently, it 
moved to Asia, especially China and India.  As demand in Asia ballooned during the past 
decade, FDI is rushing to this region.  From the historical perspective, we can also draw 
implication that market opportunity was the key motivation in the FDI. 
In a spatial or geographic aspect, another implication is that FDI in different 
locations can be explained by different determinants and motivations.  For example, 
rationale of  FDI in the advanced economies like Europe and the US can be found in the 
market size.  Sometimes they can be attributed to the political pressure as explained in 
Chapter I.  On the other hand, FDI in developing countries, such as India, ASEAN 
countries, and China can be explained by growth potential and high tariffs as well market 
size.  FDI in South American countries were mainly in order to circumvent the high 
barriers to trade.   
 
<Table II-10> Different patterns and motivations of FDI by Region 
Region Motivation Makers 
Europe Market, Resource GM, Ford, Toyota, Hyundai 
North America Market, Politics Japanese Big3, Hyundai 
South America Barrier Circumvention US Big3, Fiat, Toyota 
China, India Market, Barrier Circumvention GM, Ford, Japanese Hyundai 
Southeast Asia Market, Barrier Circumvention Japanese Big3 
 
Thus, narrowing the sample to countries in the same region, we might get different 
result and that would give us implications about the regional characteristics of  FDI pattern.  
We now analyze with Asian 12 countries with our basic model, using Pooled OLS, Panel 
GLS, and between effects model.  <Table II-11> shows that GDP, wage, tariff, number 
of  PTA, transparency, and LCR were significant estimators in Asia.  Between effects 
model was weak in that not many variables was significant, probably due to limited sample 
groups.   
Comparing the result with our full same analysis in <Table II-7>, result is 
somewhat different.  The magnitude of  GDP and number of  PTA’s coefficient grew 
bigger, while that of  tariff  became weaker.  LCR still is positive and significant coefficient, 
and the magnitude of  coefficient increased.  It would be possible to interpret that LCR’s 
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investment inducing effect is bigger in the Asian region.  If  the dependent variable was 
denominated as number of  foreign owned establishments including the parts supplier, the 
result would have been more evident.    
On the other hand, tax was not significant estimator in Asia, either.  Most notable 
difference is that wage variable is now significant in equation (1) and (2).  Thus, wage was 
not a significant estimator in the full sample, but narrowing the sample to a more 
homogeneous group of  countries, it became significant.  This can be interpreted in 
several ways: first, FDI made in this region was more based on wage factor consideration 
than other region.  Second is that limiting the scope of  option for FDI location to Asian 
region, wage became an important factor.  To find out which interpretation would explain 
the result better, we do one more regional analysis with Europe.   
 
<Table II-11> FDI determinant in Asian region(n=78) 
FDI (1)Pooled OLS (2)Panel GLS (3) Between Effects 
ln(GDP) 
2.589*** 
(0.601) 
1.594*** 
(0.477) 
4.901* 
(1.207) 
GDP Growth 0.040 (0.107) 
0.062 
(0.055) 
-0.041 
(0.458) 
ln(Wage) -0.992* (0.567) 
-1.054*** 
(0.366) 
1.183 
(1.425) 
Tariff 0.026*** (0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.023) 
Tax -0.101 (0.106) 
-0.033 
(0.029) 
-0.482 
(0.308) 
PTA 0.247*** (0.052) 
0.167*** 
(0.039) 
0.274 
(0.150) 
CPI -1.295*** (0.406) 
-1.061*** 
(0.176) 
0.237 
(1.104) 
LCR 4.975*** (1.346) 
2.809*** 
(0.844) 
24.606* 
(6.233) 
R-square 0.5970  0.9583 
LR test  Chi Sq=89.78 Prob(Chi sq)=0.0000  
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
 
Now we narrow the full sample to EU member countries, excluding Russia, Turkey, 
and Ukraine.  The sample includes 17 countries and 161 observations.  The result shown 
in <Table II-12> is strikingly different from both the basic model analysis and the Asian 
region analysis.  Wage variable, which became important factor in Asia was still 
insignificant, and it showed even positive relationship with FDI in equation (2).  On the 
other hand, corporate tax became significant estimator in Europe.  LCR, which used to be 
positive factor both in Asia and worldwide, turned out to be negative factor, though it was 
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only significant in the Pooled OLS model.  Perhaps this result corresponds with the 
former findings and conclusion of  many economists and researchers in Europe: that 
presence of  LCR in the country does not help promote but undermine the free flow of  
investment.  It can be presumed that the investment diverting effect of  LCR can prove 
right in the developed world.  
The most notable difference can be seen in the tariff  and PTA.  These two 
variables were very powerful determinant in the previous two analyses, but in Europe they 
were all insignificant and the sign is negative.  How can we interpret this result?  We can 
apply the two kinds of  interpretation from Asian region case.  According to the first 
interpretation, FDI in this region was made regardless of  tariff  and PTA network of  
countries, but the decision was rather based on other factors   Secondly, limiting the 
scope of  FDI location within Europe, tariff  and PTA network were not prominent 
decision factors.  From the global perspective, FDI in Europe, especially in Eastern 
Europe were made targeting the large market, thanks to the economic integration to form a 
single market.  Therefore, second interpretation holds better; tariff  or PTA cannot be a 
merit among EU member countries, so other factors are taken into consideration.  
 
<Table II-12> FDI determinant in Europe(n=161) 
FDI (1)Pooled OLS (2)panel GLS (3) Between Effects 
ln(GDP) 
1.002*** 
(0.212) 
0.819*** 
(0.128) 
1.628 
(0.966) 
GDP Growth 0.086 (0.111) 
-0.111* 
(0.061) 
0.640 
(1.214) 
ln(Wage) 0.414 (0.315) 
0.964*** 
(0.269) 
-1.641 
(2.007) 
Tariff -0.004 (0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.119 
(0.096) 
PTA -0.001 (0.022) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.058 
(0.173) 
Tax -0.070** (0.029) 
-0.106*** 
(0.017) 
-0.103 
(0.162) 
CPI -0.714*** (0.116) 
-0.689*** 
(0.078) 
-0.700 
(0.516) 
LCR -2.057* (1.123) 
-0.978 
(0.636) 
-4.264 
(4.208) 
R-square 0.4155  0.6211 
LR test  Chi Sq=273.53 Prob(Chi Sq)=0.0000  
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
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3. Conclusion and Implications 
 
From observations on the overseas production pattern and the empirical analysis, 
we confirmed that market size is the key factor in determining FDI location, and 
production cost including wage level was the secondary factor.  Tariff  was another 
significant factor.  FDI is alternative to export and thus their substitutional relationship 
can be confirmed from this result.  In fact, tariff-circumvention can converts to market-
seeking behavior, according to Dunning.  High tariff  is very powerful incentive for the 
foreign makers, first because it can reduce the cost of  export, and secondly once they enter 
the market, then it is highly protected from global competition pressure among other 
foreign companies.  Growth rate and wage were both not significant by themselves; they 
can play positive role in FDI decision at some point, but not the primary factor as 
important as GDP, i.e. market size.  However, they were relevant factor in FDI decision, 
jointly with market size variable.   
The most significant finding here is the myth of  LCR’s investment distorting 
effect.  We could not find any evidence that LCR had systemic negative effect on the FDI 
even excluding intermediate goods industry.   Rather it exhibited positive correlation with 
the inflow of  foreign OEMs.  We already supposed that LCR could attract more 
investment in the parts industry, and it again might have affected positively the vehicle 
assembly industry as well.  By region, it was more distinct in the Asian region, while the 
positive effect became weaker in Europe.   
Further, it can be evidently shown that there is increasing returns to scale in the 
vehicle manufacturing.  Generally, full scale overseas plant considering economies of  scale 
should have 200,000~300,000 units annual production capacity.  Therefore, building a 
plant of  this size in foreign country means that the annual sales volume is above 10 million 
units, assuming that the investor’s market share is around 5%.  There are three 
countries(or bloc) that qualify this threshold: China, EU, and the United States.  
Otherwise, the country should be in the motorization, as in India, or should have 
preferential market access to many countries by numerous FTA networks to make the 
export hub in the region.   
Another finding was that FDI determinants can differ across countries and regions. 
We also inferred that global manufacturers first decide the general region or country 
according to the market size, and then when deciding plant site within the region or 
country, consider the production cost factors such as wage, tax, and road infrastructure, etc.  
This is because terms and conditions of  investment including the rents and taxation can be 
negotiable with the state or local government.  Since automotive industry has large 
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employment and linkage effect to related industries, governments often compete in 
offering benefits and incentives to win the investment.   In this context, countries within 
a region are rivals with each other in hosting the FDI.  Frequently, FDI is concentrated to 
one or two countries in a region; within a country, the plants flock together to 3~4 spots.   
Competition within a region can be another factor.  The Table below shows 
global vehicle makers’ major production sites in four developing regions. MNCs tend to 
pick a single country within a region and concentrate its resources and thus production 
capacity in that country.  This is again to do with economies of  scale.  Unless the market 
size of  the host country is large enough, almost every country is subject to the competition 
within the region with its neighbors.  It is even more so when the countries are bound 
together in a free trade area.  China is by itself  a regional focal point, free from 
competition for its huge market and growth potential.  India is also independent as China, 
but as its economic integration with South Asia becomes deeper, it could possibly become 
the focal point in the South Asian region.  Russia is also a sure candidate of  regional focal 
point in the CIS countries and some eastern European countries exclusive of  the EU 
members. 
 
<Table-13> Regional Focal Point of investment by Major Manufacturers 
 Southeast Asia South America Eastern Europe* Africa 
GM Thailand(100%) Brazil(71%) Poland(72%) Egypt(66%) South Africa(34%) 
Ford Thailand(93%) Brazil(77%) Poland(99%) South Africa(100%) 
VW - Brazil(93.8%) Czech(68%) South Africa(100%) 
PSA - Brazil(58%) Czech(53%) Slovakia(47%) 
Morocco(56%) 
Egypt(44%) 
Renault - Brazil(57%) Argentina(31%) Romania(58%) Morocco(91%) 
Fiat - Brazil(90%) Poland(97%) - 
Toyota Thailand(53%) Brazil(45%) Argentina(45%) Czech(100%) South Africa(100%) 
Honda Thailand(60%) Brazil(100%) - - 
Nissan Thailand(60%) Brazil(100%) - South Africa(74%) 
Suzuki Indonesia(94%) - Hungary(100%) - 
Mitsubishi Thailand(77%) Brazil(93%) - - 
Hyundai Malaysia(63%) - Slovakia(57%) Czech(43%) - 
Source: Global Insight(2009) 
Note: the numbers in ( ) indicates the share of production within the region. 
     * Eastern Europe here refers to the new members of EU. 
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Thus, MNCs tend to spread their production sites globally, but within a region, they 
tend to flock together with their competitors.  This clustering is partly related to 
imperfectly competitive nature of  automotive industry and market, and partly due to the 
increasing returns to scale of  parts industry.   
 
To summarize, it was shown that most vehicle makers consider market size and the 
export barrier as the most significant factor when deciding FDI location.  The importance 
of  market size factor is the evidence that the automotive industry has increasing returns to 
scale.  
In this way, FDI in the automotive industry is based on market, and thus it can be 
viewed as localization as well as globalization.  One might say it is glocalization.  
Globalization based on demand side can be far from optimization strategy in terms of  
production side because production related variables such as input price fall behind in the 
priority relative to market related variables.  Strictly speaking, global automotive industry is 
not in the optimal status due to its increasing returns to scale.  However, this inefficiency 
is more or less complemented by the regionalization.  At least within a region, some cases 
are witnessed that OEMs build optimized production system and supply chain based on 
comprehensive and balanced consideration of  market-related and production-related 
factors.  
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Chapter III. LCR and Industry Development 
 
1. Rationale of  LCR: Host Country vs. Investor’s View  
 
1) LCR’s Economic Role and Effect: Host Country’s View 
 
As literature on FDI studies is accumulated, the focus of  research has change 
from analysis on FDI patterns, direction and determinants; to FDI’s role in growth and 
development.  Consequently, primary role of  FDI policies are also changing; from means 
to attract more FDI to device to promote development.  In this context, LCR has become 
a very important policy instrument.  
 
(1) Resource allocating Effect 
 
There are basically two types of  LCR: mandatory local content rule and tariff  
incentives for higher local content.  Both of  them have resource allocating effect: 
employing more domestic component and less imported component than no LCR 
situation.  To the perspective of  importing country, LCR has trade reducing and market 
distorting effect.  Here, it is assumed that procurement from local source is more costly 
than import from home country.23  In the view of  trade economist, the former is more of  
a quantitative restriction, while the latter resembles tariff  which works by price mechanism. 
 
a) Mandatory Local Content Rule 
 
In the initial stage of  vehicle production, countries often require mandatory local 
content rates in percentage of  value, or announce a list of  parts and components(often 
called as ‘deletion program’) that should be procured from local suppliers.  These kinds of  
rules were extensively used in 1980s and early 1990s in most of  the countries imposing 
performance requirements: Mexico, Argentina, Thailand, Cambodia, Philippines, and in 
China before the WTO accession.  Even after these countries changed their local content 
requirements to incentive type rules, some items or rules were maintained as mandatory, 
especially in the commercial vehicle sector.  
 
                                            
23 It is presumed that parts produced in India would be cheaper than the same item produced in Korea.  
However, in most cases it turns out to be the opposite.  Thanks to economies of scale, unit cost in 
developed countries is lower than in the developing countries in many occasions.  
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<Figure III-1> Effect of Mandatory Local Content Rule 
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The graph shows how a firm adjusts the procurement plan pursuant to the local 
content rule.  The curve represents an isoquant for a firm producing a car using imported 
and domestic components.  Let us assume that labor and capital is constant.  The line 
WW indicates the free trade relative price of  imported to domestic parts.  Thus B 
represents the cost minimizing combination of  imported and domestic components under 
no LCR, and OW represents the cost of  making a car in this circumstance.  However, 
when there is a mandatory local content rule prescribing 60% of  minimum local content, 
the firm uses the combination of  imported and domestic components at point A.  OW″ is 
the cost of  producing a car under 60% local content rule.  When the minimum rate is 
reduced to 50%, the combination moves to A´, and the amount of  domestic components 
would be reduced by W´W″, while imported components would increase.  Here, the cost 
of  production is lowered to OW´, even though it is still higher than OW.   
 
b) Tariff/Tax Benefits 
 
As the industry develops, countries usually relax their local content requirements 
from mandatory percentage rule to tariff  discrimination according to the product’s local 
content rate.  Some governments provide tariff  or tax benefits for foreign producers that 
use domestic parts and components above certain minimum level.  Until recently, these 
kinds of  rules were most frequently observed in Malaysia, Venezuela, Canada, and Russia.  
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This is different from mandatory local content rule in that import is allowed 
regardless of  the amount of  local content in the product.  There are basically two kinds 
of  tariff  discrimination: differentiated tariff  rates according to the amount of  local content, 
and the other is imposing different tariffs on products by shifting tariff  classification based 
on the local content rates, which would be subject by higher tariff  rate.  The former type 
is the most common case that was seen in Indonesia, India, Canada, etc.  The latter type is 
not as common as the former.  It was once tried in China as a new KD rule24, but it was 
found in violation of  WTO obligations, and thus recommended to repeal.  When a 
foreign investor supplies the host country’s market by KD production, manufacturers 
export KD sets from the home country to assembly plants in the host country.  Usually, in 
a country where KD production takes up a significant portion of  its vehicle production, 
separate HS codes for the KD sets are designated, and the tariff  rates for these KD sets are 
normally lower than those for complete vehicles.  In case of  China, the tariff  authority 
imposes tariff  for complete vehicles, which is 25%, on the KD sets or components whose 
tariff  is normally around 10%, if  local content rate does not reach the threshold value, i.e. 
60%.  In both cases, the relative price of  imported components and domestic 
components is higher than under no such requirements.   
 
<Figure III-2> Effect of Tax/Tariff Benefits  
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24 See Appendix II. 7 for detailed information. 
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As previously explained, without local content requirements, firms produce cars at 
point B with the relative price WW.  Under the mandatory local content requirements the 
minimum level of  domestic content was determined, and thus it worked similarly with 
quantitative restriction.  On the other hand, the tax or tariff  incentive system is the price 
based approach.  Under this scheme, the relative price of  imported components increases, 
which leads the firm to use more domestic components.  With relative price DP, the 
procurement combination takes place at point A.  In this case, the production cost also 
increases from OW to OW″.  When the preferential treatment is lessened, the relative 
price decreases a little bit, and the firm produces at point A´, and the production cost is 
lowered from OW″ to OW´.  If  the domestic component’s price becomes cheaper, then 
the slope of  DP gets steeper and the domestic procurement will increase.   
To conclude, by imposing LCR use of  domestic input increased, although the 
mechanism was somewhat different in the two types of  LCR.  Thus, LCR has resource-
allocating effect in the global production aspect; however, it can be called import-
substituting effect in the trade aspect.  
 
(2) LCR’s Surplus Transferring Effect 
 
The graph shows partial equilibrium analysis of  domestic supplier and foreign 
supplier production under LCR.  D is a demand curve of  foreign investor for parts and 
components.  The horizontal line SW the supply curve in the world market, and OS is the 
supply curve in the host country.  When the host country impose LCR, the supply curve 
moves up to SLCR.  Higher the line, stricter is the investment regulations.  When there is 
no LCR, the foreign investor procures Oa from local source, and aQ from the world 
market, presumably from home country.  When there is LCR, the domestic supplier’s 
production increases from Oa to Oa′.  Imports from home country decreases from aQ to 
a′Q′.  Certainly, LCR has shifted some portion of  import to domestic production.  
How about welfare effect? The welfare can be broken down to producer surplus, 
consumer surplus, and government surplus.  Producer surplus is again divided into 
foreign producer’s surplus and domestic supplier’s surplus.  Consumer surplus decreased a 
lot, due to higher domestic parts price and less quantity.  Domestic supplier’s surplus 
increases from △Obd to △Oce.  □efhi goes to host government as tariff  or tax 
revenue.  There is no change in foreign producer’s surplus.   while domestic supplier and 
government surplus increased.  Overall welfare decreases by the amount of  △dei and 
△fgh, which were originally belonged to consumer surplus.  Consumer includes foreign 
OEM, operating in the country, because this is not the final good.  Therefore, by 
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imposing LCR, some part of  foreign OEM’s surplus is transferred to host country; LCR 
has surplus transferring effect, or rent-shifting effect.  The cost penalty mostly attributed 
to the foreign OEM, and this works as a subsidy to the local parts supplier.  In other 
words, cost penalty associated with LCR is social tax or CRS expense for the foreign 
investor to the host country.  
Then, does LCR decrease the overall welfare? From this graph, it seems that it 
does.  However, it is widely recognized that FDI and increased production in the host 
country generates externality such as technology and productivity spillover, or social values 
including employment and wage spillover, etc.  These intangible benefits and effects may 
big enough to compensate for the deadweight loss.  However, this argument is limited to 
the host country’s welfare.  From the global perspective, the aggregated total welfare is 
more likely to decline.    
In conclusion, local content policies generate economic benefits to the local 
economy as long as the components that are localized as a result of  the policy generate 
more social value than the cost penalties associated with higher domestic prices. Thus, the 
equilibrium is determined where the value of  investment equals cost of  entering the market.  
However, under the current system where the performance requirements are prohibited in 
general, benefits of  such country with attractive market with great growth potential will be 
transferred from the host country’s government and industry to the foreign investor firm.   
 
<Figure III-3> partial equilibrium analysis on host country vs. investor surplus 
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(3) FDI inducing effect in the Upstream industry 
 
There are roughly 4 kinds of  procurement channel for the foreign investor as 
in :<Table III-3>.  Since there are conflicts of  interest between the foreign investor and 
the host country as examined just now, they show very different preference.  My best 
choice is the other’s worst choice.  Host country prefers mode (2) the best, and this is the 
least preferred option for the foreign investor.  For the foreign OEM, this method is not a 
desired choice because of  many reasons.  First, they cannot guarantee the quality of  
products; the cost is higher due to low scale of  production; besides it is costly to change 
the supply channel for technical problems25; lastly, there is cost of  technology transfer, etc.  
Mode (1) is the least preferred choice for the host country, but it has the advantage 
for the foreign OEM in that the foreign OEM can take full advantage of  economies of  
scale, and quality control is easier.  By imposing LCR, the host country can effectively 
eliminate option (1).  Since (2) is investor’s least wanted choice, decision is made among 
(3) or (4).  This, in turn, induce additional FDI to the host country.   
 
<Table III-1> preference on the mode of procurement (host country vs. investor)  
Mode of 
Procurement 
(1)Import from 
Existing supplier 
Local Procurement 
(2)Local 
supplier 
(3)Partner 
supplier’s local 
presence 
(4)Vertically 
Integrated supplier’s 
local presence 
Host Country’s 
Preference 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 
Investor’s 
Preference 1st* 4th 3rd 2nd 
 
Moreover, LCR can increase irreversibility of  investment.  Once the supply 
network is built in the host country with large amount of  initial investment, the supply 
system is maintained after the local content requirement is phased out, or when the home 
country and host country enter into a preferential trade agreement to eliminate tariff  between 
the two countries.  On the other hand, if  the plant was just for assembly purpose with CKD 
or KD set, there is high chance that the investment is pulled out altogether.  Therefore, 
LCR is a very effective policy for the host country to foster intermediate goods industry and 
vehicle assembly industry at the same time.  
 
                                            
25 The parts and components used in a vehicle are specially customized to that vehicle from the design 
stage.  Compatibility of Parts and components in the automotive industry is very low compared to that of 
electronic goods.  This is due to the closed architecture of automotive products.  
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2) LCR’s Influence on Global Supply Chain: Investor’s View 
 
Firm’s FDI decision in the vehicle assembly plant can be different from its global 
supply chain management decision.  Why automobile markers locate production plant in 
the foreign country was reviewed in the first and second chapter: it was empirically proven 
that market size(demand for automobiles) and trade barriers were the most important 
factors.  However, global supply chain management (SCM) does not necessarily go along 
with these motivations.  The characteristics of  the industry are crucial factors in firms’ 
decision whether to locate parts suppliers near the assembly plant or to ship them from 
home country.  Economies of  scale and industry architecture are the two most important 
features that affect firm’s global sourcing strategy.  
<Table III-2> is a typical cost structure of  an automobile manufacturing firm.  
In the unit cost analysis, the manufacturing cost takes more than 50% of  the total cost of  
production excluding overhead costs and sales promotion expenses.  Then, among the 
manufacturing cost, material cost takes about 87%, while labor cost and others are 13%.  
In general, employee cost or wage generally takes 8~10% of  the manufacturing cost.  The 
huge chunk of  cost comes from purchasing the materials and intermediate goods.  
Therefore, procurement and supply network strategy is very important for firm’s cost 
reduction and overall profitability.   
 
<Table III-2> Example of Price-Cost breakdown of Automobile Production 
Cost Category Cost Contributor Share of MSRP*(%) 
Vehicle 
manufacturing 
Material Cost 42.5 
Assembly labor and Other manufacturing cost 6.5 
Production Overhead 
Transportation/Warranty 5.0 
Amortization and Depreciation 
Engineering/R&D 14.5 
Corporate Overhead Pension and Health Care Advertising and Overhead 7.0 
Selling 
Price Discounts 5.0 
Dealer markup 17.5 
Sum of Costs 97.5 
Profit Automobile Profit 2.5 
MSRP  100.0 
Note: Based on ANL methodology and Borroni-Bird Presentation (Vyas et al, 2000) 
* Manufacture Suggested Retail Price 
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(1) Integral Architecture and Lean Production  
 
As Fujimoto(1991) pointed out, automobile production is an integral industry26, 
where more than 20,000 parts are combined and integrated to work as one seamless entity.  
Therefore, assembling cars is a very sensitive operation from assembling electronic goods 
such as computer, which is closer to modular product.  In manufacturing integral 
products, proximity of  supplier location is desired, because timely coordination between 
parts supplier and assembler is crucial.  Besides, as lean production system27, which was 
introduced by Japanese OEMs became stylized as the mainstream production method, 
geographical proximity of  suppliers became more of  a prerequisite.  For these reasons, it 
might be in the foreign investor company’s own interest to localize the supply network 
system as well as in the host country.   
Perhaps, this is the underlying reason why Japanese makers, in general, show 
higher localization level in the overseas production compared to American or European 
Makers.  They usually make comprehensive range of  FDI covering almost entire supply 
chain.  Still, they are capable of  management in cost reduction while procuring mostly 
from local sources, largely thanks to the organizational or corporate culture: collaborative 
workplace atmosphere. 
Western OEMs are relatively behind this localization capability compared with 
Japanese OEMs.  However, these days western OEMs tend to enhance local content rate 
in foreign operation based on the judgement that it would be more profitable in the long 
run.  In China, foreign OEMs have constantly endeavored to raise the local content rate, 
partly due to policy concern, and partly due to business consideration.  For example, Ford, 
aiming to reduce procurement cost by an average of  30~40%, established a procurement 
center in Shanghai to expand procurement in China.  Its partner Mazda also tries to raise 
local content rate from less than 50% at the end of  2005 to 90% by 2010, with the entry of  
allied suppliers into China.   
<Table III-3> shows the example of  India: local content rates by models and 
makers, and this is the typical pattern of  local content in the host country.  By makers, the 
domestically owned makers like Tata and Hindustan Motors exhibit 100% local content 
rate; among foreign makers Asian makers and volume makers show higher local content 
                                            
26 Fujimoto (2004) classified industries into three types according to their architecture: closed integral 
industry, closed modular industry, and open modular industry.  Typical examples of closed integral 
architecture include automotive industry, motorcycle industry, and game software industry.  The two 
most common closed modular industries are main frame computer and Lego.  Lastly, open modular 
architecture is observed in PC system, internet products, bicycles, and financial products. 
27 Lean production system’s key factors are flexibility of production, pull method(instead of push 
method), minimization of inventory(Just-in-Time, JIT), etc.  
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rates than western makers and premium vehicle makers.  Even within a maker, local 
content rate is different by models; bigger the sales volume, higher the local content rates.  
 
<Table III-3> Local content rates by makers and models in India 
Maker Model Local Content Rate 
Daimler - 10%  
BMW - 10% 
Eicher Motors - 95% 
Fiat Palio Stile 75% 
GM Tavera 93% 
Hindustan Motors - 100% 
Honda Jazz 70%  
Hyundai 
Santro King 90% 
Accent 75% 
Sonata 30% 
Suzuki 
800 95% 
Alto 90% 
Zen Estilo 90% 
Swift 85% 
SX4 25% 
Omnivan 95% 
Wagon R 80% 
Gypsy 81% 
Tata - 100% 
Toyota Innova 70% 
Volvo - 40% 
Source: Korea Automotive Research Institute 
 
(2) Closed Product Architecture 
 
 Due to the closed architecture of  automobile, parts cannot be readily substituted by 
other suppliers.  Usually, OEMs have long-term business relationship with their suppliers28, 
although global sourcing is becoming popular especially among Western OEMs.  When 
OEMs manufactures in foreign countries, they tend to keep the existing supplier relationship 
in the home country.29 To shift the supply channel, they need time to renew and build 
                                            
28 On average, Asian OEMs keep long-term relationship with their suppliers with minimum 50% of the 
total suppliers, as strategic partners with OEM.   
29 This is more prominent among Japanese OEMs.  They usually have vertically integrated supplier 
relations, based on long-term relationship.  Thus, Japanese OEMs are slower to change the supplier channel, 
than Western OEMs: heavily dependent on global sourcing, they are more swift in changing the sourcing 
channel. 
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relationship with local suppliers.  Moreover, the locally produced parts often lack the 
quality the OEM requires.  In fact, overseas production more often entails quality 
problems.30  In controlling the quality of  parts, long term relationship with supplier is 
more advantageous and changing the supplier often raises uncertainties and risks.  
 In this background, it is not a simple matter for the OEM to change the supplier 
channel.  If  firms have to source parts locally to comply with the regulations or to qualify 
for government incentives, they rather choose to be accompanied by the home country 
suppliers in the host country.  In other words, if  the host government imposes local 
content requirements, it often leads to additional FDI.   
   
(3) Bigger Economies of  Scale in the Upstream Industry 
 
As evidentially shown in chapter II, there are economies of  scale in the automotive 
industry.  Besides, the scale economy is larger in the upstream, such as parts 
manufacturing and R&D stage than in the assembly stage.31  Therefore, it would be the 
most efficient for the manufacturer when product development and parts or module 
manufacturing processes remain in the home country and locating the assembly line in the 
overseas market.  Parts and components produced in the host country are usually more 
expensive and quality is not easily controlled.32 If  the foreign OEMs consider only price 
and quality of  the intermediate good, provided that delivery conditions are equivalent or 
can be ignored, there is not much reason for them to procure from local suppliers. 
For the foreign OEMs to build its own supply chain in the vicinity of  assembly 
plant, scale economy should be secured.  In other words, the local market size and 
production scale should be large enough for the local supply chain to be efficient and 
sustainable in terms of  profitability.  
                                            
30 Toyota’s recall incident can be an example of quality management failure in overseas production.  
Toyota accused CTS, the US parts maker, of supplying defective accelerator pedals. 
31 For this reason, parts supplier usually produces small number of items and supplies multiple assembly 
plants and sometimes multiple OEMs in order to enhance the economies of scale. 
32 In general, OEMs consider three standards when making procurement decision: price, quality, and 
delivery.   
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2. Development Effect of  Local Content Requirements 
 
1) Literature on FDI, LCR and Development 
 
(1) FDI’s impact on Development 
 
Compared to trade effect studies on development, history of  empirical studies of  
foreign investment’s effect on development is relatively short, since FDI is a rather recent 
phenomenon than trade.  It was not until 1990s when considerable volume of  
econometric analysis of  FDI’s impact on development was pouring that FDI was 
incorporated to the mainstream of  economic research.  While empirical studies regarding 
foreign investment was growing large in volume, conventional researches still paid more 
attention to movement of  factors and the increased return on factor consequently.  In 
many contexts, movement of  factor referred to capital movement, i.e. portfolio investment.  
Another stream of  studies focused on substitution effect vs. complementary effect 
between FDI and trade.  These research trend somewhat reflected that researchers were 
still engrossed in the trade economics and they understood FDI as a derivative of  trade.  
They were not ready to deal with FDI as an independent subject of  study.  Also, there was 
somewhat more substantive reason.  First of  all, it was hard to capture the FDI’s impact 
on development, how FDI affected the host country’s economic development.  It was 
even hard to tell how FDI influenced the host country’s industry, by what path and how.  
Some leading economists later named it spillover effect, or linkages effect of  FDI.   
Caves(1974) pioneered the study on economic benefits of  FDI as spillover to the  
host country industries.  He noted that the benefits do not directly come from the 
presence of  foreign subsidiary or the efficiency of  the firm itself.  He divided the 
spillovers in three categories: productivity level increase of  domestic firms cased my the 
multinational firms: removal of  distortions in the host country market by the foreign 
subsidiary’s competitive pressure: and the transfer of  technology expedited by the 
competitive pressure by the MNCs.  
Globerman(1979) was also one of  the earliest researchers on productivity 
spillovers by FDI.  He did empirical study on the labor productivity growth in Canadian 
manufacturing industries.  He confirmed that there were differences in labor productivity 
among plants and that difference derived from spillover efficiency benefits associated with 
FDI.  Then, he found the different spillover efficiency among plants in the industry’s 
capital intensity, plant-level economies of  scale, and average work hours per employee.   
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Among many economists who studied the impact of  FDI on development, 
Markusen and Venables(1999) is among the earliest that investigated on this subject.  They 
showed that multinationals can exert positive effects on the development of  indigenous 
firms, through the creation of  linkages with indigenous suppliers through increase in 
demand for intermediate products and changes in prices.  Most of  the empirical studies 
on the development effect of  FDI notes that externality of  FDI can induce various linkage 
effect that brings about the industrial development.  More concretely, they argued that 
multinationals can change the structure of  imperfectly competitive industries in the host 
country by fostering the development of  domestic intermediate good producing firms, 
which in turn may have positive effects on the development of  domestic final good 
producing firms.   
Qui and Tao(2001) suggested two forms of  FDI benefit.  One is employment 
created by the FDI, given that each unit of  output from FDI requires a certain amount of  
local input.  The second is technological upgrading provided by the FDIs.  Gorg and 
Strobl(2002) showed that through creation of  linkages effect multinationals can exert 
positive effects on the development of  indigenous firms in the case of  Irish economy. 
Here, the linkages effect by the presence of  MNCs was decomposed to three effects: first, 
competition effect, as multinational firms compete with domestic firms and crowding out 
them.  Second effect is additional demand for the domestically produced intermediate 
goods, and third effect is the fall in the price of  intermediate goods.  Their finding from 
the study was that presence of  multinational companies has positive effect on the 
indigenous entry, which can be interpreted as industrial development.  Fotopoulos and 
Louri(2002) also maintained that multinationals stimulate local industrial development by 
spillover effect based on the empirical study on the Greek manufacturing firms from.  
They tried to show how positive impact on growth and development was transferred from 
multinational firms to domestic firms.  Lipsey and Sjöholm(2005) noted on the wage 
spillover effect and productivity spillover, from the Indonesian manufacturing industry.  
In this study, they found that there were not much wage spillovers in the developing 
countries like Indonesia, whereas there were evidence of  that kind of  effect in the United 
States and the United Kingdom.   
These studies confirmed the positive impact of  FDI on the development by 
examining how the entry of  foreign investor affects the productivity of  domestic firms 
through spillover effect, backward linkage effect, or technology transfer. 
However, there were researches skeptical about the growth impact of  FDI. 
Carkovic and Levine(2005), from an empirical study with macroeconomic data, concluded 
that there was no universal relationship between FDI and growth, i.e. FDI did not exert a 
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robust, independent impact on economic growth when other factors are taken into account.  
Regarding the paradoxical results against the previous empirical works demonstrating 
positive impact of  FDI in development, they found the cause in the data.  They 
commented that microeconomic studies generally shed pessimistic evidence on the growth-
effect of  FDI, many macroeconomic studies find a positive link between FDI and growth.  
Thus, macroeconomic studies have more explanatory power over the real world, but their 
models are actually less precise in that they usually do not control for endogeneity, country-
specific effects, and the inclusion of  lagged dependent variables in the growth regression.  
Also, to correct the deficiencies in existing cross-country studies, they used panel data 
method and utilized Generalized Method of  Moments(GMM) instead of  OLS.  
Nunnenkamp(2003) shared the view of  Carkovic and Levine(2005) that growth impact of  
FDI are ambiguous due to highly aggregated FDI data, and FDI does not guarantee 
development of  host country.  He found out that host country’s policies are of  over-
riding importance to spur economic development from FDI, through research in Latin 
America during the 1980s and 1990.  He studied the role of  exogenous factors, corporate 
strategies, the role of  economic policy, and found that sustainability of  macroeconomic 
stabilization, government credibility, openness to trade, etc were most relevant issues in 
terms of  FDI.  Kohpaiboon(2009), by examining the technological spillover in the Thai 
manufacturing industry, found that advanced technology associated with MNC affiliates 
does not always spill over to the local firms.  The extent of  spillovers largely depends on 
the nature of  the trade policy regime.  He asserted that only industries operating under 
liberal trade policy regime experience positive horizontal FDI spillovers.  Javorcik(2009) 
has also found evidence of  spillovers from multinationals to the supplying sectors in Czech. 
Looking for the reason why the spillover effect was different from countries to 
countries, firm-specific characteristics did not answer the question very well.  Instead, they 
argued that certain country specific effect might bring about the difference in the ability to 
benefit from the presence of  FDI.  It might be due to too small size of  domestically 
owned firms, or the lack of  capability of  those firms from the foreign investor firms.  
They pointed out that heavy protection of  domestic sector can be detrimental to the 
capacity building of  domestic firms.  In other words, policy or institutional variable can be 
a crucial factor to determine the FDI’s growth effect of  the host country.  Görg and 
Greenway(2004) investigated productivity, wages and exports spillovers in developing, 
developed and transitional economies.  They built up on the existing studies of  
Blomstrom and Kokko(1998) and Lipsey(2002) by highlighting the policy dimension of  the 
host country.  Hansen et al(2008) recommended differentiation of  FDI promotion 
policies for developing countries.  
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(2) Role of  Policy: LCR and Industrial Development 
 
From recognition among some economists and researchers that FDI itself  does 
not bring the development of  host country, policy and institutional factors of  host country 
gained weight in the FDI studies.  However, local content requirement has received little 
attention in the literature of  empirical studies of  FDI.  Though there were substantial 
volume of  researches paying attention to the policy role determining the growth effect of  
FDI, there are not many studies focusing on the policy effect of  local content requirement 
on the industrial development, and even less are specifically addressing the automotive 
industry.  However, LCR’s economic effect and automotive industry cannot be separated 
because LCR is frequently limited to automotive industry.  UNIDO(1986) reported that 
among 50 countries, 27 of  them have local content requirement on FDI in the automotive 
industry alone in 1980.  LCR can tremendously affect the supply chain of  the industry, as 
we looked over in the first part of  this chapter. 
Grossman(1981) was among the earliest researcher that analyzed the effects of  
content protection on resource reallocation, especially the intermediate goods.  He 
understood that local content requirements had protection effect of  the domestic 
intermediate goods industry, and the actual effectiveness of  the policy depends on the 
substitution possibility of  production, the supply condition in the domestic industry, and 
the market structure.  Lahri and Onno(1998) also focused on the policy implications of  
FDI and suggested optimal policy combination.  They characterized optimal level of  LCR, 
based on the number of  domestic firms, the number of  foreign investors, and the firm’s 
cost.  The most intensive and earnest study on LCR in the automotive industry were 
provided by Veloso(2001).  He understood the underlying issues of  LCR in the 
automotive industry, and its development policy aspect, but he rather focused on firms’ 
production pattern under LCR; firm’s supply chain management and content decision 
based on cost modeling in the industrial engineering perspective. These studies focused on 
the LCR’s resource allocating effect or FDI inducing effect rather than the industry growth 
effect. 
Researchers who tried to find out the welfare effect of  LCR, generally found 
negative result: Davidson et al(1985) demonstrated that LCR had cost increasing effect, 
which reduces the world output and world welfare, and also source country’s(home 
country’s) welfare.  Belderbos et al.(2002) observed that LCR protect vertically integrated 
domestic industries, and induce inward FDI in intermediate goods production.  They 
claimed that LCR has negative impact on the host country in that LCR causes new market 
distortions by promoting FDI at an inefficiently small scale of  operation.  Moran(2005) 
 68 
found that mandatory joint venture requirements(foreign ownership limitation) and 
domestic content requirements raise foreign affiliate production costs and thus hinder host 
country economic growth.  He therefore argued that foreign investors should be free to 
source from wherever they wish and allowed whole or majority ownership to increase host 
country welfare and promote growth.  Ohdoi(2009), by using dynamic general equilibrium 
analysis, proved lemmas indicating that reducing LCR can raise welfare not only in the 
home country.   
On the other hand, there were some positive results on LCR’s development effect.  
Hollander(1987) found that LCR at a proper level can increase welfare; he considered 
welfare effects from a foreign multinational’s response to an LCR, by shifting more 
production stages to the host country, and found that small LCRs can increase welfare.   
Richardson(1993) analyzed that under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, 
LCR no longer affect the price of  the intermediate goods.   Davidson et al.(1985) also 
pointed out that LCR shifts monopoly rent of  the foreign investor to the host country’s 
domestic firms.  They found that if  output of  the host country exceeds the sales of  the 
investor and the demand is linear, LCR can increase welfare.  Also, it can increase 
employment of  the host country, but to a certain extent because as LCR is imposed, FDI 
declines afterwards. Jordaan(2010) found that input-output linkages between FDI firms 
and local suppliers may act as an important transfer mechanism of  positive externalities.  
Younger generation maquiladora firms were generating larger positive local impact by using 
much more local suppliers.   
Thus, development effect of  LCR is under controversy.  Typically, developing 
countries’ governments are advocates of  the legitimacy and necessity of  LCR and claim 
they need the requirements to properly protect their national economy from huge and 
heartless capital of  multinational corporations.  On the other hand, developed countries’ 
governments and MNCs argue that those requirements are clearly against the international 
rules and obligations, and moreover they are not effective tool in promoting the host 
country’s development.  In this context, this dissertation tries to show whether LCR has 
positive effect on automotive industry’s development of  host country.   
The relative difficulty of  analyzing development effect lies in several reasons.  
One of  them is the vagueness of  the term ‘development’.  When we talk about economic 
development, it sometimes refers to the economic growth, most frequently represented by 
the GDP growth rate.  As it was pointed out by some researchers, it is easy to show the 
positive proof  between FDI and development with macroeconomic data.  On the other 
hand, development in a certain industry can be tricky.  It can be measured in numerous 
ways, which reflects that industrial development is the combination of  many factors, and 
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thus hard to disentangle.  In fact, when Markusen and Venables(1999) mentioned the 
terminology ‘development’, it meant more intangible development in the industry, e.g. 
technology development spilled over from the foreign investor to the indigenous firms.  
Gorg and Strobl(2002) pointed out that although Markusen-Venable model appears to 
provide a very intuitive tool to analyze the impact of  FDI on host country development, 
there has not been any empirical study investigating the effects exactly as described in the 
model.  
Regarding the dataset, majority of  previous studies usually looked into a time-
series development effect in one country of  interest, or cross-sectional comparative 
research.  Time-series data in one country in a specific industry can have both feature of  
quantitative method and case study, and therefore it is suitable to show the spillover from 
MNC to the local industry.  The spillover is a quite microeconomic concept: productivity 
spillover or wage spillover can happen at the firm level, or sometimes plant-level.  On the 
other hand, the data are sometimes at the industry level or the macro-economy level.  
Gorg and Strobl(2001) once argued that panels, using the firm level data are the most 
appropriate estimating framework.  However, firm-level data is very hard to obtain and 
manage.  Cross-sectional dataset generally showed positive relationship between FDI and 
economic development.  However, in that case, the possible bias was due to the selection 
problem, i.e. it is hard to distinguish whether FDI actually contributed to the local firms’ 
productivity or the host country economy growth.  The multinational firms may have 
invested in inherently productive sectors or countries.  Also, the cross-sectional data 
analysis fails to show the development of  a certain country’s economy or industry over a 
longer period of  time.  Using panel data, much of  this selection bias can be resolved, but 
there still may remain problems in the data especially when the panel data is combined 
from both developed and developing countries.  Blonigen and Wang(2005) pointed out 
the possible bias in the data pooling, which may lead to misleading results.   
So far, there has seldom been extensive cross-country comparative research on the 
specific industrial development during substantial span of  time.  By using panel dataset, 
this dissertation study can be differentiated from the former literature in that it examines 
LCR’s growth promoting effect in the automotive industry; and also it looks into both 
cross-country differences in terms of  LCR’s policy effect.  
 70 
2) Hypotheses  
 
The general objective of  this study is to find out what role the government policy 
does play directly or indirectly in the host country’s industrial and economic development. 
More concretely, this study tries to show linkages effect between FDI and industrial 
development promoted by local content requirements.  When the host government 
imposes local content requirements, the foreign investors should use more domestically 
procured parts, or source from its affiliates by building its own supplier networks in the 
vicinity.  This leads to more establishments in the industry, more employment, and more 
production.  Intuitively, there is a clear difference between a foreign automotive maker 
just assembling imported KD kits from the home country, and another foreign maker 
building the vehicle sourced from various local vendor or its own subsidiaries.  Linkages 
and spillovers can be maximized with the presence of  these measures.  Thus, the 
hypothesis of  this empirical study is as follows.  
 
Hypothesis 
LCR has positive effect on the growth of  automotive industry in the host country. 
 
We would look at the growth and development of  in the automotive industry of  each 
country and its relation to the enforcement status of  LCR in that country.   
 
3) Methodology and Data 
 
(1) Basic Model 
 
Our analytical framework starts from the general production function.  (3.1) is a 
aggregate production function for the host country.  
 
Y=AF(K, L)                                       (3.1) 
 
Y is the total output or value added, K is capital and L labor and A is total factor 
productivity.  Usually, total factor productivity is described as a function of  technology 
development and other general capability of  the industry.  My assumption here is that 
policy environment in the host country is crucial variables in this function, all the more 
when the host country is developing nation.  
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A=A(T, P)                                         (3.2) 
 
where T is technology development over time, and P is vector of  policies and 
institutional environment in the host country, such as trade regime including tariff  and 
number of  preferential trade agreements, level of  transparency and business friendliness, 
and investment environment including performance requirements such as LCR.    
From this analytical framework, the basic form of  our model follows the standard 
base model for most cross-country growth studies.  While the original model focused on 
the growth effect of  FDI, this empirical study aims to analyze the policy effect on the 
development.  Therefore, out model looks like this.   
 
Yit=ß0+ß1 it+ß2. it+εit                                 (3.3) 
 
 is a group of  policy variables of  the host country, and  is a group of  macro-
economic variables as our control variables.  FDI was excluded from the equation because 
of  its endogeneity with other explanatory variables.  Yit is the dependent variable which 
indicates the industrial development status in the country i’s automotive industry at time t.   
The development in the automotive industry can be measured in several ways.  
The most extensively used dependent variables are value added and output.  Blomström 
and Sjöholm(1999), Takii(2001), Todo and Miyamoto(2002) used value added as dependent 
variable; Blalock and Gertler(2002, 2003) used output.  Number of  firms can be a 
dependent variable to measure the industry development as in Görg and Ströbl(2002).  
They used entry of  indigenous firms as dependent variable and estimated the factors that 
affect the entry of  indigenous firms using plant level data for the Irish manufacturing 
sector.  Number of  employee can be another indicator, but Qui and Tao(2001) suggested 
that production can be a good instrument for the industrial development because each unit 
of  output requires certain amount of  local employment, and bigger the scale of  
production, more solid is the industry infrastructure.  Fotopoulos and Louri(2002) used 
domestic firm size as the dependent variable: as domestic industry develops, that is, the 
firm size becomes larger.  
In this model, value created against the total production, number of  firms, and 
number of  domestic complete vehicle makers(OEM) were used as dependent variable.  
By domestic value rate, I try to measure the self-supporting capability of  the industry, 
which is a good indicator of  industry development.   
Focusing more on the development rather than growth, qualitative measurement 
can be used as dependent variable: technology development, or productivity growth.  First, 
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technology development is brought generally in two ways: technology transfer and 
technology diffusion.  Technology transfer occurs mostly in joint ventures between 
transnational corporations and local companies, by licensing agreements or management, 
marketing, and technical service contracts.  Technology diffusion is the delivery of  
technologies from foreign affiliates to local companies.  These terms can be quantified 
such as number of  patents applied for, or number of  hours taken for a car to be 
manufactured.  Generally, growth of  an industry is achieved by factor accumulation and 
technology development.  Growth by factor accumulation is quantitative growth, and can 
be measured by employment increases or capital formation.  Output or value added also 
can be a proxy.  Usually, productivity growth is used to demonstrate the latter type of  
growth.  Most frequently used variables are unit labor productivity and total factor 
productivity(TFP).  In this study, labor productivity was used.  Dividing the total output 
by number of  employee in the automotive sector, the productivity captures capital 
accumulation and technology development.  In fact, in many empirical studies, TFP and 
labor productivity showed very similar results.33  
it is the matrix of  control variables, most of  which are macroeconomic variables 
at the national level: the size of  the economy is represented by (GDP), and the per capita 
GDP(CGDP) is used to reflect the average income level and it is also a barometer of  the 
economic development stage of  the country, and GDP growth rate(GR) is also added to 
capture the dynamics of  the economy.  In some equations, quadratic form of  GDP per 
capita is added to see whether the industrial development is the quadratic function of  host 
country’s general economic development level: that is, to reflect the maturing industry 
problem in the developed countries.  Many empirical studies have added variable related 
to investment, but in this study, it was purposely omitted due to its endogeneity with other 
regressors.  
 it is the matrix of  policy variables: tariff  rates(tariff), number of  preferential trade 
agreements(PTA) such as FTA or Customs unions, degree of  transparency indicated by the 
perceived corruption(CPI), enforcement of  local content requirement(LCR).  Tariff  
signifies the trade openness of  the country, and by using the specific tariff  rates on vehicles, 
the degree of  protection in the automotive industry can be reflected in the model.  
Number of  RTA is also related to the trade openness, but it is somewhat different tariff  
variable in that is linked to the market size issue.  Level of  transparency is of  course can 
influence the industrial development.  Whether the host country enforced local content 
                                            
33 Prema-Chandra at el(2000) measured TFPG and LPG from production by majority owned US foreign 
affiliates in 44 countries.  Although TFPG was lower and more dispersed than LPG, they were highly 
correlated(r=0.90).  Besides, the regression results, by the same set of explanatory variables, was 
resilient to the choice between TFPG and LPG as dependent vriable. 
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requirements(LCR) on the foreign manufacturers, and whether the country has its own 
domestic brand(dOEM) would be added as our key variables, to see whether enforcing 
various government policies are more effective when the host country has its own maker.   
LCR is a dummy variable denoted by 0 or 1(presence of  LCR).  It can be 
augmented to range of  numbers, e.g. 0 to 5 according to the strictness of  the requirement.  
However, it would be highly arbitrary and subjective, and may cause biased estimation.  
Therefore, it was simplified to binary level.  
 The growth studies are typically done in cross sectional data on an average value 
of  variables during a certain time span to conduct the cross-country comparison and see 
the long term growth effect.  However, nowadays panel approach is more popular in 
dealing with endogeneity issue of  variables.  Therefore, I used both approach in this study.  
 
(2) Econometric Specification 
 
i) Simple Cross-Section and Pooled Regression 
 
As noted before, the econometric study’s result can be different according to the 
data structure: cross-sectional or panel.  Therefore, in this empirical study, it would be 
needed to conduct the regression in various possible methods, using cross-sectional data, 
and panel data; with all countries sample or developing countries sample.   
Many growth studies have run simple cross-country regression to check the long-
term effects on growth.  Here, we also start with this approach as our basic model.  
Islam(1995) also started with single cross-sectional regression, in order to see how much 
the results of  panel data differ from those of  cross-sectional regression. 
 
Yi=ß0+ß1X i+εi                                                             (3.4) 
 
There is no time specification here, and i denotes countries.  Yi is the average of  
annual growth rate, and Xi is the economic variables at the average value.  Policy variables 
are also averaged, except LCR.  LCR takes value 1, if  the country has enforced local 
content requirements at some time during the time span, and 0 otherwise.   
Another method is pooled OLS regression.  Since we use panel data set, there is 
now time specification, t.  Still, we treat all the observations as independent ones.  Here, 
the error term εi is composed of  ci and uit.  If  there is no country-specific factor (ci), but 
the purely random component (uit), εi equals uit, and we can use pooled OLS regression.   
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Yit=ß0+ß1Xit+ci + uit                                                       (3.5) 
 
However, there remain a couple of  problems using pooled OLS in the panel data.  
It does not consider country specific effects or the changes over time because all the 
observations are a single sample.  Also, it is likely that the composite errors are serially 
correlated due to the presence of  country-specific effects, ci  in each time period.  In that 
case, the pooled OLS method fails to address the issue of  unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity.   
 
ii) Panel Approaches: Fixed and Random Effects 
 
The panel data analysis has advantage over cross-sectional analysis in that it can 
estimate dynamic relationships among variables during the time span.  Also, it allows you 
to tackle the issue of  unobserved heterogeneity and associated endogeneity by controlling 
for unobservable variables that does not change over time.   
To analyze our panel data, two techniques were used in this analysis: fixed effects 
and random effects.  Fixed effects model explores the relationship between predictor and 
outcome variable within a country.  Each country has its own individual characteristics 
that may or may not influence the predictor variable.  Also, when using the FE model, we 
assume that something within the individual may impact or bias the predictor or outcome 
variables and we need to control for this.  FE removes the effect of  those time-invariant 
characteristics from the predictor variables so that we can assess the predictor’s net effect.  
Also, the FE model assumes the time-invariant characteristics are unique to the country 
and should not be correlated with other countries.  Gorg and Strobl(2002) suggests that 
fixed effects model is preferable for the estimation of  the sector-specific effects to a 
random effects specification.  The key insight is that if  the unobserved variable does not 
change over time, then any changes in the dependent variable must be due to influences 
other than these fixed characteristics.   
In the fixed effects model, the error term can be decomposed into a country 
specific effects(ci ) and random error component(uit).  
 
Yit=ß0+ß1Xit+ci + uit                                                   (3.6) 
 
Here, ß1 does not change across panels, but the constant term, (ß0+ci ) changes.  
To estimate this equation, we do within transformation.   
(Yit- i)= ß1(Xit i )+ (cit- i)                      (3.7) 
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Now, the error term uit disappeared from the equation.  If  country effects are 
correlated with uit, then fixed effects model is preferred.  On the other hand, if  country 
effects are not correlated with each explanatory variable in all time periods, random effect 
model is better to be used.  In the random effect model, the constant term, (ß0+ci ) is 
considered as random variable.  In using the RE model, first-order autocorrelation 
problem and correlation between explanatory variables and uit, i.e. cov( )= 0.  
 
iii) Dynamic Panel Data Approach: The First Differenced GMM 
 
Still, endogeneity remains a concern for our analysis.  There may be unobserved 
time variant effect that determines both the policies and the growth of  automotive industry.  
To investigate the endogeneity, we need to identify an appropriate instrumental variable, 
but it is difficult to identify the IV for each potentially endogenous variable in country-level 
analysis.   Therefore, here we used GMM techniques in the dynamic panel data analysis.   
Dynamic panel data approach is extensively used in the economic growth studies.  The 
GMM techniques suggested by Arellano and Bond(1991) and Bond and Blundell(1998) 
allows us to use lagged values of  lagged value of  the dependent variable as instruments.  
Especially, the Arellano-Bond estimator was designed for small-T large N panels, like our 
panel data where large number of  countries(42 countries) are observed for a relatively 
short period of  time(12 years).   
 
Yit= ß0+ß1Yit-1+ß2Xit+ci + uit                                             (3.8) 
 
To eliminate the country specific effect, the first difference is taken. 
 
∆Yit= ß1∆Yit-1+ß2∆Xit+∆uit     (3.9) 
 
The transformation solves the problem of  omitted variable bias by eliminating c 
out of  the equation.  However, there still remains a potential endogeneity problem when 
the dependent variable and the new error term [uit-uit-1] are correlated.  If  the control 
variables are endogenous, i.e. E( )≠0, and E( )≠0, then this means that 
E( )≠0, so the lagged one period variable cannot be an instrument for 
( ).  The lagged two period value would be a good instrument variable in this 
case.  Here, E( )=0 and E( )≠0.  
On the other hand, if   is weakly exogenous, where both E( )≠0, and 
E( )=0, then E( )=0.  In this case, one lagged variable can 
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be a valid instrument for ).  
To get the consistent estimator in the dynamic panel model, one can choose within 
estimation eliminating ui or first differenced model, and instead use instrumental variable 
estimation to tackle the endogeneity problem.  However, within transformation is not 
proper because the lagged value of  dependent variable can be correlated with . 
 
iv) Dynamic Panel Data Approach: The System GMM 
 
Blundell and Bond(1998) maintained that estimators relying on lagged variables are 
weak instruments when the series are close to being ‘random walk’.  That is, 
( ) is weakly correlated with ( ).  Then, this affects the 
asymptotic and small sample performance of  the differenced estimator, leading to large 
variance of  the coefficient and finite sample bias.  This is particularly likely to be a 
problem when using the first differenced GMM with highly persistent series.  In this case, 
system GMM is preferred.   The system GMM estimator uses the levels equation to 
obtain a system of  two equations, one differenced and one in levels.  Thus the variables in 
levels in the second equation are instrumented with their own first differences, and this 
usually increases efficiency.  
To check the consistency of  the GMM estimators, we need to find out the validity 
of  the instruments.  To address this issue two specification test were conducted.  The 
first is a Sargan test of  over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of  the 
instruments by analyzing the sample analogs of  the moment conditions used.  The second 
test examines the hypothesis that the error term is not serially correlated.  In both First 
Differenced GMM and System GMM, we test whether the error term is second-order 
serially correlated, since the differenced error term is second order serially correlated by 
construction, even if  the original error term is not.  
 
(3) Data and Samples 
 
There have been many empirical studies examining the effectiveness of  policy or 
institution on the host country’s development.  However, most of  them were viewed in 
one country when they are time-series analysis.  There are some cross-country empirical 
studies with time series, but in that case it is usually done on the national economy level. 
There has not been many cross-country panel data analysis focused on a specific industry.  
It is mainly due to data availability problem.   The FDI or development statistics are 
mostly easily obtained at a country level, but it is hard to get industry level data cross 
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country, especially when the industry specification breaks down to sector level, e.g. 
automotive industry, or chemical industry, etc.  Many statistics offices offer aggregated 
industry data, such as manufacturing industry, service industry, and so on.34  It is even 
more difficult to collect consistent data of  cross-country industry data with times series.   
The industry development data are represented in domestically added value ratio, 
labor productivity, number of  enterprises, and number of  domestic OEMs.  These dataset 
was obtained from UNIDO(United Nations Industrial Development Organization).  
They offer industry statistics to ISIC 4 digit level.  The data used here include ISIC 3410-
Motor vehicle, 3420-Automobile bodies(coachwork), trailers and semi-trailers, and 3430-
Parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines. 
 
i) Value Added/Output 
 
The measure of value added covers: (a) value of materials and supplies for production 
(including cost of all fuel and purchased electricity); and (b) cost of industrial services 
received (mainly payments for contract and commission work and repair and maintenance 
work).  The measure of output covers only activities of an industrial nature. (a) the value 
of sale of all products of the establishment; (b) the net change between the beginning and 
the end of the reference period in the value of work in progress and stocks of goods to be 
shipped in the same condition as received; (c) the value of industrial work done or 
industrial services rendered to others; (d) the value of goods shipped; and (e) the value of 
fixed assets produced during the period by the unit for its own use.   
 
ii) Labor Productivity 
 
Labor productivity was computed dividing the total output by number of  employees in the 
automotive industry.  The output and number of  employee were obtained in UNIDO 
dataset. 
 
iii) Number of  Enterprises 
 
An “enterprise” is a legal entity possessing the right to conduct business in its own name; 
for example, to enter into contracts, own property, incur liability for debts, and establish 
                                            
34 Many national statistics offices offer industry data with rough categorization, mostly one-digit level 
classification at best, based on ISIC industry classification: i.e. manufacturing industry, agricultural 
industry, service industry, etc.   
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bank accounts. Value added and outputs would be the most direct indicator of  industrial 
growth.  However, weakness of  these variables was the volatility.  Number of  enterprises 
and employees was free of  this problem.  They showed consistent upward trend in most 
of  the countries.  Moreover, number of  enterprises in the automotive industry can be an 
indicator of  industrial growth.  Number of  business entities in the industry is closely 
related to the size of  the industry, and degree of  attractiveness of  the industry in the 
concerned country. 
 
iv) Number of  Domestically Owned OEMs 
 
Data on local manufacturer was obtained in HIS Global Insight, the worldwide research 
institution specializing in some industries including automotive industry.  Manufacturers 
producing more than 100 unit of  vehicles annually was counted.  
 
Independent variables are basically the same as those used in Chapter II.  What is 
different from Chapter II is that, here per capita GDP is used instead of  wage, and 
corporate income tax is omitted.  As for the LCR, same value was used in this analysis as 
in the empirical study in the Chapter II.  However, there is some modification to the 
variable in the panel data method.  Since differencing is generally used in the time-series 
analysis, the binary value of  LCR is not suitable for the panel data method: fixed effects 
model and dynamic panel data method.  Therefore, this time LCR is denominated by the 
accumulated number of  years that the LCR was in force.  That is, ∑1t LCRi is used in the 
panel data method.    
The sample is a panel data of  42 countries which produces vehicles and regularly 
publish production data.  Approximately 50 countries have automotive industry, but not 
all of  them provide with official data regarding the vehicle production.  The countries not 
producing vehicles were excluded from the sample, because it can lead to paradoxical 
results that countries without tight investment regulations have lower production or lower 
value added.  The time period of  analysis is from 1995 to 2006.  The reason the period 
was limited to 2006 is because as of  2010, not many data pertaining to automotive industry 
is available from 2007.  Also, extending the period beyond 2006 might be meaningless 
because in most of  the countries local content requirements expired before 2005.    
<Table III-3> is the summary statistics that will be used in our study.  There was 
limitation in our sample size: mainly because of  our inherent sample structure.  However, 
missing values in some years especially in the first four variables, which are our dependent 
variables, aggravated the sample size problem.   
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<Table III-4> Summary Statistics 
 obs mean Std. dev. Min value Max value Unit of Measure 
VA 367 0.650 0.179 0.219 1.000 % 
lProd 385 50498.25 37627.28 1608.514 178436.8 Billion $ 
Firms 378 1427.4 1937.81 1608.51 178436.8 # 
dOEM 504 1.198 3.164 0 26 # 
GDP 504 756.559 1703.765 12 13399 Billion $ 
Gcap 504 12419.32 12330.1 288.87 44822.96 US $ 
Growth 504 3.66 3.35 -13 12 % 
LCR 504 0.34127 0.47460 0 1 1, 0 
RTA 504 13.88 12.62 0 43 # 
CPI 485 5.165 2.329 1 10 Index 
Tariff5) 442 37.22 54.49 0 300 % 
 
The correlation matrix gives us the vague idea of  what out regression result might 
be.  Contrary to our presumption, LCR showed negative correlation to almost all variables 
except domestically owned OEMs and tariff.  RTA had mixed results: it had negative 
relationship with GDP, i.e. economy size, and positive relationship with GDP per capita, i.e. 
income level.  This fact can be intuitively explained that small countries try to have more 
preferential trade relationship to boost the market size.  Tariff  also had negative 
relationship with almost all variables.  It is interesting if  trade barrier or investment 
measure is both detrimental to the economy and industry development.  Transparency, as 
expected showed positive relationship with economic variables.  
 
<Table III-5> Correlation Matrix 
 VA Prod Firms dOEMs GDP Gcap LCR RTA tariff CPI 
VA 1.000          
Prod* 0.447 1.000         
Firms* 0.476 0.332 1.000        
dOEM 0.458 0.041 0.297 1.000       
GDP* 0.948 0.422 0.476 0.371 1.000      
Gcap* 0.467 0.746 0.396 0.080 0.483 1.000     
LCR -0.1948 -0.549 -0.366 0.039 -0.197 -0.578 1.000    
RTA -0.1085 0.438 0.156 -0.200 -0.106 0.476 -0.402 1.000   
Tariff -0.210 -0.417 -0.202 -0.068 -0.209 -0.495 0.395 -0.342 1.000  
CPI 0.237 0.603 0.126 -0.033 0.198 0.766 -0.558 0.472 -0.366 1.000 
Note: * In the correlation, this variable is included as ln(variable) 
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4) Result of  Regressions 
 
(1) Cross-sectional Regression 
 
Our basic benchmark model is a simple OLS based on the cross-sectional data.  
There is no time specification and all the economic variables are represented by the average 
annual growth rate.  Policy variables are simply averaged over the time period.  The 
binary variable, LCR is indicated as 1 if  the country once had enforced local content 
requirements, and 0 if  it never enforced the requirement.  Thus, only long term growth 
effects of  each variable are estimated.  We used four different dependent variables to find 
out different implications in each regression.  For independent variables, GDP, per capita 
GDP, number of  RTAs, tariff  rates on the passenger vehicle, CPI, and LCR was used.  
 
<Table III-6> Cross sectional regression with simple OLS 
 
Dependent Variable 
(1)Value Added(%) 
(n=40) 
(2)Labor 
Productivity 
(n=42) 
(3)Number of 
Enterprises 
(n=38) 
(4)Number of 
Domestic OEM 
(n=42) 
gdp 0.129* (0.103) 
-0.473 
(0.505) 
0.149 
(0.291) 
-0.025 
(0.032) 
cap 0.242 (0.383) 
-4.538 
(9.076) 
-0.796 
(1.006) 
-0.369 
(0.531) 
cap2 -0.042 (0.031) 
0.457 
(0.796) 
0.096 
(0.079) 
0.021 
(0.047) 
tariff -0.017 (0.012) 
0.002 
(0.283) 
-0.002 
(0.028) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
RTA -0.137** (0.051) 
0.387 
(1.339) 
0.226 
(0.140) 
-0.067 
(0.086) 
CPI 0.661** (0.273) 
-4.634 
(6.913) 
0.134 
(0.671) 
-0.196 
(0.408) 
LCR 0.142 (0.154) 
-1.092 
(3.879) 
6.435* 
(3.184) 
-3.250* 
(1.904) 
R-Square 0.3139 0.0571 0.2715 0.1343 
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
     Figures in the parentheses are standard errors.  
 
Goodness of  fit of  these models was generally low, and there was hardly any 
significant estimator.  The equation with value added and number of  enterprises relatively 
showed high R-square.   Coefficients of  LCR in these equations were positive, but only 
that of  equation (3) was significant.  Overall, this cross-sectional regression model had 
little explanatory power.  This may be due to the small sample, or some fallacy in our 
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assumptions.  Also, it suggests that just cross-country analysis of  growth effect is 
insignificant.  
 Now, we use the between effects model to compare with our cross-sectional model.  
Between effects model uses panel dataset, but it only looks into variation between panel 
entities, by averaging the variables within one group i.e. country.   
i= ß0 + ß1  + ui + i                                               (3.10) 
 i = , i = , i = , thus average value within each group.  
In this way, equation (4.5) actually transformed panel data into cross-sectional data.  ß0 
and ui are constant within panel, so they have the same value in this equation.  ß1 refers to 
marginal effect between countries, and therefore the result of  between effects model would 
be similar with our simple cross-sectional regression model.   
 
<Table III-7> Between Effects Model 
 
Dependent variables 
(1)Labor 
productivity (2)Value Added(%) 
(3)Number of 
Enterprises 
(4)Number of 
Domestic OEM 
Ln(gdp) 0.178** (0.082) 
0.003 
(0.022) 
0.774*** 
(0.1713 
1.225*** 
(0.356) 
Ln(cap) -0.244 (0.995) 
0.302 
(0.261) 
1.293 
(2.202 
2.841 
(4.522) 
Ln(cap2) 0.032 (0.061) 
-0.020 
(0.016) 
-0.077 
(0.132) 
-0.174 
(0.272) 
Growth -0.043 (0.053) 
-0.018 
(0.014) 
-0.032 
(0.130) 
0.976*** 
(0.321) 
RTA -0.006 (0.010) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.039* 
(0.020) 
-0.055 
(0.046) 
tariff 0.001 (0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
CPI 0.103 (0.073) 
0.003 
(0.019) 
-0.121 
(0.134) 
0.085 
(0.280) 
LCR 0.125 (0.293) 
0.131* 
(0.079) 
-0.027 
(0.062) 
0.216 
(1.231) 
R-Square 0.6769 0.3606 0.5058 0.5195 
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
       Figures in the parentheses are standard errors.  
       Here, R-square is between R-square. 
 
Thus, to resolve the sample size issue first, we used Pooled OLS method.  Here, 
we assume that there is no heteroskedasticity in the error term among panels.  In other 
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words,  does not change over i and t.  Then, the covariance matrix of  error term( ) 
would be like this. 
 
Ωt =    
 
This matrix signifies that there is no correlation between errors across groups of  
panel, and variance of  error term should be all . 
Four regressions showed somewhat different results.  Some variables showed 
opposite signs in different equations.  For example, coefficient for GDP was negative in 
Value Added equation(1), and level of  transparency(CPI) had negative coefficient in 
equation (3).  PTA showed opposite signs in equation (3) and (4).  Overall, Equation (2) 
and (3) showed high goodness of  fit, while there were the most significant variables in 
equation (4).  
 
<Table III-8> Pooled OLS with no heteroskedasticity 
Dependent  
Variable 
(1)Value Added(%) 
(N=354) 
(2)Labor 
Productivity 
(N=371) 
(3)Number of 
Enterprises 
(N=360) 
(4)Number of 
Domestic OEM 
(N=470) 
ln(gdp) -0.007 (0.008) 
0.191*** 
(0.026) 
0.732*** 
(0.050) 
1.570*** 
(0.113) 
ln(cap) 0.262** (0.111) 
0.291 
(0.361) 
0.922 
(0.622) 
1.674 
(1.359) 
Ln(cap2) -0.017*** (0.007) 
0.008 
(0.021) 
-0.049 
(0.038) 
-0.170** 
(0.083) 
Growth -0.002 (0.003) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
0.155*** 
(0.039) 
PTA 0.001 (0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.027** 
(0.011) 
tariff -0.000 (0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
CPI 0.003 (0.006) 
0.052** 
(0.021) 
-0.115*** 
(0.038) 
0.289*** 
(0.089) 
LCR 0.103*** (0.025) 
0.250*** 
(0.079) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
0.501 
(0.330) 
R-square 0.2294 0.6643 0.5284 0.3893 
Note: **: significant at 5% level, *: significance at 10% level 
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
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Among the economic variables, GDP was the most significant estimator.  
Industrial growth was quadratic function of  income level.  That is, the industrial 
development is accelerated to a certain level, but beyond which the development can be 
decelerated or in some cases, decline backwards.  This is a meaningful result because it 
reflects the real world where automotive industry shows higher growth speed in the 
developing countries than developed countries where market size is bigger.  LCR was 
significantly positive in three equations, and was significant in two of  them.  By imposing 
LCR, domestic share of  the industry output increased as well as the labor productivity.   
Now, we assume heteroskedasticity in the panel.  In the new equation, covariance 
of  error term,  in each panel was estimated.  In this case, covariance matrix at the time 
t would be like:  Here, we assume var( )=  , at all t.   
 
Ωt =    
 
<Table III-9> GLS model with heteroskedasticity 
Dependent  
Variable 
(1)Value Added(%) 
(N=354) 
(2)Labor 
Productivity 
(N=371) 
(3)Number of 
Enterprises 
(N=360) 
(4)Number of 
Domestic OEM 
(N=470) 
ln(gdp) -0.010* (0.006) 
0.183*** 
(0.011) 
0.742*** 
(0.025) 
0.952*** 
(0.055) 
ln(cap) 0.187** (0.086) 
o.155 
(0.225) 
1.449*** 
(0.386) 
0.487 
(0.601) 
Ln(cap2) -0.013*** (0.005) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.085*** 
(0.022) 
-0.065* 
(0.036) 
Growth 0.001 (0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.020) 
RTA 0.002*** (0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
Tariff -0.000*** (0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
CPI 0.001 (0.002) 
0.050*** 
(0.009) 
-0.071*** 
(0.012) 
0.120*** 
(0.037) 
LCR 0.106*** (0.016) 
0.143*** 
(0.050) 
-0.142 
(0.124) 
0.072 
(0.187) 
LR test Chi Sq = 228.86 Prob(Chi Sq)=0.000 
Chi Sq = 431.64 
Prob(Chi Sq)=0.000 
Chi Sq = 563.12 
Prob(Chi Sq)= 0.000 
Chi Sq = -14889 
Prob(Chi Sq)= 1.000 
Note: ***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significance at 10% level 
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
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Comparing with the <Table III-7>, we can find that the test result is similar; 
variables are related to dependent variable in the same direction; the standard errors are 
smaller, and therefore more variables became significant.  The LR test results rejected the 
null hypothesis that error terms are homoskedastic except in equation (4).  Thus, 
heteroskedasticity is confirmed in equation (1), (2), and (3).  LCR again showed 
significantly positive coefficient in equations with VA and Labor productivity. The 
magnitude of  coefficient decreased somewhat and the standard errors are in general 
smaller in this model, compared to the Pooled OLS model.   
Here, we allowed the covariances are different across panels, but we assumed that 
they are invariant within panel.  However, if  the covariances within panel are different 
from simply being panel heteroskedastic, then the estimates will be inefficient and the 
reported standard errors will be incorrect.  Therefore, we need to use panel approach to 
fix this problem.  
 
(2) Panel Approach with Fixed Effects  
 
In this section, we use full-blown panel approach.  We run regressions using fixed 
effects model.  As discussed earlier, the fixed effects model is used when we want to 
control for the omitted variables that differ between countries, which does not change over 
time.  In doing so, we can capture the change of  variables over time to estimate the effect 
of  each variable on industrial development.   
Fixed effects model has limitations in that it considers ‘within variation,’ but not 
‘between variations.’  In other words, it can analyze each variables growth effect within a 
country over time, but cannot tell how their effect can be different across countries.  On 
the other hand, random effects model considers both within variation and between 
variations.  However, since we have analyzed between group effects in the cross sectional 
analysis previously, we just use fixed model here.  Still, I will provide with Hausman test 
result to see which model fits better.  It basically tests whether the unique errors(ui) or 
individual effects are correlated with the regressors.  The null hypothesis is that they are 
not.  If  we can reject the null hypothesis, then the random effects produces a biased 
estimator, and therefore fixed effects are preferred.  According to the Hausman test result, 
we can reject the null hypothesis in all four equations, and therefore we accept that fixed 
effects model is preferred. 
In this approach, GDP Growth rate was added to the model to emphasize the 
impact of  growth dynamics of  national economies.  Here, also there was inconsistent 
coefficient sign issue.  As for the economic variables, equation (1) and (3), (2) and (4) 
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showed similar pattern; while for policy variables, equation (1) and (2), and (3) and (4) were 
rather similar.   
Among policy variables, LCR was the most influential variable on the industrial 
growth.  It was significant coefficient in all four equations.  It had positive effect on 
labor productivity growth, entry of  new firms both domestic and foreign.  However, it 
should be noted that it had negative impact on the domestic value against the total 
production.  LCR used to have positive impact on the domestic value ratio in the cross-
sectional regressions so far.  Next to LCR, RTA was the significant estimator.  It was 
positively related to the industrial growth.  
 
<Table III-10> Panel Approach with Fixed Effects Model 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1)Domestic Value 
Added(%) 
(n=354) 
(2)Labor 
Productivity 
(n=371) 
(3)Number of 
Enterprises 
(n=360) 
(4)Number of 
Domestic OEM 
(n=470) 
Ln(gdp) 1.034*** (0.285) 
-2.108***  
(0.588)    
1.441 
(0.958)     
-4.309*** 
(1.641)     
Ln(cap) -0.445 (0.324) 
3.332***  
(0.665)      
-0.314 
(0.953)      
12.158*** 
(1.851)      
Ln(cap2) -0.038*** (0.014) 
-0.026 
(0.031)     
-0.069* 
(0.041)     
-0.445*** 
(0.077)     
Growth 0.004* (0.002) 
0.015***  
(0.005)      
0.014** 
(0.006)      
-0.032** 
(0.014)      
tariff 0.000* (0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001)      
0.001 
(0.001)      
-0.002* 
(0.001)      
CPI -0.011 (0.013) 
-0.074*** 
  (0.026)      
0.011 
(0.038)      
0.104 
(0.080)      
PTA 0.001 (0.000) 
0.005** 
(0.002)     
0.012*** 
(0.003)      
0.011* 
(0.006)     
LCR -0.022*** (0.005) 
0.019* 
(0.011)     
0.050*** 
(0.018)     
0.082*** 
(0.028)      
R-Square 0.1105 0.5682 0.2614 0.1668 
Hausman 
Test 
Chi-sq=24.33 
Prob(Chi Sq)=0.0020 
Chi-sq=17.86 
Prob(Chi Sq)=0.0223 
Chi-sq=34.77 
Prob(Chi Sq)=0.0000 
Chi-sq=17.74 
Prob(Chi sq)=0.0132 
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
However, Fixed-effects will not work well with data for which within cluster 
variation is minimal or for slow changing over time.  Therefore, it might not be suitable to 
investigate the impact of  discrete variables such as policy effectiveness, because the policy 
does not easily change over time.   
Also, it should not be overlooked that there is endogeneity problem in our model, 
especially those economic variables.  GDP, as a proxy of  market size, may affect the 
 86 
growth of  automotive industry, but the opposite direction is also possible.  The industry 
growth can contribute to the GDP of  the national economy.  Similarly, Per capita GDP 
can be determinant of  industrial growth, and industrial growth can raise the overall income 
level of  the country.  This is especially problematic, because the significance and share of  
automotive industry in the national economy is very large, first of  all by its volume itself, 
and further its forward and backward linkage effect amplifies the effect.  This is not 
confined to economic variables.  High tariff  would affect the speed and direction of  
industrial growth somehow, and at the same time, the level of  tariff  would be influenced by 
the growth stage of  the industry.   The causality may run in both directions.  In this case, 
the regressors may be correlated with the error term.   
 
(3) Dynamic Panel  
 
To tackle this endogeneity problem, we now turn to dynamic panel model.  In the 
dynamic panel data model, lagged dependent variable is used as explanatory variable.  
 
Yit= ß0+ß1Yit-1+ß2Xit+ci + uit                                             (3.11) 
 
To get the consistent estimation using equation (3.11), we can get within estimator 
by assuming uit  as fixed effects.  In this case, however, there is a problem: the explanatory 
variable and error term are correlated, i.e., cov( 0.  Therefore, within 
estimator cannot be a consistent estimator.   
Another method is first differencing.  If  we first difference equation (3.11), ∆Yit-
1 becomes the explanatory variable, and ∆eit  becomes 
the error term.  Here, cov( 0 and therefore, first differenced estimator 
cannot be consistent estimator.  Therefore, to tackle this we need instrumental variable, 
and use first differenced 2-stage least square method(FD2SLS): we use DVt-2 as the 
instrumental variable. 
<Table III-11> is the regression result of  FD2SLS method.  Overall, the 
estimators are weak compared to the fixed effects model.  The lagged dependent variable 
was not significant in this method.  Only equation (3) had significant variables, growth 
and LCR.  Both showed positive and significant estimator.  In the rest of  the equations 
LCR showed negative coefficient, though insignificant.  From this result, it can be 
interpreted that LCR had positive impact on the firm entry in the domestic automotive 
industry.  Also, it had bigger influence on the growth than the national economic growth.  
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<Table III-11> Dynamic Panel Approach: FD2SLS 
 
(1)Value Added 
(%) 
(2)Labor 
Productivity 
(3)Number of 
Enterprises 
(4)Number of 
domestic OEM 
N=240 N=258 N=251 N=363 
Ln(DVi, t-1) 
1.142 
(0.803) 
-27.450 
(249.383) 
0.625 
(1.848) 
2.738 
(2.111) 
Ln(gdp) 0.034 (0.910) 
-59.393 
(491.955) 
-4.481 
(5.527) 
2.830 
(5.780) 
lcap 0.022 (0.995) 
85.550 
(727.221) 
2.598 
(2.441) 
-3.379 
(7.337) 
Lcap2 -0.003 (0.032) 
-1.845 
(17.076) 
0.087 
(0.191) 
0.039 
(0.214) 
Growth 0.007 (0.004) 
0.491 
(4.359) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
tariff 0.000 (0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.026) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
RTA 0.001 (0.002) 
-0.155 
(1.459) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
CPI -0.018 (0.031) 
0.669 
(6.658) 
-0.020 
(0.101) 
-0.378 
(0.285) 
LCR -0.011 (0.019) 
-0.326 
(3.518) 
0.080** 
(0.041) 
-0.101 
(0.195) 
R-Square 0.2201 0.2396 0.5171 0.7158 
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
      Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
This is in a great part due to the first differencing: we lost vast portion of  our 
observations.  This is especially problematic, because our sample has short span of  time.  
Therefore, we use Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator.  We get better result using 
this method, with much more significant estimators.  Equation (2) and (3) has the most 
significant variables.  Among policy variables, RTA and LCR were the most relevant factor 
to the industry growth.  LCR showed positive coefficient three equations except equation 
(1), and in two of  them they were significant at 1% level.  To conclude, LCR had positive 
impact on the productivity growth, and domestic firm entry.  Besides, the size of  
coefficient increased from the fixed effects model.   
To test the over-identifying restrictions issue, we do the Sargan test.  The null 
hypothesis is over-identifying restrictions are valid.  The higher the p-value is, the better.  
Here, Sargan test shows that we fail to reject the null hypothesis in the equation (3), that is, 
the instruments as a group are exogenous.  On the other hand, the rest of  the equation 
had over-identifying restrictions.  Due to small number of  countries in our sample, a large 
number of  instruments caused Sargan test to be weak.  Also, when there is 
heteroskedasticity, it is hard to rely on the Sargan test result, because the result can be due 
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to heteroskedasticity.  It would be better if  we could use second or deeper lags to find 
good instruments, but it reduces the sample size.  Since there is not enough number of  
countries in our sample, it would not be proper. 
 
<Table III-12> Dynamic Panel Approach: Arellano-Bond estimation 
 
(1)Value Added 
(%) 
(2)Labor 
Productivity 
(3)Number of 
Enterprises 
(4)Number of 
domestic OEM 
N=274 N=292 N=284 N=396 
Ln(DVi, t-1) 
0.512*** 
(0.116) 
0.107 
(0.081) 
0.396* 
(0.119) 
0.927*** 
(0.033) 
Ln(gdp) 0.068 (0.382) 
-3.501*** 
(0.666) 
-0.847*** 
(1.059) 
-3.222 
(2.033) 
lcap -0.034 (0.425) 
3.864*** 
(0.724) 
-0.114*** 
(1.039) 
6.045** 
(2.199) 
Lcap2 0.002 (0.018) 
0.017 
(0.033) 
0.046* 
(0.034) 
-0.157** 
(0.070) 
Growth 0.006** (0.002) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
tariff 0.000 (0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
PTA -0.001 (0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
CPI -0.006 (0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.032) 
-0.020 
(0.040) 
-0.118 
(0.074) 
LCR -0.006 (0.006) 
0.047*** 
(0.012) 
0.063*** 
(0.018) 
0.050 
(0.030) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
0.0622* 
0.0455* 
0.1910 
0.1834 
0.0774* 
0.6460 
0.2381 
0.1358 
Sargan 0.0041 0.0004 0.4383 0.0000 
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
      Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
The test for AR(1) process in first differences usually rejects the null hypothesis: in 
this case, only equation (1) and (3) rejected the null hypothesis.  Therefore, there is 
autocorrelation in , but there is autocorrelation in levels.  In the test for AR(2), since 
=  and  both have , it does not really 
matter even if  it detects second order autocorrelation in levels.   However, what matters 
is that we have first order autocorrelation in the equation (2) and (4), which suggests that 
these models may not have been correctly specified.  Therefore, we need to try other 
method.  
Sometimes, the lagged levels of  the regressors are poor instruments for the first-
differenced regressors.  Then we use the augmented version of  GMM, the ‘system GMM.’  
Below is the output table of  system GMM. Test results are better with system GMM 
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method.  There is no first-order autocorrelation issue except equation (4), and second-
order correlation is not found in all four equations.   As for over-identifying restrictions, 
however, this method is not free of  bias.  Except equation (3) with number of  enterprises, 
we reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.  Thus, we can reject the 
assumption that our instruments are valid in the (1), (2), (4) equations.  However, as 
mentioned before, it is hard to figure out whether the rejection of  null hypothesis is due to 
over-identifying problem or the heteroskedasticity problem.   
Compared with the DIFF-GMM method, less variables are significant in this 
method.  Excluding equation (4) with autocorrelation issue, policy variables were generally 
insignificant estimators.  Coefficient on the lagged dependent variable and GDP growth 
generally increased in the system GMM.  However, for LCR variable, the opposite 
happened.  Not only the magnitude of  the coefficient decreased a lot, but also the 
statistical significance reduced so that only LCR in the equation (4) is significant estimator, 
which we do not consider as valid model.     
 
<Table III-13> Dynamic Panel Approach: System GMM 
 
(1)Value 
Added(%) 
(N=313) 
(2)Labor 
Productivity 
(N=332) 
(3)Number of 
Enterprises 
(N=323) 
(4)Number of 
Domestic OEM 
(N=439) 
Ln(DVi, t-1) 
0.682*** 
(0.079) 
0.621*** 
(0.067) 
0.792*** 
(0.062) 
1.010 *** 
(0.027) 
Ln(gdp) 0.017 (0.028) 
0.191*** 
(0.051) 
0.340*** 
(0.096) 
0.032 
(0.159) 
lcap -0.057 (0.227) 
-0.586 
(0.550) 
-0.896 
(0.602) 
1.958* 
(1.070) 
Lcap2 -0.002 (0.013) 
0.042 
(0.0133 
0.027 
(0.035) 
-0.127* 
(0.067) 
Growth 0.007*** (0.002) 
0.023*** 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
tariff 0.001* (0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
RTA -0.000 (0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
CPI -0.014 (0.013 
-0.048* 
(0.029) 
0.027 
(0.039) 
-0.094 
(0.072) 
LCR -0.004 (0.004) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
0.031** 
(0.015) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
0.0307** 
0.0586* 
0.0004*** 
0.1679 
0.0042*** 
0.4993 
0.2465 
0.2042 
Sargan 0.0304 0.0000 0.0763 0.0000 
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
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So far, we have used various method of  panel data analysis.  To find out which 
method best estimates policy effect on industrial growth, we do the compared the results : 
Fixed effects model, 2SLS, and the two GMM method as in <Table III-14>.  Among the 
four equations with different dependent variables, number of  enterprises equation was 
selected because it was robust in all four methods.  Some economic variables, though 
statistically significant, showed opposite signs with different regression models.  Among 
them, GDP growth showed the most strong and consistent influence on the industrial 
development.  Among the policy variables, LCR was the most relevant factor, all showing 
positive coefficient.  The two variables’ coefficients through the different regression 
method showed similar magnitude and consistent sign.  Considering the goodness of  fit 
of  model and robustness, it seems that 2SLS and differenced GMM method is the most 
efficient model.  Next to number of  enterprises, labor productivity was affected by LCR 
the most, but in the 2SLS method alone, LCR exhibited negative coefficient, though 
insignificant.  .  Thus, it can be concluded that Diff-GMM method was overall the most 
efficient panel data analysis method.  
 
<Table III-14> Comparison of Various Panel Data Method 
DV=Number of 
Enterprises 
FE 
(N=360) 
2SLS 
(N=251) 
DIFF-GMM 
(N=284) 
SYS-GMM 
(N=323) 
Ln(DVi, t-1) - 
0.625 
(1.848) 
0.396* 
(0.119) 
0.792*** 
(0.062) 
Ln(gdp) 1.441 (0.958)     
-4.481 
(5.527) 
-0.847*** 
(1.059) 
0.340*** 
(0.096) 
lcap -0.314 (0.953)     
2.598 
(2.441) 
-0.114*** 
(1.039) 
-0.896 
(0.602) 
Lcap2 -0.069* (0.041)     
0.087 
(0.191) 
0.046* 
(0.034) 
0.027 
(0.035) 
Growth 0.014** (0.006)     
0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
tariff 0.001 (0.001)     
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
RTA 0.011 (0.038)     
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
CPI 0.012*** (0.003)     
-0.020 
(0.101) 
-0.020 
(0.040) 
0.027 
(0.039) 
LCR 0.050*** (0.018)     
0.080** 
(0.041) 
0.063*** 
(0.018) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
AR(1) 
AR(2)   
0.0774* 
0.6460 
0.0042*** 
0.4993 
Sargan   0.4383 0.0763 
Note: *: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level 
Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
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3. Conclusions and Implications 
 
1) Summary of  Findings 
 
So far, we have conducted empirical analysis on cross-country panel data, over the 
policy effectiveness of  LCR on the automotive industry development.   We have adopted 
four different dependent variables as indices industrial growth and development.  VA was 
used to measure quantitative growth, and also sound development from the upper value 
chain.  Labor productivity was used to capture the technology and efficiency growth.  
Number of  enterprises and domestic OEMs were also used to measure the quantitative 
growth, especially in the perspective of  industry base.   
In the simple OLS model examining the cross-country difference in the policy 
impact, LCR mostly showed positive coefficients, but only a few of  them was statistically 
significant.  This was the same with between effects model.  The weak test result is 
supposed to be caused by the small sample problem.  Therefore, to fix the sample size 
issue, we used Pooled OLS and panel GLS method with full dataset.  In both of  the 
regressions, we obtained consistently positive coefficient of  LCR in the domestic value 
ratio and labor productivity equation.  
By using fixed effects panel data method, the efficiency of  regression method 
increased and we obtained significance coefficient for LCR in all four equations.  
However, LCR in equation (1) showed negative coefficient, this time, which has been 
exhibiting positive sign so far in the cross-sectional approach.  Lastly, in the dynamic 
panel approach, the negative sign of  LCR in the VA equation continued, but it lost 
significance.  The rest three equations all exhibited positive coefficient, and most of  them 
were significant.  
Overall, cross-sectional approach was effective in distinguishing cross-country 
difference in the domestically produced value share, and labor productivity growth; while 
panel approach was more effective in finding the growth in the number of  firms.  This 
distinction is supposedly found due to the characteristics of  dependent variables.  
Domestic share of  value added is a variable that cannot grow infinitely over time, but it has 
significance in that it demonstrates the industry’s vertical structure and linkages between 
them.   Of  course, it could grow over time, but 100% of  domestically added value is 
neither a possible nor desirable state.  Generally, domestic value ratio close to 100% can 
be witnessed often in the less developed countries.35   
                                            
35 See <Table 4> in the Appendix III.  
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Therefore, as for this variable, cross country difference can give more implications, 
based on the LCR’s presence.  On the other hand, number of  firms has significance not 
in the absolute value itself, but its growth over time.  Comparing the number of  firms 
among countries hardly has any worth, but its growth signifies that the industry is 
expanding its base.  Labor productivity is somewhere in the middle of  these two variables:  
it is meaningful index of  cross-country comparison and also representing time-series 
growth.  Therefore, VA tend to be strong estimator of  growth in the cross-country 
comparison, while number of  firms and domestic OEMs are positively related to LCR in 
the time-series growth   In any aspect of  industrial development, LCR showed overall 
positive effect.  
 Acknowledgement should be made about the shortcomings of  the empirical study 
here.  The variable LCR was not really a elaborated indicator.  Here, the degree of  
intensity of  the requirement was not reflected in the variable.  Also, in the cross-sectional 
regression, it would have produced more powerful estimators if  we counted how long the 
LCR have been in place.  It would be better if  we could capture the intensity into the 
variable, but in reality, it was very hard to quantify the strictness of  the regulation, to make 
an objective variable.  Nevertheless, the actual enforcement issue and gap between the 
local content requirements the realized local content in the sector would still remains the 
data constraint in this kind of  study.  For example, in countries where no LCR was 
imposed, the actual level of  local content rate can be high.  Lastly, VA, the value added 
ratio, may signify the level of  local content in quantitative terms, but it does not give 
information on how strategically and technologically important parts are sourced and 
produced locally.  Even though the numbers are similar in two countries, one country may 
be the manufacturing base of  powertrains or transmissions while the other produces only 
low-tech parts.    
 
2) Policy Implications 
 
FDI may have uneven effect on the host country’s industrial and economic 
development.  The determinants of  effect turned out to be combination of  many factors: 
general environment in the host country, the investment strategies of  the MNCs, and the 
competitive relationship of  the host country in the context of  regional economy.  
Sometimes, countries with similar economic background showed different development 
path, and sometimes countries with hostile environment for foreign investors fared better. 
FDI into the host country does not itself  guarantee the industrial development and 
economic growth.  It is necessary to promote the linkages between foreign investors and 
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domestic firms ensuring that the local firms are incorporated to the supply chain of  the 
foreign investors and technology and know-how are diffused to the local industry.  
Therefore, it is certain that the host government has some role to play in attracting 
high quality FDI, and amplifying the benefits from the FDI.  In this context, LCR 
certainly played some role in transplanting and settling down the industry onto the ground 
of  the host country generated by foreign capital investment.  LCR can accelerate 
development and growth of  automotive industry.   
From the positive relationship between the domestically added value share and 
LCR, we can conclude that LCR can affect the shape of  the industry, especially in the value 
chain system.  From <Table 2> in the Appendix III, we can see that share of  value added 
against the total output tend to be large in the countries where LCR was enforced.  Also, 
from the positive results with labor productivity, it can be concluded that LCR can 
successfully enhance the development in intangible assets such as technology.  FDI itself  
signifies injecting more inputs to the economy; thereby it leads to factors accumulation-led 
growth.  On the other hand, the technology-driven growth is the spillover effect, which is 
positive externality from the FDI.   
Therefore, local content requirements should be understood as a development 
related, industrial nurturing policy rather than a trade-related investment measure.  This 
conclusion now leads us to the instrumental analysis of  local content requirements in a 
legal perspective in Chapter IV.  
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Chapter IV. Regulation of  TRIMs: WTO and Beyond 
 
Local content requirements, the most common form of  performance 
requirements, are frequent subject of  controversy in the legal sphere as well as economic 
and business field.  Actually, performance requirements are quite a material issue in the 
international economic law and will be more and more so in the future, as flow of  FDI 
grows further globally.  They are popular policy instruments for host governments in 
enhancing employment and industrial development as discussed in the previous chapters; 
but to the foreign investor, they are unwanted obstacle in performing free and efficient 
international business operation.  Due to conflicting interests, they have been often 
disputed between the two parties, and they should be found in either way: for or against. 
The controversy comes from the amphibious nature of  the performance 
requirements as a trade-related investment measure.  It is treated as investment measures 
and sometimes as trade measures as occasions demand.  In the WTO, they are officially 
categorized as Trade-Related-Investment-Measures.  That is, they fall under the 
overlapping area, but at the same time they are like a hybrid that belongs to no established 
classification.  The ambiguous status of  performance requirements has been the main 
cause of  the controversy and conflicts concerning them.  Secondly, they involve some 
ideological aspect, just as in the alternative question of  free market or welfare state.  Is 
liberalization of  investment and trade more important mission than defending the 
sovereign rights of  individual countries to pursue social and economic development?  The 
second cause leaves us in an even more complicated perplexity.  Actually, this is closely 
related to the issues and problems in shaping multilateral investment regulations, which we 
do not have yet.   
Performance requirements are at the heart of  all these complexity and controversy, 
and thus they works as a signal that reveals unfair and unjustified current legal regime and 
FDI and investment measures.  The legality of  performance requirements are still open to 
questions and debates.  Its conclusive interpretation and construction in the future would 
bring about substantial implications and economic impact.   
Thus, first part of  Chapter IV will look into how performance requirements were 
regulated in the current regime, namely by the WTO; and in the next section, the 
limitations and side effects of  the current system in regulating performance requirements, 
and also where these inadequacies come from will be analyzed.  In the final part, it 
proposes the better forum to administer LCR, the multilateral investment treaty; how it can 
better address the policy concerns that WTO has been disregarding and falsely accusing.  
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1. Theory and Practice in the Current WTO Regime 
  
Unlike international trade, international investment is not yet thoroughly 
incorporated into multilateral system of  rules.  There have been some attempts from early 
20th century, before the establishment of  GATT to no avail.  Meanwhile, as an outcome 
of  the UR negotiations, investment measures were dealt with in the domain of  multilateral 
trade system, via TRIMs Agreement and GATS although with limitations.  This was 
somewhat a reflection of  the times since 1980s when world economies were getting more 
and more integrated and multinational companies were mushrooming.  Also, it signifies 
that there was a sort of  awakening shared by majority of  countries that investment should 
be supervised in the multilateral setting as well as trade.   
Provisions on investments were dispersed in GATS, TRIMs, and DSU, and 
moreover, they were limited to trade-related-investment-measures.  Trade-related-
investment-measures simply referred to performance requirements.  The ‘trade-
relatedness’ of  performance requirements made it easily integrated into the rules of  
multilateral trade system.  However, it also meant that these measures were interpreted 
through the glass of  GATT although they are in fact investment measures.  Above all, 
WTO’s initial focus was to regulate trade-distorting measures rather than investment-
distorting measures.  
Until now, performance requirements are governed in the WTO as TRIMs.  They 
are strictly prohibited by TRIMs Agreement, GATT, SCM Agreement, etc.  As suggested 
above, it is the outcome of  negotiating history and the philosophy of  WTO, a form with a 
mission to expand free trade.  
As briefly introduced in Chapter I, there have been several disputes in the WTO 
pertaining to these performance requirements. (See Table 1-1)  Again, it is worth noticing 
that most of  them are related to automotive industry.  The background on why 
automotive industry is mainly associated with local content requirements has been explored 
in the previous chapters.  <Table 4-1> shows details of  these WTO disputes concerning 
performance requirements in the automotive industry.  In most cases, complainant alleged 
the violations of  the concerned measures with WTO obligations in the meaning of  GATT 
1994, GATS, SCM Agreement, and TRIMs Agreement.  Most frequent complainants are 
European Communities, United States, and Japan, so-called ‘Triad’ in the automotive 
industry.  They are home to the world’s biggest automobile manufacturers and the most 
extensive foreign investors as well.  That is, these kinds of  disputes are practically initiated 
by investors.  On the other hand, defendant countries are mostly developing countries.  
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<Table 4-1> WTO Disputes concerning performance requirements 
Case Name Complainant Invoked Articles 
Indonesia-Autos(1996) 
(WT/DS54, WT/DS55, 
WT/DS59, WT/DS64) 
Japan 
European Communities 
United States 
Articles I and III:2 of GATT 1994 
Article 5(c), 27.9, 28 of the SCM Agreement 
Articles 2.1 and 5.4 of TRIMs Agreement 
Canada-Autos(1998) 
(WT/DS139, WT/DS142) 
European Communities 
Japan 
Article I, III, XXIV of GATT 1994 
Articles 2 of TRIMs Agreement 
Article 3.1(a), 3.1(b)  of the SCM Agreement 
Article I:1, II:1, V and XVII of GATS 
India-Autos(1998) 
(WT/DS146, WT/DS175) 
United States 
European Communities 
Article III:4, Article XI of the GATT 1994 
Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of TRIMs Agreement 
Brazil-Autos(1997) 
(WT/DS51, WT/DS52, 
WT/DS65, WT/DS81) 
European Communities 
United States 
Japan  
Articles I:1, III:4, XI:1 of GATT 1994  
Article 2 of TRIMs Agreement  
Articles 3, 27.2 and 27.4 of the SCM 
Agreement 
Philippines-Autos(2000) 
(WT/DS195/1) 
United States 
Articles III:4, III:5 and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 
Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement 
Article 2 of TRIMs Agreement 
China-Auto Parts(2006) 
(WT/DS339, WT/DS340, 
WT/DS342) 
European Communities 
United States 
Canada 
Articles II and III of the GATT 1994   
Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement  
Article 2 of the Rules of Origin Agreement 
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement 
Source: WTO website 
 
Brazil-Autos case and Philippines-Autos case were supposedly settled and thus the 
panel was not established.  Besides the two cases, every case was reviewed by the body of  
panel and was found in violation with the WTO obligations.  India-autos and Canada-
autos case went on to the Appellate Body, where most of  the panel findings were upheld.  
The most recent case, the China-auto parts case, was concluded in 2009.  It also went on 
to the Appellate Body and the most of  the panel finding was upheld.  It is slightly 
different from other cases in that the subject concerned in this case is confined to auto 
parts instead of  autos.   
These dispute cases provide with valuable literature for the interpretation and 
enforcement of  performance requirements in the WTO.  Therefore, in this section the 
above cases will be reviewed by each relevant provision in the WTO agreement.  In doing 
so, it will stand out what are the issues and problems in the current regime, and how it 
relates to the realization of  loopholes and limitations of  the current system and 
furthermore, suggestions and guidelines for the multilateral investment regulations. 
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1) GATT 1994 
 
Tariff  and tax benefits were the most common form of  local content rules 
disputed in the cases in <Table 4-1>.  In this kind of  local content requirements, 
preferential tariff  treatment is provided for cars using more domestic parts and 
components.  This is different from mandatory local content rule in that import is 
allowed regardless of  the amount of  local content in the product.  There are basically two 
kinds of  tariff  discrimination: differentiated tariff  rates according to the amount of  local 
content, and the other is imposing different tariffs on products by shifting tariff  
classification based on the local content rates.  Sometimes the preferential treatment 
expanded to domestic tax system, such as excise tax or corporate tax.  Preferential 
domestic tax can have equivalent effect as tariff. 
Among the six cases pertaining to the performance requirements, there was no 
case that did not allege violation of  GATT 1994, and nearly all of  them were in fact found 
to be inconsistent with GATT obligaitons.  Article I:1, III:4, XI:1 are the most frequently 
invoked provisions.  Canada-Autos case 36  and Indonesia-Autos 37  case were invoked 
under Article I:1; and Canada-Auto case, Indonesia-Auto case, and India-Auto case were 
addressed under Article III:4.  There are also pre-WTO cases regarding host country’s 
measure in foreign investment invoked under GATT: Canada-Foreign Investment Review 
Act(FIRA)38 in 1984 and EC-Regulation on Imports of  Parts and Components in 199039 
were addressed under Article III:4.  
Mandatory local content rates in percentage of  value of  the product, or deletion 
list can be categorized as quantitative restrictions, and therefore found in violation of  
Article XI:1 of  GATT and also Illustrative List under Article 2 of  TRIMs Agreement, and 
thus directly prohibited in the current WTO regime.  They are also found violating Article 
III:4 of  GATT 1994 because it discriminates foreign parts and components against 
domestic products.  
In viewing the concerned requirements, foreign investor and host government have 
quite the opposite perspectives.  First, host government does not recognize products 
manufactured by foreign investors in its territory as domestic products until they qualify for 
                                            
36  Panel Report on Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry(WT/DS139/R, 
WT/DS142/R), Appellate Body Report on Canada-Auto(WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS/142/AB/R) 
37  Panel Report on Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry(WT/DS54/R, 
WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R) 
38 Panel Report on Canada-Foreign Investment Review Act(BISD 30S/140) 
39 Panel Report on EC-Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components(BISD 37S/132) 
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some value added requirements, such as local content requirements.   Thus, the host 
government would provide due treatment for foreign products, mostly imposing tariff.  
When the product contains substantial amount of  locally procured contents, then it is 
granted ‘preferential’ treatment against products from third country.  On the other hand, 
foreign investors see that their products should be accorded no less favorable treatment 
than the domestic products.  They regard their products not as foreign products and 
therefore not subject to border measures imposed on imported goods.   
It would be interesting to see which perspective the WTO panel and appellate body 
reports take in finding the cases; how they categorize foreign investor’s products in the host 
country: domestic or not.  Subsequent question derived from this observation is what are 
the criteria determining the nationality of  products.  Interpretation of  MFN and national 
treatment of  course comes to the forefront in this matter.  Therefore, among all the 
provisions of  GATT 1994, Article I and III are the most relevant and key provisions to be 
studied with particular attention.   
 
(1) Article I:1 MFN Treatment  
 
Basically, most favored nation clause in Article I:1 means that a contracting party 
shall extend foreign goods any preferential treatment given to any third country.  
Narrowly defined, the MFN treatment refers to equal treatment for all foreign goods, and 
the it refers to the equal treatment in the border measures, namely tariffs.  Thus, most of  
the disputes concerns claims about better treatment for products from certain origin.   
There are two cases which invoked Article I:1 to allege violation of  performance 
requirements..  The GATT regulates customs duties and internal taxes differently.40  
Internal taxes such as sales tax or consumption tax are covered under Article III, and 
ordinary customs duties are dealt with by Article I or II.  Here, GATT I:1 is applicable 
when it comes to preferential tariffs or tariff  exemptions on imports based on its origin.       
Such customs duty exemptions have been found inconsistent with GATT I:1 in 
Indonesia-autos case41 and Canada-autos case.42  In Indonesia-autos case, it was found 
that “sales tax exemption and customs duty exemptions (awarded to Korean imports) are 
inconsistent  with  GATT  I:1  in  that  the  concerned  measures  accords  advantage  to 
certain product”, and they were “not  accorded  to  all  like products”, and “advantage 
                                            
40 Para. 5.4 in the EEC –Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components(L/6657-37S/132) 
41 WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R 
42 WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R 
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was made conditional on criteria that is not related to the imported product itself.”43     
Canada-autos case was brought to the WTO by Japan and the EC, for its duty 
waiver to Big3 affiliated imports from the United States and Mexico under the Auto Pact44 
between the United States and Canada.  The panel also found that the “import  duty 
exemption is inconsistent with GATT I:1 in that, Canada granted an advantage to some 
products  for  some members,  not  all members”, and they were “not  accorded  to  like 
products from all members.”     
In addressing the above two cases, the first questions would be; are products 
concerned in the case like products; and if  so, under what criteria.  However, in both 
cases, when examining Article I:1, the panel did not go through the scrupulous reasoning 
to verify whether the discriminated products were like products.  Are they entirely foreign 
products?  Were the preferential treatment given based on product’s nationality or other 
criteria?   The preferential treatment was not accorded to all Korean cars exported to 
Indonesia, but only for those which met the conditions.  Also in the Canada’s case, there 
were clear requirements to be applied by the favorable treatment.  However, WTO just 
found that the favor granted to imports from Korea or Canada was not accorded to the 
imports from other origins immediately and unconditionally. 
Actually, findings under Article I were not directly related to performance 
requirements, but they reflect how the product is evaluated in terms of  geography and 
value added.  The WTO’s view is limited so that it understands foreign products as 
homogeneous, with no possible variation or exceptions.  In fact, there are numerous 
phases and status in terms of  product nationality: some products are not entirely domestic 
while some products are not entirely foreign.  In this highly globalized business world, the 
manufacturing process is widely disintegrated so that there are hardly any products which 
are produced as a whole in a single country.  In that sense, the criteria to determine 
whether one product is domestic or foreign might not be where the final process took 
place, but where the major portion of  value were added.  If  that is the case, preferential 
tariff  on products with high percentage of  local content are more than justified because 
those are closer to domestic product.   
The second question concerns not the product but the relationship between 
countries.  Some countries are bound by preferential trade agreements including FTAs.  
The issue of  preferential trade agreements was also covered in the Canada-Autos case.  In 
the panel procedure, Canada claimed that the concerned preferential treatment to auto 
imports from the United States and Mexico could be justified by the NAFTA agreement 
                                            
43 To find more detailed facts related to this case, see Chapter IV. 3. 1) (2)   
44 To find more detailed facts about the Auto Pact, see Chapter IV. 3. 3) (1) 
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and Article XXIV of  GATT.  However, it did not make the case because the i) duty 
exemption was provided to third countries not parties to the free trade area, and ii) the 
treatment was not accorded to all manufacturers operating in the free trade area.  Thus, 
the Auto Pact was found in violation of  GATT I:1, and was terminated since February 18, 
2001.  EC originally claimed that Canada and Mexico was not free trade area at the time 
of  concerned measure, and that Auto Pact lacks the legal validity authority to be addressed 
under Article XXIV.   
Therefore, strictly speaking, the panel reports did not give findings on the 
legitimacy of  the performance requirements, but they just pointed out that there was 
discrimination pursuant to the origin of  the imports.      
Thus, so far there have been no case where performance requirements in the 
investment measure were examined under Article I:1.  Also it seems hardly likely that the 
MFN principal applicability can be raised in any later case.  The MFN principle is only 
meaningful when it deals with foreign products.  ‘The most favored nation treatment’ 
means the most preferential treatment accorded to products from any countries except 
domestic products.  Therefore, if  the portion of  regional value content(RVC) of  a certain 
product is so large against the total value that the product can be regarded as domestic 
product as in the concept of  Rules of  Origin45, the concerned product can be under more 
preferential treatment exceeding the MFN treatment.  That is, these products can be 
immune from the MFN principle test.  
Nevertheless, there are dozens of  countries who signs preliminary agreements that 
liberalize trade on certain products before the principal FTA agreement is concluded, 
generally under the name of  Early Harvest Programs, although most of  the products in the 
list are usually automotive parts and components.   
 
(2) Article Ⅲ National Treatment  
 
Article III is the most frequently addressed provision in the performance 
requirements related cases: in fact, every case were examined under Article III.  Sales tax 
and customs duty benefits in conjunction with local content ratio requirements were found 
inconsistent with GATT Article III:4, in Indonesia-autos case, India-autos case46, and 
Canada-autos case.   
In Indonesia-autos case, the sales tax and luxury tax exemption based on local 
                                            
45 The relationship between local content requirements and rules of origin will be covered in more detail 
later in section 2. 
46 Panel Report on India-Autos(WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R) 
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content rates were found in violation of  Article III, because the discrimination was simply 
based on its origin or lack of  sufficient local content.  The panels opinionated that “…in 
our view, such an origin‐based distinction in respect of internal taxes suffices in itself to 
violate Article  III:2...”  In India-autos case, the measure at issue was the indigenization 
requirement and trade balancing requirement and was brought to the WTO.47  Regarding 
the trade balancing condition, the panel noted that “additional burden not incurred upon 
the purchase of a like domestic product obviously affect the competitive conditions of the 
imported  products.”  In Canada-autos case, the CVA requirements were deemed to 
“modify  the conditions of competition between domestic and  imported products,” and 
“thereby resulting in less favorable treatment to imported products.”  
Article III bears the most importance in addressing the issue of  performance 
requirements throughout the current system governing FDI. The principle of  non-
discrimination is a core and quintessence of  not only WTO obligations and but also the 
general international economic law.  In fact, in the TRIMs Agreement the exact provision 
of  Article III of  GATT is borrowed.  
Most of  the legal findings above mentioned invited the notion of  origin of  the 
products, in examining the validity of  the concerned measure within the meaning of  
Article III.  Here, if  the measure at issue is border measure, it is not proper to be 
reviewed under Article III.  However, in these cases, the border measures and internal 
measures are both addressed without clear distinction under Article III.  
Relevant case regarding this argument is the China-Autos case.  This case is a 
little different from the previous cases; here, the key issue was whether the measure at issue 
was border measure or internal measure.  Chinese customs authority were levying tariff  
for complete vehicle for some parts instead of  parts tariff, if  they were regarded as having 
the character of  complete vehicle.  Complainants claimed that their products were taxed 
in excess of  the like domestic products, while China argued that it was border measure, and 
thus they do not fall within the scope of  Article III.  If  it were acknowledged that the 
parts concerned, used in the production of  those cars with foreign brands, are considered 
as imported parts, China could claim that it can levy tariff  which is not imposed on 
domestic parts.  About the level of  tariff  issue, China could have imposed tariff  rates 
higher than parts tariff  on those core parts with the character of  complete vehicle, under 
new tariff  lines e.g. CKD.  The panel upheld complainants’ arguments and found that the 
Chinese customs measure was in violation with the national treatment principle.  However, 
it does not clearly show how it reached the conclusion that the measures are not border 
measures. 
                                            
47 To find more detailed facts related to this case, see Chapter IV. 3. 3) (2)  
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Generally, when disputing a certain measure under Article III, the prerequisite for 
the application of  Article III is the likeness of  the products which are alleged to be treated 
discriminatorily.  In Indonesia-autos case, India-autos case, and Canada-autos case, which 
provoked Article III, ‘likeness’ of  parts procured from local suppliers and imported parts 
from mostly the investor’s home country were examined.   
There is the issue of  interpretation of  ‘llikeness’ in the the non-discrimination 
principle.  Diebold(2010) claimed that the applicable standards of  non-discrimination is 
highly fragmented in the different sphere of  economic activities as above mentioned.  He 
argued that there are at least four kinds of  application standards of  non-discrimination 
principle: objective standard, economic standard, subjective standard, and combination of  
standards.  He analyzed that the fragmentation is caused in the process of  identifying 
relevant tertium comparationis48.   
Applying the objective standard or economic standard, it is more likely that 
domestic parts and imported parts, or domestic supplier and foreign supplier are viewed as 
'like' because they are in the same sector49 and in a competitive relationship as well.  
Therefore, when interpreting the concept of  non-discrimination in an objective or 
economic point of  view, preference for local procurement is likely to be found as violation 
of  non-discrimination.   
However, when applied by subjective standard, the result can be different.  This 
standard has been developed by various adjudicating bodies in order to balance the weight 
between international obligations aimed at trade and investment liberalization, and 
domestic non-economic policy objectives such as environment and consumer protection, 
and economic development.   Here regulatory purpose kicks in as the tertium comparationis 
as Diebold claimed.  For example, if  the measure is designed to protect the environment, 
then the products are compared on the basis of  their environmental impact.  
PPM(Process and Production Method) and LCA(Life Cycle Assesment) principle reflect 
environmental protection purpose applied in the interpretation of  the non-discrimination 
clause.  Likewise, if  the measure was drawn up for the purpose of  industrial development, 
then the products can be differentiated as long as they have different effect on industry 
development.  This kind of  teleological interpretation is becoming more prevalent these 
days, especially in the European court.  Are the vehicle mainly composed of  parts 
produced locally and the vehicle produced with mostly imported parts similar products in 
                                            
48 The quality of element which two ‘situations’ or ‘objective’ must have in common in order to conclude 
that they are ‘alike’ for the purpose of the comparison.  
49 NAFTA rules on investment protection adopted the economic interpretation of the ‘like circumstances’ 
concept as being in the ‘same sector’. 
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terms of  the industrial development effect of  the host country?  Then could not the 
differential tax treatment be justified as a legitimate policy instrument of  the host 
government just as tariff  is justified?  Perhaps the question is not whether the foreign and 
domestic suppliers or investors are in like circumstances but whether the differential 
treatment occurs in 'like circumstances'.  
 
(3) Article XI:1 Quantitative Restriction 
 
Quantity restrictions with regard to local content can take the form of  deletion 
programs or mandatory local content rates rule.  These kind of  LCR were often 
witnessed in the very early years of  industrialization in the developing countries, from 
1960s through 70s, and in some countries up to 80s.  Quantitative limitations on imports 
are strictly prohibited under GATT XI:1, which provides as follows; 
 
“No prohibition or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges whether 
made effective through quotas, imports or export licenses or other measures shall 
be  instituted  or  maintained  by  any  Member  on  the  importation  of  any 
product...” 
 
Three cases invoked Article XI: India-autos case, Brazil-autos case, and 
Philippines-autos case.  However, the latter two cases were settled before the panel was 
established, and only India-autos case was reviewed by the panel.  In this case, the 
indigenization requirement and trade balancing requirement were found to be violating 
Article XI:1, in that the indigenization requirement was import license based on local 
content level.  The actual language of  the panel finding was somewhat broad 
interpretation of  this Article.  It said, “any form of  limitations imposed on, or in relation 
to importation constitutes a restriction on importation within the meaning of  Art. XI”. 
Also the trade balancing requirement was found in violation of  this Article because it was 
restrictive condition placed on importation of  the product and limit the amount of  imports 
in relation to the export commitment; and thus acted as a restriction on the importation 
within the meaning of  Article XI:1.   
 There seems to be no controversy on this ruling: if  any kind of  license is required 
to import certain parts or components or the foreign investor is obligated to export certain 
percent of  locally produced products, it can be ruled as quantitative restriction and thus 
can be found in violation with GATT.  However, preferential tariff  or tax system based 
on the local content rate, the most common form of  local content requirements, is not 
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relevant with quantitative restrictions.    
 
2) SCM Agreement 
 
The SCM Agreement has close relevance to performance requirements including 
LCR.  First of  all, Article 1.1 of  SCM Agreement concerns foregone revenue that is 
“otherwise due”, that is financial rewards in the shape of  tax discount, and tax redemption 
which are government revenue foregone.  Those preferential sales tax or tariff  incentives 
in the Local Content Requirements are also “foregone revenues”, and thus lie in the 
coverage of  SCM Agreement.  In fact, these measures function as subsidies to certain car 
makers or parts suppliers because manufactures employing larger quantity of  local content 
get financial rewards in the shape of  tax discount, tax redemption, or other financial 
benefits.  This results in uneven competitive relationship between foreign investors since 
it constitutes de facto subsidy for the investor procuring inputs from local suppliers, and thus 
becomes the object of  SCM Agreement. 
SCM Agreement is widely mentioned in the performance requirements related 
cases.  Many trade law scholars including Edwards and Lester(1997) have recognized that 
the fundamental concept of  LCR is subsidy.  Since the ‘subsidy’ in the meaning of  SCM 
Agreement include general preferential treatment that can be converted to monetary value 
as well as cash infusion from the government, it can actually be applied to almost every 
measures regarding terms of  trade.  Indeed, every case except India-autos case invoked 
SCM Agreement to claim the case.   
 
(1) Article 3.1(a) and 3.1(b): ‘prohibited subsidy’ 
 
Article 3 addresses ‘Prohibited subsidies’.  Article 3.1(a) refers to export subsidy 
and 3.1(b) deals with subsidies contingent upon use of  domestic over imported goods.  
Therefore, export contingency stated in Article 3.1(a) can be applied to export obligation 
or export performance requirements.  Tariff/tax benefits based on local content rates can 
be examined under Article 3.1(b) which refers to subsidies contingent upon use of  
domestic over imported goods.   
In Canada-autos case, the production to sales ratio requirements and CVA 
requirements were found as prohibited subsidy.  The panel reviewed the ratio 
requirements under Article 3.1(a) and CVA requirements under Article 3.1(b).  The duty 
exemption in conjunction with the ratio requirements was a prohibited subsidy contingent 
in law upon export performance within the meaning of Art. 3.1(a), because the amount of 
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the duty exemption earned by a domestic manufacturer was directly dependent upon the 
amount exported.  Extending to subsidies that are contingent in fac" upon the use of 
domestic over imported goods, CVA requirements were also found as violation of SCM 
Agreement under Article 3.1(b).  
China-Autos case briefly mentioned SCM Agreement.  China argued that the 
measure was to prevent tariff circumvention for some parts, but the Panel upheld 
complainants’ accusation that the measure worked as a subsidy for Chinese parts, because 
additional duties on imported parts were in fact favoring the use of domestic parts.  
 
(2) Article 5(c): ‘actionable subsidy’ 
 
Article 5 falls under the part of  ‘actionable subsidy’.  While most of  the 
performance requirements are reviewed under Article 3.1, Indonesia-autos case was the 
only occasion when Article 5 was provoked.  In Indonesia-autos case, the panel found 
that the duty and sales tax exemptions under the 1996 National Car Program were “specific 
subsidies” which had caused serious prejudice through significant price undercutting under 
Article 6.3(c) to like imports of  EC imports under Article 5(c).  Unlike the Canada-autos 
case, Indonesian regulations did not require export performance in granting favorable 
treatment.  In this regard, the 1996 National Car Program was reviewed under Article 5(c) 
instead of  Article 3.1, and instead ‘specificity’ was the key issue.  In this case, the 1996 
measure did not specify a certain manufacturer, but since the favorable treatment was 
granted pursuant to the use of  domestic parts over imported parts, the specificity was 
acknowledged.  
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3) GATS 
 
GATS also address investment issues in its mode 3: supply of  services, i.e. 
commercial presence, as stipulated in Article I:2(c).50  Therefore, there is a shared issue 
between the GATS and the prospective multilateral investment agreement.  However, it 
might possibly cause juridical conflicts in terms of  legal principles, jurisdiction, and 
sometimes economic aspects.   The GATS define country of  origin of  services based on 
the different mode of  supply.  In the first two modes of  supply, the concerned service 
acquire the origin of  services supplying country, i.e. host country in our language; whereas 
in commercial presence or presence of  natural persons, the origin of  service follows the 
origin of  service supplier.  Therefore, the origin depends on the ownership or the equity 
structure of  the service supplier.  If  Hyundai’s distributor in South Africa is subsidiary of  
Hyundai Motor Company in Korea, the origin of  services provided by the distributor is 
Korea; but if  it is the independent corporation, its origin would be South Africa.     
 
(1) Article II:1 Most-favored-nation treatment  
 
Canada-Auto case is the only WTO disputes case provoked under GATS.  
Complainants challenged Canadian government’s import duty exemption scheme favored 
wholesale services and service suppliers of  the United States, violating the MFN treatment 
of  GATS.  Canada argued that the duty exemption was accorded to only goods, but not 
the services. In this part of  case, Canada won in the Appellate Body Process, which 
reversed most of  the panel finding.  
There were a couple of  important issues in this case.  First, it touched upon 
origin of  the service supplier and vertical integration of  automotive industry.   
Determining the origin of  the supplier can be tricky sometimes especially when the 
ownership of  the supplier is dispersed.  There are many joint venture firms and plants in 
FDI in the automotive industry.  In fact, Panel failed to determine the country of  origin 
of  CAMI, which was a 50:50 joint venture company between Suzuki and GM.  There are 
                                            
50 Article I. Scope and Definition 
2.  For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a service:  
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member; 
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member; 
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other 
Member; 
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the 
territory of any other Member. 
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numerous 50:50 JVs established in China. Vertical integration is another sensitive issue in 
the automotive industry.  The key issue is whether the distributor deals with brands only 
from its affiliates or it can carry multiple brands.  It has issue linkage with competition.   
 
(2) Article XVII National Treatment 
 
Article XVII of  GATS provides National Treatment principle as follows: 
 
1.   In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of 
services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services 
and service suppliers. 
2.  …… 
3.   Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less 
favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services or 
service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any 
other Member. (Emphasis added) 
 
In essence, it looks analogous with its counterpart provision in GATT.  Here, as in 
GATT, no less favorable treatment is conditioned on ‘likeness’ and equal ‘competitive 
relationship’.  Panel in the Canada-Autos case examined the discrimination effects by each 
mode of  service supply.  Interestingly, the Panel found that the CVA requirements did not 
discriminate between Canadian service suppliers and foreign suppliers present in Canada, 
though it saw de facto discrimination between services provided by the suppliers of  Canada 
and other countries.   
However, there still is confusion in service supplier’s origin issue.  In fact, it is not 
clearly stated in the language of the agreement, how to determine the rules of origin of 
services.  In the EC-Banana case, country of origin of the service supplier was determined 
based on multiple criteria: the ownership or control test and the substantive business 
operation test.  They would mostly lead to the same results, but sometimes they might 
bring about conflicting interpretation.  Therefore, clarifying the origin issue would be an 
important task to be tackled by WTO and GATS, or some new treaty governing 
investment matters.  It needs to be harmonized and elaborated. 
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4) TRIMs Agreement 
 
TRIMs Agreement, as an integral part of  the WTO agreements, prohibits trade 
related investment measures that are inconsistent with Article III of  GATT, mostly 
performance requirements as stipulated in Article 2.1 and 2.251 and the Illustrative List in 
the Annex of  the Agreement.  This agreement most directly forbids performance 
requirements among the many WTO rules.  
TRIMs including local content requirements were seen by MNCs as a constraints 
in doing business worldwide.  US also were enthusiastic supporter for MNCs.  Therefore, 
it played a vital role in concluding TRIMs Agreement at the Uruguay Round negotiation.  
However, US were not the advocate of  MNCs from the beginning.  As inward FDI 
increased in the United States by Japanese firms in the early 1990s, there were growing 
demands to ensure that foreign firms have sufficient local content and contributed to the 
United States economy and technology base, but these demands died down as the pace of  
inflows of  investment slowed down, and the general recognition that Japanese investors 
had overpaid for their investments was spread. 52   If  inward FDI kept increasing 
afterwards, the TRIMs agreement might have been different from what it is now.  
Thus, TRIMs Agreement came into being.  So far, it is the most newly built 
instrument treating the international investments.  However, it is hardly an investment 
treaty in many aspects.  It needs to be further scrutinized whether it is well balanced and 
legally reliable agreement in light of  the negotiating history and stakes by different groups 
of  countries.  
 
(1) Establishing the Measure as Trade-Related-Investment-Measure 
 
In examining performance requirements under this agreement, it should be first 
established that the concerned measures are investment measure.  In the India-Auto case 
and Indonesia-Autos case, the panel first examined the existence of  TRIMs, whether 
measures are investment measures.  There was a debate on whether performance 
                                            
51 Article 2 National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions 
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any 
TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994 
2. An illustration of list of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment 
provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 and the obligation of general elimination of 
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the 
Annex to this Agreement.(emphasis added) 
52 Lawrence(1997) 
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requirements were trade measure or investment measure in both cases.  Both of  the 
defendants claimed that the measures at issue were trade measure and not investment 
measures, and thus cannot be ruled in the context in the TRIMs Agreement.  Thereon, 
panel found that the concerned measures were investment measures as follows. 
 
“…We find that these measures are aimed at encouraging the development of a local 
manufacturing capability for complete motor vehicles, and parts and components in 
Indonesia.    Inherent  to  this  objective  is  that  these measures  necessarily  have  a 
significant  impact  on  investment  in  these  sectors.    For  this  reason, we  consider 
that  these  measures  fall  within  any  reasonable  interpretation  of  the  term 
“investment measures.”53…” 
 
It is odd that these two countries both claimed that the LCR was trade measure, 
instead of  investment measure.  It can be presumed that the reason India made this claim 
is that these measures are clearly prohibited in the TRIMs Agreement, with hardly any 
room for extenuation.   It was definitely losing game for them if  the panel examined the 
measure under TRIMs Agreement, while they could give it a try to make their case under 
GATT or SCM Agreement.      
These performance requirements, named as ‘trade-related-investment-measure’ 
can be indeed seen both as investment measure and trade measure.  However, in essence, 
performance requirements are investment measures since they are imposed on foreign 
investors, and their impact on trade is incidental.  The DSB first examines whether they 
are investment measures, and then move on to find their trade-relatedness. In Canada-autos 
case and China-auto parts case, , TRIMs agreement was provoked but unfortunately, the 
Panel exercised judicial economy and did not make finding on TRIMs Agreement because 
the measures already were found to be inconsistent with Article III:4 of  GATT.  
If  the measure at issue proves to be both investment measure, and related to trade, 
it is whether the concerned measures are covered in the Illustrative List in the Annex, and 
at the same time, whether they are consistent with Article III of  GATT.  In Indonesia-
autos case, the Panel found the 1993 Program to be in violation of Art. 2.1 of TRIMs 
Agreement because the measure was a "trade-related investment" measure; and the 
measure, as a local content requirement, fell within paragraph 1 of the Illustrative List of 
TRIMs in the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement, which sets out trade-related investment 
measures that are inconsistent with national treatment obligation under GATT Art. III:4. 
                                            
53 Panel Report on Indonesia-Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R 
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(2) National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions 
 
Article 2.1 of  TRIMs Agreement specifies National Treatment principle as in 
GATT 1994.  Thus, TRIMs Agreement prohibits those measures by the host country that 
can discriminate foreign investor merely based on its nationality, and significantly changes 
competitive relationship between domestic products and products by the foreign investor.  
In other words, National Treatment principle is at the core of  this short agreement.   
However, it is noteworthy that there is no separate article laying down the 
Principle, as in GATT or GATS54.  The scope and definition of  National Treatment in 
TRIMs Agreement is vague to some extent.  The scope of  National Treatment in GATT 
is foreign goods in comparison with domestic goods, whereas it would have to be foreign 
investors and their products in comparison with domestic firms and their products in 
Investment Agreements.  Based on common sense, since it is investment agreement, 
though it is trade-related, it should be dealing with investor as well as its products.  
However, when it clearly quoted provisions of  GATT 1994, it would be improper to go 
beyond the established legal interpretation arbitrarily, and on the other hands, it is 
questionable if  it is acceptable to just borrow the core principle from other agreement, and 
that from trade agreement instead of  investment agreement.  Of  course, there can be 
opinion that TRIMs Agreement cannot be seen as investment agreement.  However, then 
it is worth consideration whether TRIMs Agreement is a trade agreement.  
Also, quantitative restrictions that mandate use of  domestic products or 
exportation of  the products produced by the foreign investors are prohibited again in 
TRIMs Agreement.  As in the Article XI of  GATT, this part of  TRIMs Agreement can 
do without controversy. 
 
(3) Illustrative List55 
                                            
54 There is a separate article for National Treatment in GATS: Article XVII articulated that the concept 
of non-discrimination is applied to both the service and service provider.  
55 Illustrative List in the Annex of TRIMs Agreement  
1 TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 
of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic 
law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an 
advantage, and which require: 
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic 
source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of 
products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production; or 
(b) that an enterprise’s purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related 
to the volume or value of local products that it exports. 
2. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of general elimination of quantitative restrictions 
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Illustrative List of  TRIMs Agreement enumerates various performance 
requirements as prohibited.  They are local content requirements, trade balancing 
requirements, foreign exchange balancing requirements, import restrictions, and domestic 
sales requirements.  If  the measure falls under one item of  the list, it then be prohibited 
as unlawful measure.  Due to the existence of  this List, there is practically no chance of  
evading the WTO law with performance requirements under the current system. 
  
                                                                                                                                
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or 
enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is 
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict; 
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production, 
generally or to an amount related to the volume or value of local production that it exports; 
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by 
restricting its access to foreign exchange to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows 
attributable to the enterprise; or 
(c) the exportation or sale for export by an enterprise of products whether specified in terms of 
particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of 
volume or value of its local production.(emphasis added) 
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2. Issues and Problems in the Current System  
 
1) Questioning the Efficacy of  the Current System 
 
(1) Circumvention of  Tariff  by disguised FDI 
 
One of  the policy objectives of  local content requirements in most countries is to 
deter circumvented trade by foreign companies.  In fact, considerable number of  vehicle 
manufacturer export KD kits under tariff  lines imposed on parts and components to the 
market country and sell complete cars duty free after assembly process.  This is called KD 
export strategy, substituting for CBU export strategy when penetrating a market with high 
tariff  barriers.  Also, this strategy is particularly effective when the target country’s tariff  
structure is escalated.  In many countries, automotive industry is subject to escalated tariff  
structure, where tariff  moves higher as the goods are more processed with more value 
added: that is, lower tariff  is imposed on parts and components and higher tariff  is 
imposed on complete vehicles.56  It is alleged that this structure is extensively used among 
developing countries because it helps raise the degree of  protection.   
However, it is often not so much for the protection purpose as it is widely believed 
when it comes to the local manufacturers’ procurement cost.  Usually, developing 
countries’ parts industry is underdeveloped, and therefore local manufacturers depend 
largely on imported parts to build the complete vehicle.  In this supply chain structure, 
high tariff  on parts lead to high cost in manufacturing cars, leading to poor 
competitiveness of  the local auto makers.  Therefore, many developing countries set low 
tariff  on parts and components whereas they keep tariff  on complete cars very high.  
In this background, it gives foreign manufacturers incentives to build assembly 
sites in the market by importing CKD kits from their home country at a much lower tariff.  
In other words, there are FDI in certain cases with a view to circumventing tariff.  This 
happened most often in the Southeast Asian countries and also BRICs countries, where the 
tariff  barrier is relatively high, and also escalated.  In the initial stage of  local production, 
                                            
56 China, most ASEAN countries, EU, most Latin American countries have this kind of tariff structure.  
Exceptions are US, Korea and Australia which impose same tariff rates on complete cars and parts.   
 
<Table > Tariff structure of automotive industry in various countries  
 United States EU China Korea Malaysia Brazil Australia India 
Cars 2.5% 10% 25% 8% 30% 35% 10% 100% 
Parts and 
components 2.5% 3~4.5% 10% 8% 25~30% 18~35% 10% 12.5% 
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the motivation was to circumvent the high tariff  of  these countries.  If  we look at the list 
of  defendant countries in the WTO cases regarding the performance requirements, we can 
easily notice that they are mainly ASEAN or BRICs countries.57  They are developing 
countries with their automotive industry at an early and growing stage, and of  course with 
high tariff  barriers as well as escalating tariff  structure.  China tried to prevent 
circumvented exports by foreign manufacturers by treating KD modules containing core 
parts such as powertrain and transmission with higher tariff, as was the subject of  conflict 
in China-Autos case, but to no avail. 
In fact, there is some disparity in situation between ASEAN and BRICs.  In India 
and China, the domestic market size is large enough for the foreign investors to fulfill 
economies of  scale.  Therefore, auto makers can build production facility with large 
production capacity, and oftentimes they are accompanied by investments by their own 
subsidiaries or committed suppliers.  In this way, these foreign manufacturers can form 
their own supplier networks along with the vehicle assembly line.  However, in ASEAN 
countries, their market size is not so big enough to build large capacity plants with annual 
production capacity over 300,000 units.  Usually, the plants operated in ASEAN region 
are with annual production capacity around 50,000 units, not exceeding 100,000 units at 
most.  With this small to medium size operation, the investors cannot develop their own 
supplier network nor is it easy to procure from local suppliers due to quality problems, 
standard issue, and various others reasons.58  Therefore, ASEAN countries are more easily 
exposed to circumventive imports by foreign auto makers and thus these countries tend to 
keep local content requirements.  Even China and India are sensitive about the 
circumventive imports, and they used to enforce local content requirements.  
However, the current system prohibiting local content requirements cannot 
prevent from these practices by foreign firms.  These rules are designed to protect firms 
engaged in international business, but equal weights should be weighed on the prevention 
of  circumventive or abusive activities by multinational corporations, and the system should 
not indulge in the transgression of  the rules.59  
                                            
57 Russia is still under the negotiation stage to join the WTO and thus not a member of WTO yet.  
Russia has all the common characteristics of developing countries trade barriers.  The tariff is relatively 
high(25% for the complete passenger vehicles) and the tariff structure is escalated.  Also, Russian 
government is regulating local procurement schedules for locally producing foreign manufacturers. See 
Appendix II. 4 for more detail.  
58 As explained in Chapter III, outsourcing is not a simple matter in the automotive industry due to its 
closed and integral architecture.  
59 There was a dispute regarding the alleged circumvention of duties by a foreign firms and the host 
country’s attempt to block them by levying anti-circumvention duty, the EEC-regulations on parts and 
components case.  At the time, the panel did not acknowledge EEC’s arguments.  
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(2) Rules of  Origin as a Substitute for Local Content Requirement 
 
In fact, many countries are controlling the level local contents produced by foreign 
manufacturers in their territory, without violating the WTO obligations.  Ironically, many 
of  them are developed countries.  It became possible by the proliferation of  FTAs and 
the preferential Rules of  Origin as a part of  them.  This is not de jure performance 
requirements, but can act as de facto performance requirement.  It is largely utilized 
especially in countries belonging to a large economic bloc; the model example is the United 
States as a member of  NAFTA.   
For instance, since North America became the free trade area bound by NAFTA, 
global enterprises began making direct investments in this region in order to take advantage 
of  the huge market.  These firms construct production facility in one of  these countries 
and goods produced in these plants are exported duty-free to NAFTA area and sometimes 
to Latin American countries.  Many global vehicle manufacturers are operating production 
facility in the NAFTA region.  Initially, they target consumers in the host country only, 
but as they build-up the facilities to a larger scale, they begin to expand their coverage to 
the adjacent markets, mostly within the economic bloc.  In order for the host government 
to prevent circumvent trade, and for the foreign investors to benefit from the preferential 
tariff  treatment, the foreign investors have the burden of  proving the domestic origin of  
the products when they export their products to countries within the free trade area.   
When exporting its cars from India to Thailand, Toyota can be treated with 
preferential tariff  by Thailand, as long as the Thai authority acknowledges that the Toyota 
vehicle was made in India by fulfilling the percentage of  Regional Value Added.  In other 
words, to be subject to the preferential tariff  under the FTA, the manufacturer should 
prove that the concerned product was produced within the Indian Territory.  Here, Rules 
of  Origin kicks in to determine whether the cars are indeed ‘made in India’.  Since these 
days manufacturing process is decentralized globally, one cannot conclude the nationality 
of  a product by looking at where the final process took place.  Among some criteria of  
determining the nationality of  the product, the most commonly used criterion is the 
‘Regional Value Content’ standard60, i.e. percentage of  local value. 
Specific rules of  origin are different from products to products, and as for the 
automotive products, the rules are usually tighter than other products.  Generally, the 
products have to meet the two criteria: changes in tariff  classification criterion and regional 
value added criterion.   
                                            
60 Along with RVC standard, ‘Change in tariff heading’ standard is the most commonly used method in 
the automotive industry when determining the origin of the good.  
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There is an increasing tendency that local content rules are implemented through 
Rules of  Origin rather than tariff  differentiation or tax benefits.  It is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, since the proliferation of  Free Trade Agreement.  It has also something to 
do with the global auto makers’ global production strategy: basically they pursue 
localization, but not just in terms of  sales market but also considering the relevant market 
in terms of  segment.  For example, Toyota has built production facility manufacturing 
300,000 units of  small segment vehicles in India.  Vehicles produced there are principally 
for sales in India but not all of  them.  Some of  them are exported to neighboring 
countries like Thailand and Malaysia, or sometimes to Europe, or even to Brazil, where 
small size vehicles are dominant segment.  In this case, India is the manufacturing hub of  
small segment vehicles and it is also an export base of  Toyota in the South Asia region.  
Thus, Rules of  Origin was devised as a technical regulation necessary in the field 
of  international trade and transactions, but combined with the preferential trade 
agreements; it becomes economically significant item, so as to influence trade flows or 
investment decision.  Falvey and Reed(1998) recognized that ROO has trade-diverting 
effect; Krishna and Krueger(1995) found that ROO have export protection effect.  More 
recently, Cadot et al(2005) demonstrated that ROO can work as an export subsidy with an 
theoretical and empirical analysis of  the Mexico’s exports to the US under the NAFTA 
Rules of  Origin.  They found out that in order to export goods from Mexico to the US 
duty-free, they are forced to buy US intermediate goods, and therefore the preferential 
tariff  treatment on the condition of  acquiescence to the ROO, in fact work as an export 
subsidy for the US intermediate goods industry.  Duttapupta and Panagariya(2002) proved 
that FTA becomes joint welfare diminishing after inclusion of  ROO, in a theoretical model. 
What these economists tried to show that ROO is as a matter of  fact trade protection 
measure, and therefore undermine the economic benefit of  free trade arrangements.  
However, we need to note on the fact that the similarity between their arguments and what 
the WTO panel has made.  Like the Rules of  Origin, LCRs have been oftentimes accused 
of  the same charges: they distort or divert trade, protect domestic firms from foreign 
imports, work as a export subsidy, and provoked under GATT and the SCM Agreement.  
One does not have to look up the academic articles in search for the theoretical 
evidence.   It is happening in the automotive industry everywhere in the world, in the 
United States, Europe, and Southeast Asian countries.  For example, if  Toyota produces 
vehicles in Mexico and exports those to the US and Canada duty free, it has to procure 
most of  the parts and components needed from local suppliers.  In NAFTA, the value-
added necessary for the passenger vehicles to qualify as originated from NAFTA is 62.5% 
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in net cost method.61  Toyota has achieved so high level of  local procurement as to make 
the TPS work almost as in Japan.  Hyundai and Kia also have strived to increase their 
local content rates since they built the plants in the US.62   
Thus NAFTA value-added criterion to be eligible for the preferential tariff  
practically does function as local content rule.  If  not, those foreign makers are to be 
subject to the MFN tariff, not the internal preferential tariff  among NAFTA countries63.  
There is no trade bloc that does not have this kind of  Rules of  Origin.  In the European 
Union, for zero tariff  treatment among the 27 member countries, the regional value should 
be above 60%.  In ASEAN and MERCOSUR, the RVC should be above 40% and 50%, 
respectively.  In short, foreign manufacturers have more incentive to match the necessary 
regional value according to the Rules of  Origin especially when the host country has struck 
FTAs with many countries, or it is a member of  a regional economic bloc, such as EU, 
NAFTA, or ASEAN.  Thus, the Preferential Rules of  Origin is technically not a 
performance requirement, but it constitutes a de facto local content rule in effect. 
 
<Table IV-2> Value Added Criteria in Some Countries under Rules of Origin in the 
Preferential Trade Agreements  
Party Details 
US 1) In NAFTA ROO, 62.5% of RVC is required in net cost method. 
EU 2) In various FTAs with other countries, EU set RVC at 60% 
ASEAN 3) 40% in terms of transaction value  
Brazil 4) 50% of the F.O.B 
Source: 1) NAFTA Annex 401 Section B: Specific Rules of Origin 
1) European Community-Mexico FTA  Annex III Appendix 2 
2) ASEAN Rules of Origin for the CEPT(Common Effective Preferential Tariff) 
3) Mercosur Treaty of Asuncion, Annex III Rules of Origin Article 2 
Note: 3) and 4) are general rules of origin, whereas 1) and 2) are specific rules of origin, 
applied to motor vehicle products only.  
 
                                            
61 The Chapter III.2(1) and Annex III of the NAFTA Agreement stipulates that manufacturers producing 
in the United States can export vehicles free of import charge to Canada or Mexico, only when they meet 
the NAFTA Rules of Origin, which is 62.5% of regional value added in Net Cost Method.  This is way 
higher than other tariff items in the NAFTA as well.as those in other FTAs.  For example, they are 50% 
in net-cost method US-Australia FTA, 40% in build-down method in AFTA, and 35% in net-cost method 
in US-Korea FTA.and other tariff items in the NAFTA as well. 
62 There is a grace period for this rule.  For the first 5 years of local production, the US government 
acknowledges domestic origin for cars with 50% of local contents. 
63 Canada’s external tariff for passenger vehicles is 6.1% and Mexico’s external tariff is 50%, whereas 
internal tariff among the three members would be 0 %.  
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In other words, Value Added Criteria can effectively work to promote local 
procurement while not violating the WTO rules.  The two measures are different in name, 
and in legal status, but their legality is exactly the opposite: one is prohibited local content 
requirements and the other is legitimate tool to prevent from tariff  evasion or 
circumvented trade.  It is interesting that one of  the policy objectives of  LCR is to deter 
circumvented export by foreign investors.  Moreover, how they work to promote local 
content is almost identical.  By qualifying for the certain level of  local or regional content, 
the product could be subject by more preferential tax or tariff  treatment.  Therefore, host 
governments can achieve the same policy goal as good as the local content requirements, 
with the Rules of  Origin.  Hence, these preferential trade arrangements and Rules of  
Origin make prohibition of  performance agreements in the TRIMs agreement incapacitate.  
Other than the efficacy issue, there are a couple of  more problems.  First one is 
equity problem.  Preferential Rules of  Origin is an effective tool for countries which has 
struck many FTAs or belongs to a large regional bloc.  However, for countries with few 
FTA networks, it does not work the same way.  For example, manufacturers have more 
incentive to meet the regional value criteria in the United States or in Europe, while they 
are not that encouraged to do so in the less developed countries such as Uzbekistan or 
Egypt.  Therefore, it induces more investment to the already developed countries or 
regional hub countries, whereas it does not contribute to the development of  
underdeveloped countries.   That is, when approached from the Rules of  Origin 
determination rather than performance requirements, its benefits accrue to certain 
countries as to deepen the disparities in industrialization among countries.   
Second problem is that this kind of  preferential rules of  origin stirs up countries 
to engage in more regional trade arrangements such as FTA to gain leverage so as to be 
qualified as the export base in the region.  The biggest demerit of  preferential trade 
agreements is the distortion of  trade and impairing the benefits of  MFN principle.  
Already, there are too many FTAs in force, and even more FTAs are in progress, under 
negotiation or consideration.  The proliferation of  FTAs can act in such a way that it 
lessens the countries’ commitment to multilateral liberalization.  As globalization of  
manufacturing advances more widely and deeply, countries will be motivated to engage in 
more bilateral arrangements, ending up with one big messy spaghetti bowl. 
Also, it is conflicting with many significant goals such as investment promotion, 
competition, and development since it is mainly serving trade promotion purpose.  This 
will be discussed in the next section.  
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2) Conflicts with Other Policy Objectives 
 
(1) Trade vs. Investment 
 
The basic explanation why performance requirements are prohibited in the TRIMs 
Agreement is that it distorts trade.64  Without performance requirements, there would 
have been more exports from the home country.  The foreign investor makes overseas 
plant so that it avoids the vehicle tariff, and also exports its intermediate goods.  However, 
the foreign investor could have produced its vehicles in the home country without having 
to sacrifice its volume of  exports in the first place.  This is like having the cake and eating 
it, in the part of  foreign investor.  The rationale of  trade-distorting effect is in some sense 
absurd.   
From a different point of  view, performance requirements can serve to promote 
investment into the host country.  As noted earlier, local content requirements can induce 
more investment in the upstream industry, i.e. parts and component industry.  In this 
sense, trade and investment can be complementary, but sometimes directly substitutable 
with each other: the intermediate goods could be either imported from the home country 
or locally produced by the foreign suppliers which made FDI jointly with the foreign OEM.  
That is, by imposing such measure on the FDI, the foreign investor company should buy 
components from local source instead of  sourcing from its home country mother 
company or affiliated suppliers.    
Thus, in situations where trade and investment are substitutable, current system is 
favoring trade at the expense of  investment.  Also, it can be said that the rule favors 
foreign investor than the host country.  Trade and investment are the two pillars of  
international economy.  However, due to the substitutional relationship between trade and 
investment, it is very likely that one pillar is repressed in order to enhance the other.  Most 
of  the time, the repressed pillar is investment.  In the development point of  view, FDI 
contributes more directly and rapidly to the development of  less developed countries.   
If  it is desirable to promote trade, why not promote investment?  If  more FDI 
flows into the developing country, it could help develop the country’s manufacturing 
industry and further national economy.   Between the trade flow into the country and the 
investment flow, which would be more efficient in its development?  There are three 
dimension of  conflict: trade vs. investment, MNC vs. host government, developed country 
vs. developing country.   
                                            
64 It is also alleged that TRIMs distort investment also, but in the WTO system, the investment distortion 
is not yet a topic of discussion. 
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However, more important questions rise from this point.  FDI, by its nature, 
substitutes trade, and thus reduces trade volume: based on this visible data, it is prohibited 
in the WTO because allegedly it is distorting trade.  Perhaps, we should rethink the matter 
from ground zero.  Do performance requirements indeed distort trade?  Performance 
requirements should be distinguished from ordinary trade barriers.  Performance 
requirements are mostly aimed at investment promotion and industrial development.  It 
should not taken for granted that trade should have priority over investment.  
Certainly, in the current system of  rules, a policy objective of  investment 
promotion is hard to enforce.  If  TRIMs Agreement is the predecessor of  multilateral 
investment agreement, then it should be regulating investment distorting measures, instead 
of  trade distorting measures?  If  TRIMs Agreement bans trade distorting measures, it is 
another chapter of  GATT.  
 
(2) Investor Protection vs. Competition 
 
Since the first Ministerial Conference in Singapore 1996, trade and investment was 
regarded closely associated with competition policy issue.  Roughly, there are four types 
of  anti-competitive business practices: horizontal restraints, vertical restraints, practices by 
one or more firms in abuse of  a dominant position, and anti-competitive mergers and 
acquisitions.  These firm behaviors are oftentimes practiced by foreign investors, and 
therefore investment instruments should be able to deal with competition issues.  
Focusing on the automotive industry, the biggest competition issue is vertical 
integration.  As discussed earlier, vertical integration is the peculiarity often witnessed in 
the integral industry, and automotive industry is the most typical integral industry.  
Therefore, when an auto manufacturer first invests in a foreign country, it usually starts 
from KD assembly.  By doing so, it can effectively penetrate a foreign market while 
preserving the vertically integrated supply chain.  In fact, in the WTO Working Group 
discussion on Trade and Investment, India pointed out that many MNCs were still 
procuring parts and components from their subsidiary or affiliated company.  This is less 
desirable circumstance for the host countries because it does not lead to employments, 
development of  industry, and further macroeconomic growth impact. 
Also, the intra-firm trade within the MNCs enables many anti-competitive 
business practices.  Transfer-pricing is common in the cross-border transactions among 
vertically integrated automotive firms.  The parent company provides parts to its overseas 
subsidiary at high price to reduce the profit of  the overseas subsidiary.  Thus, profit 
increases for the parent company at home, while it saves tax it has to pay to the host 
 120 
country government.  This definitely would not be a desired form of  investment for the 
host country.  
 Therefore, for host countries attracting FDI in automotive industry, breaking 
these vertical restraints would be the main policy task.  India argued that local content 
requirements were the handy tool for this purpose.  Hence, local content requirements in 
the automotive industry are related to competition policy in two ways.  It could put 
foreign suppliers at a competitive disadvantage, but at the same time, for host country’s 
suppliers, it could open an opportunity to compete with vertically integrated foreign 
suppliers, and thus guarantee level playing field.   
M&A is another issue in the investment regulation, and they occur frequently in 
the automotive industry, as discussed earlier.  It is true that sometimes host country’s 
reduction of  regulatory barriers in investments results in the creation of  monster foreign 
conglomerates by M&A that builds high barriers against entry of  domestic firms.  
General public is more repulsive towards M&A of  domestic firm by foreign company. To 
tackle these situations, host country should be entitled to control admission and operation 
of  gigantic MNCs, especially in the less developed countries.   
Hence, the question is how and where the balance should be sought, in the 
protection and consideration of  both the host country and MNCs. The current regime, 
mainly controlled by GATT and TRIMs Agreement is more inclined to MNCs rather than 
the host country.   
 
(3) Trade promotion vs. Development 
 
Almost every motor vehicle producing country has been imposing performance 
requirements, such as local content requirements and trade balancing requirements, for 
some period at least.  In general, there are several reasons: 
 
i) to protect the parts upstream industry. 
ii) to influence the effective protection for the final goods producers. 
iii) to preserve foreign exchange(especially trade balancing requirements). 
iv) to create a spill-over effect for the upstream industry(i.e. backward linkage effect). 
v) to build a industry cluster in the territory. 
 
The main objective of  performance requirements imposed by host country, 
especially developing countries, is development of  the domestic industry and building its 
own viability.  By imposing local content requirements, host country can attain two goals: 
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first, more market opportunity for the domestic firms, and second more investment inflow 
into the country.  For example, in the automotive industry, local content requirements 
encourage car markers to procure parts and components from local suppliers; or to 
establish its own subsidiary or sometimes invite existing vendors to produce in the vicinity 
in the host country.  In this way, local content requirements magnify the linkage effects of  
FDI.  
In the WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment discussions, developing 
countries including India and Malaysia claimed that performance requirements such as 
technology transfer, export obligation, local content requirements were necessary for 
protecting infant industry and promotion of  domestic export industry.65 Development 
purpose can be pursued by technology transfer, which can constitute a separate 
performance requirement, but also can be effected through local content requirement.  
 
A. Flexibility for Development 
 
Developing countries seek FDI to promote their economic development.  Direct 
investment generates domestic production, employment, and growth.  Therefore, it is very 
closely connected to development issue.  However, at the same time investment 
agreement, be it bilateral, regional, or multilateral, to a certain extent limit the policy 
options for governments in pursuing their development objectives.  For example, to 
magnify the development effect by the FDI, governments are tempted to rule employment 
of  nationals, procurement from local vendors, and so on.  This could boost the growth of  
the host country rapidly, especially when the host country is at the infant stage of  
development.  Therefore, many existing investment agreements texts allow for flexibility 
for developing countries in various modes and provisions.  
This flexibility can be pursued in different ways; by distinguishing between 
categories of  countries, e.g. developing countries and developed countries; by providing 
provisions relating to stages and degrees of  participation; or by limiting the substance of  
treaty obligations, e.g. granting exceptions or escape clause, or just giving transition period 
to assume obligations.  
Article 5.2 and 5.3 of  TRIMs Agreement are phasing provisions granting extra 
period of  time so as to enable developing countries to get ready to assume fully and 
entirely their international obligations. These transitional arrangements do not create 
permanent rights, but acknowledge that developing countries may not always be in a 
                                            
65  There were also dissenting opinions that performance requirements including local content 
requirements had little effect on industrial development. 
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position to act in the same manner as developed countries.  However, even for the least 
developed countries, the transition period is 7 years.  Now that 12 years passed since the 
launch of  WTO, this provision is only effective for newly joining members.  That is, there 
is no flexibility remaining for developing countries as far as TRIMs Agreement is 
concerned.  
 
B. Respect for the National Policy Objective  
 
Investment issues get into more national and sovereign area because it is 
happening in the national territory, whereas trade occurs across borders.  Therefore, it is 
perhaps naturally and politically correct to give more room for the member country’s 
authority.  However, the TRIMs Agreement puts trade and investment no the equal 
footing, but perhaps from the viewpoint of  trade.  Perhaps the current system, while 
excessively absorbed in finding the discriminatory treatment based upon nationality, may be 
overlooking and undervaluing the policy objective and its implications.   
 Also, there are some opinions alleging that the Agreement advocates the interests 
of  multinational companies.  Therefore, if  the new agreement does not bend ear to 
developing countries’ voice and embrace development issues, it would not be able to 
vindicate itself  from the reputation that it serves the interests of  MNCs in the developed 
countries.  
 
3) Limitations as a Legal Instruments 
 
(1) Narrow Scope  
 
After many fruitless efforts to set up multilateral investment rules in various 
forums, starting from ITO, UN, to OECD, the investment agenda came to GATT.  
However, the WTO system, designed primarily to deal with trade in goods, and secondarily 
trade in services, was not ready to deal with and regulate investment matters as a whole, 
and all the less in the multilateral setting.  As a matter of  fact, at that time the WTO was 
not so ambitious as to establish comprehensive investment regulations dealing with 
investment matters from A to Z, but only touched upon issues that overlapped with trade 
in goods and services.   
Therefore, the current investment regulation in WTO, i.e. TRIMs Agreement, is 
very limited in scope of  its coverage.  In other words, the agreement confined its 
jurisdiction to the impact of  investment measures that distort trade in goods, and did not 
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deal with the investment per se, and left the rest of  the whole other investment issues 
uncovered: liberalization of  investment, protection of  investment, dispute settlement, etc.  
In case of  investment in service industry, it is relatively well covered by GATS.    
Since the current investment regulations represented by TRIMs Agreement is not 
comprehensive in dealing with investment issues, it is hard to view the Agreement as a 
separate and independent investment agreement and, it does not suffice as a legal 
instrument when investment related disputes take place.  Therefore under the current 
system, one has to draw on all other possible instruments which have even slight relevance 
to investment activities.  That is why the current multilateral system of  rules on 
international investment is often referred to as a ‘patchwork’, a derogatory remark criticize 
the gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies of  WTO rules on investment.66  Moreover, since it 
is linked to trade in goods issue, it has to depend on GATT and other agreements to make 
the case legally applicable.  This will be discussed in the next section. 
 
(2) GATT dependency and Redundancy  
 
Hence, it came up with TRIMs Agreement, which was limited and incomplete in 
terms of  coverage and formality, and many disputes involving investment activities still had 
resort to GATT and SCM Agreement.  TRIMs Agreement is linked to GATT 1994 in 
terms of  its application, as stipulated in the Article 2.1 and 2.2(Footnote 10) and the 
Illustrative List(Footnote 11).  As explained before, the core of  TRIMs agreement is i) 
national treatment for the foreign investor and their expatriate products, and ii) no 
quantitative restrictions on these products.  TRIMs agreement borrowed the principles 
and obligations from GATT.  In case of  GATS, though many of  its definitions and 
principles came from GATT, it has separate provisions to elucidate them, whereas TRIMs 
agreement just quotes some articles in GATT.  Being as it is now, TRIMs agreement looks 
like a sort of  sub-agreement to the GATT.  
The GATT dependency is clearly stated in the panel report of  Indonesia-Autos 
case. Panels noted autonomous legal existence of  TRIMs Agreement, but they concluded 
that it was linked to GATT 1994 in terms of  application, in that the Illustrative List was 
extended from Article 2.1 and 2.2, and to establish violation, the concerned TRIMs should 
be inconsistent with Article III or Article XI.  Thus, WTO panel also admitted that the 
TRIMs agreement was not in itself  legally viable, but it should borrow some principles and 
rules from GATT67. 
                                            
66 Brewer(1998) 
67 Indonesia-autos case Panel Report(WT/ ) 
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From a different angle, by the same reason, TRIMs Agreement overlaps in great 
part with GATT and some part of  the Agreement is not necessary at all, because existing 
obligations under the GATT 1994 were sufficient to illegalize performance requirements.  
The FIRA case 68 , which concerned about local content requirements and export 
performance requirements was dispute before the WTO and thus without TRIMs 
Agreement.  The Panel concluded that the local content requirements were inconsistent 
with the national treatment obligation of  Article III:4 of  GATT, and it did not need 
TRIMs Agreement.69  
The redundancy can be aggravated when mixed with inconsistency and 
contradiction.  GATT and TRIMs agreement are sometimes inconsistent with each other 
in certain provisions.  Brewer(1998) pointed out that “the TRIMs agreement provides for 
the phased elimination of  practices that were arguably already disallowed under the 
GATT” and claimed that the TRIMs agreement is retrogressive.  Well, in the ordinary 
principles of  law, special laws are prior to the general laws when they contradict to each 
other, and this can be applied to this case.  However, this inconsistency is better to be 
resolved when the new multilateral rules are 
 
(3) Trade-orientedness 
 
The very fact that the various performance requirements including local content 
rules have been addressed under GATT provisions and TRIMS agreement based on GATT  
means that these are understood as trade rules.  This fact has great importance and 
implications, and also leaves lots of  rooms to be tackled.  
   At the core of  the TRIMs Agreement and other provisions of  GATT that apply to 
performance requirements is ‘national treatment’ principle and ‘like product’.  The 
concept of  national treatment can be extended to investment as well as trade, although 
slightly different.  In fact, the concept of  ‘like product’ per se is very trade-oriented idea.  
In trade point of  view, products that are made of  local contents and those that are made of  
imported contents can be like in nature.  However, in investment point of  view, those two 
can be ‘unlike’.  Vehicles produced with locally procured parts and components and 
                                            
68 This is an investment dispute between the United States and Canada.  The Foreign Investment 
Review Act (“FIRA”) (BISD 30S/140, 1984) of Canada required from foreign investors purchase of 
certain products from domestic sources(local content requirement) and the export of a certain amount of 
percentage of output(export performance requirement) as a condition for the approval of investment 
projects.   
69 However, the panel could not find violation in the export performance requirements under GATT.  
Brewer(1998) also pointed out that the list of illustrative list of TRIMs agreement does not include export 
performance requirements in particular, and thus the list is not exhaustive.  
 125 
vehicles just assembled from imported CKD kits can be like products in the view of  trade.  
However, they could bear totally different meanings and implications considering the 
impact they can bring to the host country: employment effect, backward linkage effect to 
the local suppliers, etc.  In this context, Dimascio(2008) has claimed that 
nondiscrimination in trade treaties and investment treaties should be applied differently. 
On the other hand, even in the forum of  trade, things can be interpreted 
differently when a little more consideration is made to other policy objectives than trade 
liberalization.  The good example would be ‘environment’ issue.  There is a prevailing 
consensus that products made with environment-friendly process no more the ‘like 
products’ as the products made with process damaging environment.  If  the current 
system regards these two kinds of  products as ‘like products’, it is understanding the case 
only in the convention of  trade, and disregarding all the other policy objectives.   
That is, local content requirements and other performance requirements, although 
they are investment measures with close relevance to trade, if  seen under the frame of  
investment, the legal interpretation could be dissimilar.  They are prohibitive measures in 
the framework of  trade, but in the perspective of  investment and national policy, they have 
their solid rationale and justification.  As long as the investment regulation is drafted and 
implemented in the current system in the WTO, this trade-orientedness would not easily 
disappear even if  the legal text is extended in scope and reinforced.  
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3. TRIMs in the Investment Treaties 
 
1) Why should TRIMs be Regulated in the Investment Treaty? 
 
MAI was discarded more than 10 years ago, but it is not because negotiators were 
entirely against the languages in it.  It was rather a scapegoat in the history of  
globalization.  General mood at that time in the international community regarding the 
foreign investment was somewhat different from now.  Around the time when MAI was 
negotiated, there was a vague sentiment of  fear or repulsion towards the MNCs, and 
developing countries were very careful about making commitment to the international 
obligations on investment liberalization.  Earlier than that time, the object of  fear was 
targeted at western empires, from the delusion of  colonial era.  Perhaps, it is about time to 
resume the negotiation of  multilateral investment treaties when developed and developing 
countries can come to the negotiating table with equal footing and voice.   
Researchers and experts in the field of  economic law roughly reached a consensus 
on the necessity of  international cooperation with regard to international investment.  
This also leads to the consensus on the establishment of  a multilateral investment treaty.  
Many scholars and experts are positive about creating multilateral rules on FDI.  
Nieuwenhuys and Brus(2001) urged the birth of  multilateral investment treaty to replace 
and supplement MAI, as an upgraded version.  They mentioned the possible and 
appropriate forum for negotiations on the agreement.  Sikkel(2001) went one step furtuer, 
to discuss how to establish a multilateral framework for investment.  There is hardly any 
opinion denying the necessity or role of  multilateral investment treaty or opposing the 
creation of  one.   
Since the desirability or necessity of  investment treaty is not the topic of  this 
dissertation, we assume the necessity of  multilateral investment treaty.  Rather, the topic 
of  interest here is why we should address TRIMs in the investment treaty.  This question 
can be answered in three stages.  First, why TRIMs should be addressed in the investment 
framework, and secondly how it would be different from being in the trade setting, and 
finally what would be the efficacy and utility therefrom.   
 
(1) Legal Relevance: Investment Aspect of  Performance Requirements  
 
 Here, the matter at issue is to find the most relevant law that performance 
requirements can be addressed and regulated.  More concretely, does performance 
requirements have to be regulated in the multilateral investment treaty or is it fine to be 
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handled with multilateral trade agreements.  The most simple and plain answer would be 
as follows: in order to match the source of  law and the measure of  concern.  In other 
words, performance requirements are investment measures, and therefore it should be 
covered in the investment regulation.  
 There is a fundamental nature of  investment that is distinct from trade.  Trade 
and investment were long addressed jointly in the history of  international treaties, because 
trade in goods was most of  the time made by natural persons living abroad and selling 
goods in foreign nations. Therefore, trade was an activity where goods, investment, and 
aliens were involved.  Thus, the border between trade and investment was vague and 
perhaps meaningless.  Take the example of  FDI in the automotive industry.  GM and 
Ford did not sell automobiles to European consumers by export from the United States.  
They established distributor company and production facilities in Europe. .  In today’s 
definition, FDI was sometimes preceding trade.  In the meantime, early efforts to regulate 
trade in specific agreements made distinction between trade and FDI.70  So far, for about 
a century, as trade liberalization progresses, trade and investment were recognized 
separately, and were addressed in the separate jurisprudence.  
 Investment is a form of  economic activity, closely linked to trade.  Yet, it is 
different from trade in many ways.  Investment is more directly connected and deeply 
involved with domestic economy and policy environment.  The recent convergence since 
the launch of  WTO, of  course with much more weight on trade, has resulted not from the 
two regimes having a common origin, but because most of  the direct investment these days 
is accompanied by trade in goods, as the boundary between the two regimes has become 
fuzzy again.  The fuzziness has given birth of  TRIMs Agreement, and posed investment 
at a lower position than trade.   
 As explained in the previous section, TRIMs agreement tackled performance 
requirements as a trade measure when it is an investment measure which is at most related 
to trade.  Maybe, prohibition on performance requirements in TRIMs agreement is clever 
movement of  dealing with investment matters with trade rules, thereby making things 
easier for foreign investors.  The current situation has resulted largely because 
performance requirements were unduly covered in the trade-oriented framework.  If  we 
go on dealing with investment matters with trade rules, we would go on taking on the 
adverse effect that we discussed in earlier section.  Therefore, by relocating it to the 
relevant source of  law, they can be illuminated properly and justifiably. 
  
                                            
70 DiMascio(2008) 
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(2) Interpretation of  Non-discrimination Principle 
 
Non-discrimination obligation is the key doctrine governing almost every 
international treaty on economic activities: trade in goods and services, and intellectual 
property rights.  In the investment treaties as well, non-discrimination and the national 
treatment to the foreign investors would be the core and quintessential element.  MAI 
also listed non-discriminatory and national treatment.   
Non-discrimination treatment pertaining to investment is generally divided into 
pre-entry treatment and post-entry treatment, and as in the case of  trade in goods, national 
treatment would be invoked in terms of  post-entry treatment.  It is to guarantee foreign 
investors no less favorable circumstance than the local enterprises in the actual operation 
after establishment.  In other words, if  a certain measure does not put a foreign investor 
in a disadvantageous position compared to the national investors, then it is treated non-
discriminatorily.  
As in the national treatment in GATT, ‘likeness’ would be the core and crucial 
concept in determining the relevancy of  the treatment.  There could be several ways of  
verifying likeness: i) goods or services, ii) the firm or investor, and iii) most broadly, the 
circumstances.  Therefore, it should be clarified whether it is non-discrimination between 
domestic goods and goods imported by foreign investors as a result of  trade, or non-
discrimination among domestic firms and foreign investors which are provider of  the 
goods at hand.  In GATS, it is plainly expressed that the concept of  non discrimination is 
applied to both: the service and the service provider.  On the other hand, in TRIMs 
Agreement, it is not clearly stated, but just quoted as ‘provisions of Article III of GATT 
1994.’  Chances are that in TRIMs Agreement, it only meant national treatment among 
the goods, the final outcome of  the investment activities. 
The interpretation and actual application of  the Investment Treaty could be very 
different based on which level of  likeness is chosen in the treaty.71  For example, in 
NAFTA, like circumstance is the standard in finding the matter of  non-discrimination, and 
the concept of  like circumstances contains a subject element.  
Next issue is the interpretation of  national treatment whether it is among like 
products, like firms, or like circumstances.  Let’s say it is on national treatment among 
goods just as in GATT, should vehicles produced by the foreign investor A with imported 
parts and vehicles produced by foreign investor B with large portion of  domestic parts and 
components be treated equally?  There could be another question.  Is vehicle produced 
                                            
71 However, there are some investment treaties which do not condition national treatment on the presence 
of likeness.  
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by foreign firm with extensive domestic supplier networks the same product as vehicle 
produced by domestic firm with all globally sourced parts and components?  Looked in 
these two scenarios, it seems that it is not sufficient to questioning the likeness of  the 
goods alone or the firms alone when dealing with investment matters.   In other words, 
whether the foreign and domestic suppliers or investors are in like circumstances should be 
considered. 
Perhaps in the investment treaties, the concept and implementation of  national 
treatment could or should be different altogether from the GATT.  We are too 
accustomed to the national treatment in the trade rules.  When there is a certain measure 
applied differently to a foreign product or foreign producer, it is almost automatic that 
National Treatment principle is brought up to the table.  However, there are some 
differences in the national treatment in the trade treaties and investment treaties.   
In the investment treaties, the policy objective pursued by the local content 
requirements may be taken into consideration to define the circumstances in which the 
comparison of  foreign and domestic production parts takes place. There are legal 
challenges to the regulatory purpose consideration in the interpretation of  likeness.  
Those opponents argue that legitimate objective itself  is not sufficient to be exempted 
from the breach of  non-discrimination obligation.  There also have to be some link 
between the measure and the legitimate objective purpose.  Therefore, if  the measures at 
issue are proved to be effective in pursuing the policy objective, it could gain more 
justification.  In this case, if  local content requirements are ascertained to be effective in 
accomplishing the industry development, then its lawful enforcement claim could gain 
more ground.   
In this context, the WTO regime has primarily studied the influence and effect of  
performance requirements on trade.  Intuitively, performance requirements, by promoting 
local production of  intermediate goods, reduce imports from the parent country.  Here, 
WTO and trade liberalists only took notice of  the negative effect of  performance 
requirement, while overlooking the effect on the host country’s industrial development.  
Robert Hudec’s scholarly confession that “there has always been some concern 
that the national treatment] test would fail to prohibit some…distinctions that should be 
prohibited, and prohibit some…distinctions that should not be prohibited” suggests many 
things.  Different treatment to products pursuant its percentage of  domestic contents 
might not be distinctions that should be prohibited.  With different application of  
national treatment, the legal finding on performance requirements can be different from 
what it is now in the TRIMs Agreement.  
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(3) To advocate the Public Interest and Development Concern 
 
 In the WTO process, private interest and maximizing the global economic 
welfare has been pursued.  Consequently, public interest and equal development 
opportunity for developing and underdeveloped countries were relatively neglected.  
Doha Development Agenda was named as it is in order to attract attention from the 
developing world, but so far it is almost a failure.  It is perhaps best to reorganize and 
reshuffle the ground  
 One might question how it is possible to make a treaty that is so different in 
principles and philosophy from WTO rules; arguing that they must share some 
fundamental principles and essence of  global economic law, even though the contents dealt 
with in the treaties are different.  
 Therefore, we cannot expect international investment to be liberalized as much as 
international trade; just as we do not expect natural persons to be entitled to migrate 
anywhere as goods travel anywhere in the world.  Generally, trade in goods occurs at the 
beginning of  bilateral business exchange between two countries, and then it expands to 
capital, investments, corporate entity, and natural persons.   So is the degree of  openness.  
It is higher for the goods, and next comes investments and then natural persons.   
Performance requirements are prohibited in the GATT and TRIMs agreement, and 
even in the MAI72.  It does not mean that it should be also prohibited in every investment 
                                            
72 In the TRIMs agreement, performance requirements were demonstrated in the Illustrative List, 
MAI provides complete provisions of performance requirements much more comprehensively elaborated.   
Other than the formality, MAI is different from the TRIMs agreement in that it adopts MFN principle as 
well as National Treatment.  Following is the complete text of performance requirements in the MAI. 
 
III. Treatment of Investors and Investments 
National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment 
Performance Requirements 
1. A contracting party shall not, in contrast with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, sale or other disposition of an 
investment in its territory of an investor of a Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting 
Party, impose, enforce or maintain any of the following requirements, or enforce any 
commitment or undertaking: 
(a) To export a given level or percentage of goods or services; 
(b) To achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; 
(c) To purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided in its 
territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory. 
(d) To relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to 
the amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such investment;  
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treaty.  
As previously mentioned, there are thousands of  researches on the development 
effect of  the performance requirements, and mainly local content requirements.  The 
empirical results of  the studies are in produced in both ways.  In some cases, they are very 
effective in host country development, and in some of  them, they are not.  However, it 
does not assure that irrelevancy or ineffectiveness of  the measure on industrial 
development.  Under certain circumstances, they are more effective in some cases, they 
fail to accomplish the goal for some other relevant variables, such as the level of  education 
or quality of  human resource of  the host country, level of  corruption, or the general 
infrastructure such as transportation and telecommunications.  In fact, there has been 
much evidence shown in various empirical studies that performance requirements, 
especially local content requirements are not effective in the industry development of  the 
host country, and sometimes there is evidence of  negative impact in certain cases.  These 
results of  studies were well utilized as a theoretical and empirical support for the opponent 
of  performance requirements.   
 In the process of  lawmaking, economic efficiency and effectiveness could be an 
important factor of  consideration, but it does not mean that it always has to be given the 
highest priority.  The policy could succeed or not pursuant to the policy design, the 
country’s unique circumstances, etc., but it does not necessarily legitimize the elimination 
of  the possibility to enforce one.  The host country has the discretion to choose whether 
to enforce local content requirement and the foreign investors can decide whether to enter 
                                                                                                                                
(e) To restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment produces or 
provides by relating such sales to the volume or value of its exports or foreign exchange 
earnings; 
(f) To transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a natural or 
legal person in its territory, except when the requirement  
-is imposed or the commitment or undertaking is enforced by a court, administrative 
tribunal or competition authority to remedy an alleged violation of competition laws, or 
- concerns the transfer of intellectual property and is undertaken in a manner not 
inconsistent with the TRIPs Agreement; 
(g) to locate its headquarters for a specific region or the world market in the territory of that 
Contracting Party; 
(h) to supply one or more of the goods that it produces or the services that it provides to a 
specific region or the world market exclusively from the territory of that Contracting Party; 
(i) to achieve a given level or value of research and development in its territory; 
(j) to hire a given level of nationals; 
(k) to establish a joint venture with domestic participation; 
(k) to achieve a minimum level of domestic equity participation other than nominal qualifying 
shares for directors or incorporators of corporations. 
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the market and make investments.  The host country cannot impose too strict level of  
local content requirements in order to induce FDI.  The equilibrium level or local content 
requirement and amount of  FDI will be determined by the same mechanism as supply-
demand and exports-imports are determined under the classical economic theory. 
The current system of  investment regulations start from the conception that these 
rules liberalize investment in the host country and protect the foreign investor.  That is, 
the investment regulation is devised to protect the multinational enterprises from the outset.  
The new legal system should give more consideration for the other party. 
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2) Legal Framework for the Prospective Investment Regulations 
 
(1) Bilateral or Regional Approach 
 
Existing international instruments on investment can be a starting point in 
drawing the MIT.   There have been numerous investment treaties.  There are 2,392 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) already concluded, and around 500 multilateral 
conventions and instruments governing cross-border investment flows. 73  Roughly, 
investment treaties serve two main objectives: investment protection and investment 
liberalization.  
Bilateral Investment Treaties have been enabling in character: their primary 
purpose was to protect investment. BITs focus on providing legal framework and reducing 
uncertainty for the foreign investors.  The United States’ BIT and European Bilateral 
Investment Protection Agreements (BIPA) devoted to protect foreign investment from 
host country regulations or nationalization.  They did not have much effect on liberalizing 
the access to FDI.  A number of  empirical researches showed that the amount of  FDI 
inflow was largely determined by factors other than investment agreements, and BITs 
overall played only a minor role.74  Recently, BITs began addressing liberalization issue as 
well as protection issue, but it seems that BITs would remain as transitory pragmatic 
approach to deal with FDI.  
The liberalization in investment is pursued in the Service chapter as a part of  
FTAs.  They generally contain concrete components pertaining to market access and 
terms and conditions on investment.  Thus, these investment treaties go beyond the 
traditional boundary of  BITs, to include liberalization schedule as in the trade agreements.  
Recently negotiated Korea-US FTA text includes investment chapter, which is 
comprehensive bilateral investment agreement.  It grants national treatment and MFN 
treatment to pre-entry stage as well as already established investment.  It contains almost 
every component of  investment agreement.   
However, in the similar context, the regional trade agreements (e.g. FTA) often 
including investment chapters are also temporary expedient like BITs.  Their different 
scopes of  investment, different definitions and interpretations on the terms and principles 
by individual agreements, would only add up to the inefficiencies and obstacles in the 
global FDI environment.  Since investment was omitted from the Doha Round Agenda 
                                            
73. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005-Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of 
R&D(Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2005)  
74 Nunnenkamp and Pant(2003)  
 134 
through ‘July 2004 package’, regional initiatives emerged as a feasible tool for countries to 
pursue liberalization of  investment and enhancing investment access to their trading 
partners.  As in treaties on commodity trade, there are fundamental principles such as 
MFN and national treatment in investment treaties.  Therefore, these investment 
agreements as an integral part of  FTAs will be able to build foundations for the future 
multilateral investment agreement.  Thus, as long as there are no multilateral rules on 
investment, these bilateral investment treaties can fill the gap. 
 
(2) Multilateralization of  the Investment Treaty 
 
In the past when FDI was mostly in oil and mining industry, protection of  the 
private right of  foreign investors from the host government was the most important 
function of  investment treaty.  Therefore, bilateral agreement was sufficient for the 
MNCs to prevent host governments from appropriating their assets.  However, as there is 
growing demand for investment liberalization, there also rose the call for comprehensive 
investment treaty serving both purposes, to protect and liberalize investment.  In this 
context, investment treaty in multilateral setting was gaining necessity. 
There is another rationale for multilateral investment treaty.  In the case of  trade 
in goods, MFN principle can be meaningful when it is enforced multilaterally.  World 
welfare is maximized when countries treat their partners in equal terms, so that there are no 
trade distortions and diversions.  Let alone the welfare talks, a multilateral framework is 
superior to the bilateral or plurilateral framework.   Multilateral investment treaty 
replacing the complex mesh of  numerous BITs and regional investment treaties would 
enhance transparency and reduce transaction costs as well as administrative costs.  Using 
theoretical model, Che and Willman(2009) proved that coordination effect of  multilateral 
investment treaty is most effective when majority of  countries take part in the agreement 
whereas a treaty between the two countries would have little effect.75   
There were also investment treaties in the multilateral setting from the early years, 
hand in hand with trade treaties, though today the two aspect of  international economic 
activity has evolved to a very different state after a different course of  development.  The 
treaties on investment have been mostly non-binding, serving as guidelines or model law.76  
                                            
75 In this article, they also proved that investment increases and welfare of both home country and host 
country increase by establishment of multilateral investment treaty.   
76 Notable examples of multilateral investment instruments are “United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 1803(XVII): Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” in 1962, “Resolution 51/191 
and 52/87. United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial 
Transactions”, “ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”. 
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So far, attempts to come up with a substantial and material outcome of  multilateral treaty 
ended up as a failure. 
The first attempt to build multilateral agreement on foreign investment was made 
in 1948, in Havana Charter to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO).  In 
the earlier draft, the Investment chapter contained pretty much comprehensive elements of  
investment treaty: it provided extensive rights for investors including the obligation of  host 
countries to extend national treatment and MFN treatment.  However, this was opposed 
by many countries, and consequently, the Charter had to be shrunk to a very limited scope.  
The final draft did not incorporate any rules related to performance requirements and 
dispute settlement mechanism between governments and foreign investors.  Anyway, the 
Charter was not ratified by the US Congress and this attempt turned out a failure.  
Next attempt was done by OECD with ‘Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI)’.  As cross-border investments were becoming active and complicated, there again 
arose the need for international norms to regulate these activities.  Existing investment 
rules have formed around multilateral fora such as OECD and WTO, and regional 
initiatives including NAFTA, EU, and APEC.  However, the content of  MAI was not 
sufficient to cover quantitative and qualitative changes in FDI since 1980s, and most of  all, 
was not provided with dispute settlement mechanism, thus lacking efficacy as compelling 
tool.  Also, there was allegation that MAI, with OECD behind it, was advocating MNCs 
and were in some sense devised to support their worldwide operation, and that the 
underlying principles and spirits were reflection of  business consideration of  these 
enterprises, and thus were indifferent to the concerns of  LDCs.  This kind of  
understanding made it hard to induce general support from member countries, developed 
and less developed alike, and it indeed failed. 
Another attempt was being made within the WTO, after its launch in 1995.  The 
mood at that time requesting for multilateral setting for investment continued, and it was 
recognized that TRIMs were not sufficient in addressing complex investment issues.  In 
1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, it was agreed to set up working groups on 
investment, as one of  the “Singapore Issues.”77  However, in 2004 most of  the Singapore 
issues were dropped from the negotiation agenda of  Doha Round, due to the harsh 
opposition from the developing countries group.   Thus, this final attempt to create 
multilateral investment treaty also failed.  
 
                                            
77  They are competition policy and transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation.  
However, the Working Group’s mandate was mainly examining the relationship between trade and 
investment.  
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(3) New Multilateral Investment Treaty 
 
The awareness and attempts to create multilateral investment treaty(MIT) has been 
there for decades.  Since the establishment of  a Working Group on Trade and Investment 
(WGTI), discussions on the new Investment Treaty and plans to launch negotiations have 
been under way.  In the report of  the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade 
and Investment(1998), a checklist78 was annexed for further studies.  Included in the list 
are comprehensive subject regarding the relationship between trade and investment: their 
                                            
78 The checklist is as follows.  
i) implications of the relationship between trade and investment for development and economic 
growth, including: 
- economic parameters relating to macroeconomic stability, such as domestic savings, fiscal 
position and the balance of payments; 
- industrialization, privatization, employment, income and wealth distribution, competitiveness, 
transfer of technology and managerial skills; 
- domestic conditions of competition and market structures. 
ii) The economic relationship between trade and investment: 
- the degree of correlation between trade and investment flows; 
- the determinants of the relationship between trade and investment; 
- the impact of business strategies, practices and decision-making on trade and investment, 
including through case studies; 
- the relationship between the mobility of capital and the mobility of labour; 
- the impact of trade policies and measures on investment flows, including the effect of the 
growing number of bilateral and regional arrangements;  
- the impact of investment policies and measures on trade; 
- country experiences regarding national investment policies, including investment incentives 
and disincentives; 
- the relationship between foreign investment and competition policy. 
iii) stocktaking and analysis of existing international instruments and activities regarding trade and 
investment: 
- existing WTO provisions; 
- bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives; 
- implications for trade and investment flows of existing international instruments. 
iv) and on the basis of the work above: 
- identification of common features and differences, including overlaps and possible conflicts, 
as well as possible gaps in existing international instruments; 
- advantages and disadvantages of entering into bilateral, regional and multilateral rules on 
investment, including from a development perspective; 
- the rights and obligations of home and host countries and of investors and host countries; 
- the relationship between existing and possible future international cooperation on investment 
policy and existing and possible future international cooperation on competition policy. 
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impact on the economic growth and development, correlation between trade and 
investment flows, and appraisals on the current legal system thereon, etc.   
Based on these studies and the experience from the trials and errors of  the 
previous attempts and instruments, it is desired that the new multilateral investment 
agreement be equipped with the following properties: completeness, comprehensiveness, 
efficacy in enforcement, and development consideration. 
First, it needs to be a whole, self-sufficient investment treaty integrated into one 
whole independent text, unlike TRIMs Agreement.  It should not be subjective to GATT 
because GATT is just general agreements for trade literally.  It should be able to stand 
alone, not like an annex to other instruments.  This is important because it is necessary in 
terms of  substance, but also symbolically suggesting that ‘investment’ has the equal gravity 
and significance to the international business and economy to ‘trade’.  Many experts in 
this field are emphasizing that the new multilateral investment agreements should be 
separate from the trade agreements and its framework and priorities should be distinct 
from those in the existing trade agreements.  Some even claim that this instrument should 
be drafted in some other venue than the WTO.    
Secondly, it should be comprehensive in that it regulates investment measures in all 
stages of  investment, from pre-entry to operation; providing rules for both manufacturing 
firms and service providers; from definition to exceptions.  The current WTO system is 
mainly handling the trade aspect of  investment, which is only relevant at the operation 
stage.  If  the new multilateral investment treaty has a hole in the coverage, the source of  
law in dealing with investment matters will be again fragmented to various instruments.  
Thirdly, it should be armed with proper and effective dispute settlement 
mechanism so that it can possess efficacy in enforcement, and bind countries.  Especially, 
the agreement should contain State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism.  In case of  
Investor-to-State Mechanism, the host country’s domestic legal system would be sufficient, 
but the absence of  State-to-State dispute settlement system cannot be readily replaced by 
equivalent system.  Without the effective dispute settlement mechanism, it could still work 
as GATT worked before the launch of  WTO.  
 Lastly, it is strongly desired that the new investment treaty has good reflection on 
development issue.  Otherwise, the investment regime would be advocating the MNCs at 
the sacrifice of  the policy interests of  the individual countries.   Then, the treaty would 
not be able to be negotiated at all.  First of  all, it should focus on inducing participation 
by developing countries to the negotiation, by assuring developing countries that the new 
regulation will reflect proper and due development consideration in its provisions.  In 
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order to do so, the negotiating text would have to be substantially different from the MAI.79   
The feasibility of  multilateral investment treaty is another matter.  In fact, there 
remain many obstacles to be hurdled.  It would require great finesse of  balance between 
conflicting interest and powers among different group of  parties.  Evidentially, it has been 
long since the international community agreed that we need a complete system to govern 
FDI, the process has not been materialized yet.   
The bottom line scenario is the plurilateral agreement signed by some like-minded 
countries, something like the outcome of  Tokyo Round negotiation.  Even GATT had 
only 23 parties to start with in 1947.  The Investment Treaty could be signed by a group 
of  countries and the membership can be expanded when the remaining countries are ready 
to become the contracting party of  the agreement.  As the number of  countries increases 
to the extent that it outnumbers the non-member countries, remaining countries will have 
more incentive to enter the group to be integrated in the multilateral system of  investment.   
Another option is the regional program.  This would be favored by regional integration 
groups, and may contribute to the regional economic development.  Above all, by 
breaking down to regional level, it is much easier to negotiate than the multilateral treaty. 
However, any non-multilateral approach is apt to damage the original intention and 
purpose of  multilateral investment treaty, harmonizing the rules of  investment regulation 
globally and reflecting the balanced interests of  both developed and developing world.  
Therefore, coordinating the different position of  developed and developing countries on 
the general principles and framework of  the treaty, and establishing the firm logic on the 
economic benefit of  multilateral investment liberalization would be the departure of  the 
negotiation forum.  Every contracting party should be assured that multilateral investment 
liberalization can bring benefits to their economies.80 
 
                                            
79 In fact, proponents of multilateral investment treaty, mainly developed countries, suggest that the 
contents of the new treaty should be similar to what have been discussed in MAI negotiations. 
80 The simplest argument for investment liberalization is analogous to that of trade liberalization.  That 
is, liberalization of international investment increases the global welfare.  However, matters are not as 
simple as in trade. Can the same rationale be applied in the sphere of investment when trade agreements 
are aimed at liberalization and welfare maximization, whereas investment treaties are devised to protect 
investors and their investment?  Young and Tavares(2004) made several points on this issue; they noted 
that asymmetry in the investment position and the invisibility and complexity of measuring FDI flows 
makes it difficult that benefits of liberalization are spread fairly and therefore it is hard to induce fair and 
balanced negotiation outcome. 
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3) Legal Status of  TRIMs in the New Multilateral Investment Regulation  
  
Then, how should be TRIMs regulated in the MIT?  Should it be prohibited as it 
is in TRIMs Agreement?  It would be determined by the negotiation outcome by the 
member countries.  Certainly, there will be parties that claim outright prohibition on 
performance requirements, mostly developed countries.  The United States have been 
insisted prohibition of  performance requirements in the TRIMs Agreement in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations and in its BITs.  Most of  the developed countries including EC and 
Japan were taking the similar position as the United States.  Developing countries 
generally were against the outright prohibition of  performance requirements.  Their idea 
was to have performance requirements be actionable taking into account the economic 
effect of  the measure.   
In the new regulation, it is very likely that current outright prohibition is modified, 
accommodating the developing countries’ position.  The legality of  measure at issue 
would be determined by several methods: effect test would be one way to tell the 
consistency to the regulation.  The host country can claim that the measure was not aimed 
at protection.  The judicial process will investigate if  there is clear protectionist purpose, 
and if  the measure provides with less favorable treatment for the foreign investor, etc.  If  
it is clearly host government's intention to protect domestic industry, the measure may then 
be disencouraged. .  It is sort of  indirectly restricting the business activity of  the investor, 
but it is not giving the less favorable treatment as long as the foreign investor follows the 
requirements.   
Far from giving less favorable treatment, many countries are offering government 
incentives to the foreign investors.  These incentives are not strictly regulated in the 
current regime.  Obviously, it is not fair to regulate financial contribution to domestic 
firms while it is allowed for the foreign firms.  Many scholars criticize the disparity in the 
legal status of  performance requirements(as FDI disincentives) and FDI incentives. 
Moran(1999) suggested that developing countries might accept the prohibition of  
performance requirements on the condition that incentive for the foreign investors is also 
disallowed, when they negotiate for the future Multilateral Investment Treaty. 
As explained in the first Chapter, the local content rules and TRIMs in the original 
meaning have mostly disappeared by mid-1990s.  The only remaining LCRs were mostly 
in the automotive industry.  In other words, most governments have phased out the local 
content requirements as the industry development got on the right track.  This 
evidentially demonstrates that the purpose of  LCR was to promote industrial development, 
not to protect the domestic firms from the foreign imports. 
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The key legal element is whether the multilateral investment treaty should take the 
same element of  Goods and Services Agreement.  Does MFN principle in the investment 
treaty have the same gravity as in trade in goods and services?  Should non-discrimination 
and national treatment obligation be the foremost principle?  The legal status of  TRIMs 
in the new investment treaty would very much depend on the interpretation of  
nondiscrimination principle.  With the same definition and interpretation of  the principle, 
it is highly likely that TRIMs will be again regulated as unlawful measure.  Yet, 
nondiscrimination and national treatment obligation may not be the supreme order in the 
investment framework.  It seems that the status of  MFN principle in investment treaty is 
not as authoritative as in the trade agreements.  Evidently, in some existing investment 
treaties such as NAFTA Article 1102 and numerous BITs, public policy justification is 
more widely accepted than in GATT, and thus can rebut presumption of  discrimination 
even in “like circumstances”.  Is foreign investors procuring large portion of  inputs from 
its home country a like investor as the national investor contributing more to the domestic 
economy by employment of  human and physical resources?  This is also closely related to 
the development issue, which will be discussed later more specifically. 
Sauve(1997) suggested an idea of  regulating TRIMs based on the traffic light red, 
amber, and green, as used in the GATT SCM Agreement.  His argument was that TRIMs 
have the similar purpose and effect with subsidies.  This view is supported by many trade 
law scholars including WTO panels.  At least the idea of  traffic light system could be 
useful in regulating TRIMs.  According to various policy designs, some performance 
requirements could be strictly discriminatory and trade distorting, while some are less so, 
and some are not.   
Sauve’s approach has some elements common with the developing countries’ 
position, that is, to have actionable TRIMs.  However, Sauve’s categorization requires 
second thoughts.  He placed LCR in the red light category, along with most other TRIMs: 
export performance requirements, trade balancing requirements, manufacturing 
requirements and limitations.  Sauve takes the same position with developed countries 
that LCR is immediately prohibited, while developing country’s genuine intention was to 
give at least yellow light to the LCR and other performance requirements.   
Besides, there can be a totally competitive approach: differentiating markets 
according to their attractiveness.  One possible method is to prohibit only performance 
requirements that are announced after the investment decision.  In this way, countries 
with attractive market can get some rents and still receive FDI from MNCs, while countries 
with less attractive market will try to attract foreign investments with more friendly 
business environments.   This kind of  rule can be welcomed by the developing countries.    
 141 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
Under the current WTO regime, performance requirements including local content 
requirements are prohibited under many trade obligations in GATT, GATS, SCM and 
TRIMs Agreement.  By the principle of  non-discrimination as it is interpreted in the 
goods agreement, performance requirements are condemned as discriminatory and trade-
distorting measure.  Thus, performance requirements which have been enforced in some 
developing countries were mostly ruled as violation of  the WTO obligations.  Now most 
of  these countries eliminated those measures. 
This seems like a fair and reasonable result from the perspective of  free trade 
advocates, but not necessarily for some others with other views and frames.  It might look 
too stringent for them to prohibit them altogether, even if  there were little evidence that 
these were protectionist measure.  By prohibiting local content requirements, it limited 
host country’s policy discretion: to prevent tariff  circumvention of  foreign multinational 
companies, to foster and develop the local industry, and to prevent anti-competitive 
practices by MNCs, and to induce more investment from foreign firms.  The current 
investment-related regulations are far from sufficiency. 
While the rules and standards in the current system reflects the traditional 
economic theory of  comparative advantage and free trade, host governments policy goals 
are based on strategic trade theory.   Under the traditional trade regime, chances of  
unindustrialized countries to become industrialized are in fact very thin, because it is 
predetermined according to its comparative advantage.  On the other hand, according to 
the strategic trade theory, those countries can be industrialized if  they can have policy 
discretion such as local content requirements on the FDI in the strategic sectors, eventually 
to reach increasing returns to scale necessary to achieve competitiveness.  That is, 
competitive advantage can be acquired through the right policy mix.   
If  the economic interpretation on the same policy can be different pursuant to 
different economic theories, making separate rules governing FDI and performance 
requirements can be an alternative.  Nevertheless, making an Investment treaty does not 
itself  guarantee the due consideration for the development concern.  It should be 
emphasized from the beginning in the process of  negotiation.   Considering the fast 
growing economic power and status of  developing countries during the last decade, it is 
expected that the new rules would better reflect interests of  developing countries and the 
development issue than ever.   
Thus, it examines the prospective for the investment regulations as an alternative to 
the existing TRIMs and GATT, which are currently governing the jurisprudence of  
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investment measures.  Though performance requirements have disappeared from almost 
all countries even in the automotive industries now, there are chances that they can return 
as FDI floods into less developed countries.  Take Russia’s example.  Russia has been 
imposing local content requirements.  Recently, it has renewed the directive into tighter 
rules.  The TRIMs have never died and it might be proliferating again.  We need 
multilateral investment treaty anytime soon in order to regulate them.  It brings the 
possibility that various indigenization policies and performance requirements can be legally 
acceptable in the multilateral investment treaty. 
 
 Setting rules for investment is supposed to be much more challenging work than 
setting rules for trade.  There are many open questions to be answered, legal controversies 
to be resolved, and terms and scope to be defined.  DiMascio(2008) well pointed out that 
investments necessitate and justify more extensive regulation because they cause the 
producer and the production process to cross the border, leaving a larger footprint, both 
positive and negative, than trade.  Indeed, investment entails far more complex matters 
than trade and sales in foreign market.  That is, the investment regulation text inevitably 
has to be more elaborated and relatively more weight should be placed on policy 
justification than trade regulations.  
There is undying controversy of  economic efficiency vs. sovereign rights and 
institution.  There is the dilemmas posed by relationships between globalization, the 
nation State and its sovereign interests and there are constant debates over the relative 
merits and demerits of  institutional and regulatory harmonization versus diversity at 
country level. 81  It has been popular topic of  debate in terms of  trade liberalization, but it 
is a much bigger and sensitive issue in the investment matter.  Rules governing FDI have 
more overlaps and interference with domestic laws.  This can be possibly extended to 
jurisdiction issue, which legal instruments should have control over the foreign investor’s 
business entity, from what stage and in which matters.  This potentially overlapping 
jurisdiction will be the core and most frequent cause conflicts and disputes in the new 
system. 
After all, keeping the balance between the two confrontational values: 
liberalization and development, globalization and sovereign rights of  states, interest of  
investor and host country, is the most crucial yet difficult task of  the future negotiation.  
                                            
81 Young and Tavares(2004) also noticed this problem. 
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Chapter V. Concluding Remarks 
 
 So far, we have examined various aspects of  FDI in the automotive industry and 
the policies surrounding the FDI in both economic and legal perspectives.  Growing FDI 
in the automotive industry and its inherent strategic importance in the national economy 
made it the major target of  indigenization policy of  host countries.  Host governments 
try to maximize the economic utility from the FDI extended to its local industry 
development.   Local content requirements are the most popular policy tool to enhance 
the linkage between the FDI and its local industry.  However, LCR and other 
performance requirements are strictly prohibited in the WTO regulations, since it hinders 
the free flow of  trade from foreign investor’s perspective.  This is purely trade-oriented 
approach.  If  the same measure were viewed from investment-oriented approach, the 
result might have been different. 
To find out LCR’s impact on the investment flow, empirical research was 
conducted on various FDI determinants with both economic and policy variables, in the 
automotive industry of  more than 43 countries.  From the results, it was concluded that 
market size and market-related factors were the most important determinants of  FDI.  
However, there was no evidence that the local content requirements distorted the FDI flow 
into the country, and rather it had positive effect especially in Asian region.  Further, LCR 
brought positive impact on the industry growth measured in various methods: volume of  
industry, percentage of  value added, and productivity growth.  LCR can promote linkages 
with domestic supplier industry and bring favorable externalities to the host country 
economy, which again accelerates spillover from the MNC to the local industry.  
Combined together, these two findings proved that local content requirements are not 
detrimental to FDI inflow and they rather boost industrial development.   To conclude, 
current trade regime illegalizing these measures lack both economic and political 
persuasion.   
Thus, the TRIMs Agreement governing the performance requirements including 
the local content requirements is put under controversy in terms of  efficacy, harmony with 
other policy objectives, and integrity as legal instruments.  This, in turn, leads to the 
proposition that investment measures including performance requirements are better to be 
addressed by investment regulations.  Overall, this dissertation aims to give implications in 
building the new investment regulation system.  After much deliberation on regulating the 
FDI in the multilateral investment treaties, the most outstanding conclusion is that much 
more attention has to be paid to the development concern of  developing countries.  It is 
inevitable in the newly formatted multilateral investment rules. 
 144 
Recent emphasis on FDI and development has something to do with the changing 
map of  global economic structure.  From now on, the center of  gravity will be shifted to 
less developed countries.  Majority of  the world investment capital are flowing into Asia 
and Latin America region.82  Evidently, the growth of  China and India are in much part 
owing to inward investment from the developed countries.  In the time forward, 
developing countries would exert way more power and influence in the negotiation process 
of  multilateral investment treaty, than in the 1940s when multilateral trade agreement was 
drafted.  This means that the political economy underlying the future investment treaty 
can be vastly different from that of  trade rules.  Thus, future dynamics in the global 
economic order and the multilateral system on trade and investment will reflect these 
changes, and interpretation on local content requirements can be completely different from 
as it is now. 
Also, pattern of  globalization is changing due to the proliferation of  FDI.  In the 
domain of  traditional trade economics, globalization was driven by trade liberalization, and 
theoretically free trade leads to complete specialization of  industries.  That is, a couple of  
countries would monopolize the production of  a certain industry, supplying the rest of  the 
world.  It was predicted by many experts that only a handful of  manufacturers would 
survive in the end in the automotive industry.  Actually, this has been the case before FDI 
was increasing as it is now.  The US, Japan, Germany, France, and Korea were producing 
most of  the vehicles consumed in the world, and the degree of  concentration was rising.  
This was the reality just ten years ago.  Monopolistic capitalism, polarization, North-South 
problem, economic imperialism, etc were typical words associated with globalization.  
However, FDI has suddenly changed the direction of  globalization backwards.  It is again 
spreading the vehicle production map worldwide.   Globalization by trade liberalization 
led to oligopolistic structure of  industries and concentration, while globalization by FDI 
led to localization and dispersion.   
Perhaps, we have been too absorbed in the trade regime, in pursuit of  the free 
trade.  It is not saying that free trade should not be desired.  However, in the meantime 
we have marginalized the equally important way of  commercial system, investment.  It is 
not likely that one type of  globalization would take over the other entirely.  FDI will 
continue in the future at a higher speed, but anyway automotive industry needs scale 
economy.  Perfect localization is impossible; there still would be trade.  Nor is it possible 
to tell that one thing is better than the other.  They are equally important twin pillars of  
global economy sharing the same goal of  enhanced economic welfare.  We have been 
                                            
82 In 2008, among the total investment flow in the world, 23% went into Asia, 9% to Latin America, and 
5% to Africa.  
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perverted blind to maximize trade flows even if  it injures the policy objective of  
investment.  FDI will take the lead in the globalization for the time being, and we might 
need to change our perspective.   
FDI can be better disciplined within the framework of  investment rather than trade.  
However, it does not mean that the new rule can damage the established multilateral trade 
system and benefits from trade liberalization.  Thus, our future task would be to 
harmonize trade and investment in terms of  regulations and policy design; would the two 
regimes be able to get along with each other and how the conflicts and disputes could be 
managed.  Another suggestion for future research extended from this dissertation is 
investigating the conditions in the host country that are most appropriate for the spillovers 
and favorable externalities.  In what circumstances, the favorable effect of  LCR can be 
maximized and when adverse effects occur.   Similarly, LCR can be effective in some 
countries while in some countries it does not show clear contribution to the industry’s 
development, but just reduces overall efficiency and welfare.  There would be no universal 
policy that can bring about equal amount of  industry development in different countries 
with different circumstances.     
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Appendix I History of FDI in the Global Automotive Industry 
 
1. Early Years(from 1910s to mid 80s) in Europe 
 
FDI first started in the early 20th century, by two American vehicle makers, GM 
and Ford.  GM and Ford were very early in enacting globalization: they started their 
globalization strategy first in Europe.  Also, in that period, tariff  rate for vehicles in 
Europe was very high: apparently, the purpose of  FDI was to seek markets.  
Ford was one step ahead of  GM in overseas production.  In fact, Ford has been a 
world organization right from the beginning.  Ford Motor Company in the United States 
were founded in 1903, whereas Ford Europe was launched in 1909 when the Branch 
company was set up to supervise European sales. Ford first established assembly plant in 
UK in 1911.  For about twenty years, a branch company and assembly plant was 
inaugurated almost every two or three years, in many countries in Europe.  In 1967 Ford 
incorporated them into ‘Ford Europe’.  
 
<Table 1-1 > History of Ford’s Overseas Operations 
Year Details 
1911 First overseas assembly plant in Manchester, England. 
1919 Another assembly plant was founded in Copenhagen, Denmark. 
1922 
Ford Belgium and assembly plant established 
Assembly plant in Cadiz, Spain was built to serve Southern Europe.  
1922 Assembly plant in Triesta, Northern Italy, aimed at Eastern Europe market. 
1925 The first Germany Ford company and assembly plant was established. 
1926 Assembly plant in Berlin 
1931 Third assembly plant in Germany was built in Cologne. 
1936 Romanian company was founded in 1931 and assembly began in 1936. 
1938 Hungary company was founded and its assembly began in 1941. 
1953 Ford built another Assembly plant in UK, in Southampton.  
1962 Major new plant in Halewood, UK 
1964 Second plant in Genk, Belgium. 
1965 Plant in Lommel, Belgium was founded. 
1970 Ford Germany’s Saarlouis plant(Home of Focus) 
1973 A new transmission plant in Bordeaux was built.  
1976 A large car factory opened in Valencia, Spain(Home of Fiesta) Second Romanian plant was built in Craiova. Built Transit and Connect. 
Source: Various sources 
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GM first entered European market by undertaking a British auto maker in 1925. 
GM’s Europe operations were expanded and reorganized around UK’s Vauxhall and 
Germany’s Opel in 1980s, taking the European Integration into account.  Though a bit 
behind than Ford, GM continued expanding overseas production in 1920s, constructing 
assembly lines in Latin America, Australia, and Japan, as well as Europe.  GM’s Europe 
strategy can be distinguished from Ford’s in that GM’s European operation was conducted 
mainly through Opel, while Ford’s operation was polycentric.  GM’s main production 
facilities are concentrated in Germany and Spain whereas for Ford, Germany, Belgium, UK, 
Spain and Sweden are the main production locations.83   
FDI in the Europe in this period was definitely market-seeking, to better reach the 
consumers in Europe.  Western Europe was the biggest market in the world. 
 
<Table 1-2 > History of GM’s Overseas Operations 
Year Details 
1918 GM Canada is established through M&A. 
1923 First European Assembly Plant in Copenhagen, Demnark. 
1925 GM acquired Vauxhall Motors in UK. GM also established operations in Argentina, France and Germany. 
1929 GM acquired controlling interest in Adam Opel AG of Germany. 
1980 Announced plans to build five new plants in Europe, one in Austria and Northern Ireland and 3 in Spain. 
1989 Acquired SAAB from Sweden. 
2002 Opel’s new plant started operation in Russelheim, Germany. 
Source: GM website 
 
2. 1960s~70s in Southeast Asia 
 
Japanese manufacturer’s history of  overseas production in this region is very long.  
They entered ASEAN market in 1960s and have taken undisputed leadership for a couple 
of  decades.  Until early 1990s, import of  complete vehicles into this region was practically 
prohibited, either due to high tariffs or government restriction.  In this period, Japanese 
makers invested in ASEAN in partnership with local makers, and started KD production.   
                                            
83 Later on, GM and Ford showed different styles of overseas expansion: Ford mostly established 
greenfield plants whereas GM undertook local manufactures.  Besides, Ford has been steady in 
expanding its overseas production by 1980, but GM was kind of dormant since 1931 when GM acquired 
Holden from Australia, until it announced further investment in Western Europe in 1980.  On the 
contrary, from 1980s towards the end of 1990s, GM was more active in FDI than Ford, establishing plants 
in Asian region.  Ford rather concentrated on M&As than direct investment during this period. 
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<Table 1-3> Production and KD units in ASEAN 4, by maker  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Toyota 205,003 207,374 266,523 357,773 438,276 644,527
Mitsubishi 359,662 393,444 435,886 352,988 395,011 433,253
Honda 62,603 64,886 95,950 148,748 157,339 167,875
Nissan 52,491 56,471 64,789 71,809 78,091 80,598
Suzuki 48,865 54,704 64,430 71,933 85,990 126,948
Total 733,025 780,454 929,227 1,005,214 1,162,364 1,457,893
Source: Marklines 
 
Until now, Japanese manufacturers have the dominant market share and industry 
leadership in ASEAN.  They are producing almost 80% of  total production in ASEAN 
region.  Japan had close relationship with the Southeast Asian economy, and moreover, it 
was less invested region by developed countries’ manufactures.  Hence, Japanese car 
makers intended to occupy preemptive position in ASEAN.   Still, automotive industry 
needs a certain level of  market size in terms of  demand condition, and a certain level of  
production scale in terms of  supply condition.  Individual countries in ASEAN did not 
meet these conditions, and thus Japanese OEMs makers realized that cooperation between 
member countries and industry integration was necessary for the development of  
automotive industry in the region. As its first attempt, these makers proposed BBC(Brand 
to Brand Complementation) Scheme in 1988.  By this Scheme, individual countries 
specialized in a certain parts and components production and supplied other countries with 
these. This integration effort got rid of  overlapped investment and helped achieve 
economies of  scale, and as its consequence cost reduction. BBC later evolved into 
AICO(ASEAN Industrial Cooperation) Scheme in 1996, covering the industry in general.  
 
<Table 1-4> Foreign Maker’s production in ASEAN  
Country Maker 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Thailand 
Toyota, Isuzu, Honda, 
Mitsubishi, Nissan, Ford, 
Mazda, GM 
525,680 411,721 1,125,318 1,001,268 
Indonesia Toyota, Suzuki, Honda ,Daimler, Mitsubishi 386,234 296,223 485,386 502,489 
Malaysia Toyota, Honda, Nissan 103,118 70,278 230,560 174,517 
Pakistan Suzuki, Toyota, Honda 34,509 45,473 175,209 115,366 
Philippines Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi 112,392 70,959 72,053 6,081 
Source: Global Insight 
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3. 1980s to early 90s in North America 
 
North America has been the number one region in the world until 2003, with sales 
volume around 20 million units a year.  At an individual country level, the United States 
has been the biggest market, yielding to China the first place in 2009.  Yet still, North 
America is the most important region for automotive manufacturers. 
 
<Table 1-5> US Big 3 and affiliates light vehicle production in Canada and Mexico 
Country Maker # of Plants 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Canada 
GM 5 1,071,833 1,053,391 1,030,571 346,805 
Ford 2 533,443 629,646 221,809 237,974 
Chrysler 2 538,097 705,764 679,714 310,625 
Total 9 2,143,373 2,388,801 1,932,094 895,404 
Mexico 
GM 4 198,819 440,938 433,826 350,167 
Ford 4 214,072 275,966 127,206 231,415 
Chrysler 2 205,561 401,193 344,437 144,445 
Total 10 618,452 1,118,097 905,469 726,027 
Source: Global Insight 
 
Of  course, the 3 US makers are the biggest producer in this region including 
domestic market, but apart from the United States, the US makers are the most committed 
investor and producers in Canada and Mexico.  As mentioned above, US makers were 
very early in overseas production because unlike other makers, especially Japanese.  They 
have opted for overseas production over exports for their foreign sales strategy.  Thus, in 
1990s US makers showed relatively lower portion of  exports but a high ratio of  overseas 
production, compared with other makers.  Also, it was triggered by the regional 
integration: North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA).  Since NAFTA, 
automotive industry of  North America has been restructured.  GM has seven plants in 
Canada and Mexico, three in Canada and four in Mexico.  Ford is currently operating four 
plants in Canada and Mexico, two in each. 
Next to US makers, Japanese makers also invested a lot in this region, and mostly 
in the United States.  The initial motivation of  the FDI in this region was because the US 
government has been imposing trade pressure on Asian countries, especially Japan and 
Korea.  Japanese makers began producing in the US in 1982, followed by the VER in 
1981.  They made a great success due to the oil shock.  Americans were ever more 
sensitive to the gas price and fuel efficiency going through the oil shock period.  Ever 
since, production increased every year, so that in 1985, it was only 300,000 units per year, 
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but the number doubled in three years and in 1995, it was over 2,000,000 units.  In 2005, 
the Japanese makers produced around 3.5 million units, which occupied 25% of  total US 
production.  In 1993, Japanese makers’ US production figure outnumbered their exports 
to the US market.  Now Japanese OEM’s production amounts to almost 35% of  total 
production in the North America. Japanese automakers now supply 63% of  their total US 
sales from their North American plants, compared with less than 12% in 1986. 
 
<Table 1-6> Japanese Big 3 and Affiliate production in North America 
Maker Country # of Plants 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Toyota 
Canada 3 90,136 183,740 306,020 319,547 
Mexico 1 0 0 23,670 42,696 
US 9 638,037 919,253 1234,172 873,280 
Total 13 728,173 1102,993 1563,862 1235612 
Honda 
Canada 1 106,133 326,823 385,491 383,011 
Mexico 1 135 19,709 23,538 51,247 
US 4 581,225 698,287 939,868 987,176 
Total 6 687,493 1044,819 1348,897 1032039 
Nissan 
Mexico 2 106,794 295,407 349,179 358,322 
US 2 523,821 443,866 836,011 356,647 
Total 4 630,615 739,573 1185,190 714969 
Source: Global Insight 
 
4. Late 1990s to Early 2000s in the Eastern Europe 
 
Since 1990s, there was some change in the FDI in Europe, along with the 
prospects of  thaw in the cold war by the collapse of  Soviet Union.  As the East European 
economy was integrated to the Western Europe, there was growing foreign investment in 
this region from the Western hemisphere.  The investor was not US makers but mostly 
Western European makers, making investments within Europe.  Since mid 1990s, 
European makers have been shifting their production to Central and Eastern Europe, to 
exploit the cheap labor cost, and geographical vicinity to Western Europe. Spain used to be 
the major FDI recipient by these makers before; now Poland, Czech, etc merged as the 
most favorable location for vehicle production for its infrastructure, endowment with 
skilled labor force, and adjacency to Western Europe market.  Most European makers 
have production facilities in Central and Eastern Europe.  This Eastward translocation 
was later followed by foreign makers, such as GM, Daewoo, Ford and Toyota.  This 
movement was accelerated by the EU’s enlargement since 2004.  
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<Table 1-7> Historical View of European Makers’ operation in Eastern Europe 
Maker Strategy Model 
VW 
Acquired Skoda (1991) 
Czech: Skoda production base 
Slovakia: VW 4WD 
Poland: VW small commercial vehicle 
Hungary: Engine 
Skoda Fabia 
(Saloon/HB/SW) 
Superb  
VW Polo/Golf/SLW 
Renault 
Full-scale manufacturing since 1998 
Concentrated around Slovenia, Romania, Turkey 
Export Thalia from Turkey to Eastern Europe 
Brand divided into Renault and Dacia 
Renault Clio/Thalia, 
Symbol/Kangoo  
Dacia X 90 
PSA 
Full-scale manufacturing since 1998 
Brand divided into Peugeot and Citroen 
Czech: Joint venture with Toyota, supply base toward 
Western Europe 
Peugeot 206-106, 
Citroen C3, Peugeot 
Partner, Citroen 
Berlingo 
Fiat Established FAP(Fiat Auto Poland) in 1992, and produced mid-to-low price small car for Western Europe 
Palio/Weekend/Siena, 
Fiat Gingo 
Source: Global Insight 
 
<Figure 1-1> Overseas production ratio of European makers 
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Generally, share of  overseas production in the European makers is low compared 
to other global makers.  Moreover, their production outside Europe is very limited.  
Except for Volkswagen and Fiat, most European makers are Eurocentric, at least in terms 
of  production.  The two French makers, PSA and Renault are very similar in that they 
their sales and production are concentrated in Western Europe and France.  Among PSA’s 
total production, 55% was built in Western Europe, and over one third was made in France.  
Majority of  Renault plants are located in Europe, especially in Western Europe. 
 
<Figure 1-2> European Makers’ Production Portfolio and its development 
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5. After mid-2000s: Competitive Global Expansion 
 
From this time around, FDI by global makers were accelerated and made 
everywhere by almost every manufacturer.  What can be distinguished from the FDI trend 
from the previous period is that the hottest FDI spot in this period were mostly developing 
countries: BRICs and East Europe.   
 
1) China 
 
Asia is the fastest growing region in terms of  automobile production as well as 
sales, largely due to motorization in China and other developing countries.  China is by far 
the most powerful absorber of  FDI within Asia.  VW, Hyundai, and GM are the Top 3 
producers among foreign OEMs, and Japanese Big 3 are the next largest makers.  Almost 
every global maker has entered China and began production.  However, European maker’s 
presence in general is yet weak at the moment.  Only VW is leading significant business in 
China while presence of  other three volume brands is weak.  Currently Renault and Fiat 
has no sales in China let alone production.  PSA runs one plant in Wuhan. 
 
<Table 1-8> Top 10 Foreign OEMs in China 
Maker 1995 2000 2005 2009 
VW GROUP 199,726 331,529 481,577 1387,327 
HYUNDAI 0 4,853 345,393 845,825 
GM 0 30,024 358,425 772,501 
TOYOTA 0 451 146,211 613,065 
HONDA 0 32,228 268,218 602,455 
NISSAN 0 0 172,999 535,657 
FORD 0 5,526 79,268 266,496 
PSA 10,733 53,900 141,661 262,889 
SUZUKI 17,174 53,958 120,654 243,079 
MAZDA 0 0 50,386 173,889 
Source: Global Insight 
 
2) India 
 
India is another potential strong market next to China, and thus attracted FDI of  
many global manufacturers.  Until 1990s, a handful of  makers entered through joint-
venture, but now most foreign OEMs operate independently through wholly owned 
subsidiaries thanks to the deregulation of  automotive industry.  Asian makers are the most 
 165 
distinctive key players.  Maruti-Suzuki and Hyundai are the top two producers.  In fact, 
Suzuki is the by far the biggest foreign OEM. Hyundai is the second biggest maker.  India 
has substantial significance in Hyundai’s global production roadmap.  It is attractive not 
only for its low wage, but it has one of  the greatest potential for market growth.  India is 
now in the process of  motorization, thus the demand is expected to rise rapidly for at least 
10 years.  Currently, cars produced from Indian plant are for exports to Europe as well as 
domestic sales.  It is warned that when India-ASEAN FTA enters into force, cheap parts 
and components will be imported from Thailand, which can be detrimental to suppliers to 
Korean makers in India. 
Besides these two makers, other foreign makers are not significant in terms of  
volume yet.  The total production units of  Japanese Big 3, GM, Ford, and European 
makers combined is smaller than the production of  Hyundai alone, the second biggest 
foreign maker.  European manufacturers are not doing very well in this market, and their 
production volume is insignificant.  VW, adopting the aggressive emerging market strategy, 
is now trying to build production capacity and expand sales in India, taking advantage of  
its partnership with Suzuki.  
 
<Table 1-9> Top 10 Foreign OEMs in India 
Maker 1995 2000 2005 2009 
SUZUKI 270,801 361,296 555,335 903,986 
HYUNDAI 0 84,578 250,917 558,558 
GM 6,514 60,045 29,337 66,148 
HONDA 0 10,705 38,580 60,740 
NISSAN 0 0 0 56,742 
TOYOTA 0 21,514 45,695 52,565 
FORD 0 17,417 22,804 32,476 
FIAT GROUP 0 12,015 0 23,653 
VW GROUP 0 0 8,674 12,321 
RENAULT 0 0 0 7,464 
Source: Global Insight 
 
India is becoming the manufacturing hub of  compact cars by global manufacturers.  
As seen in the graph, compact cars(A segment) takes about half  of  the total production.  
Also, its production is growing very fast annually.  Leading models include Suzuki Alto, A-
Star, GM’s Spark and Beat, Hyundai’s i10 and Santro, Nissan’s Micra, Tata’s Indica and 
Nano, etc. 
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<Figure 1-3> Production by Segment in India 
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Source: Global Insight(2010) 
 
3) Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Third stream of  FDI was made in the Central and Eastern Europe.  For this 
region, it is the second generation of  foreign investment.  The motivation of  FDI by 
these newcomers is different from that of  European makers.  Western companies 
including GM and Ford mainly invested in this region for cheap resource, whereas Asian 
makers such as Toyota and Hyundai had mixed motivation: to reach the Western European 
market while sourcing relatively cheap labor. 
 
<Table 1-10> FDI by non-European makers in Eastern Europe 
Maker Plant Location Year 
GM Poland Gliwice, Warsaw Hungary Esztergom 
- 
2006 
Ford Poland(Tychy) Romania(Craiova) 
2007 
2008 
Toyota Czech Colin: TPCA(Toyota Peugeot-Citroen Automotive) 2005 
Hyundai Czech (Hyundai) Slovakia Zillina(Kia) 
2006 
2004 
Source: Global Insight 
 
 Recently, Russia is emerging as another big region receiving FDI by foreign 
OEMs; especially since 2003, when its government released new automotive development 
policy.  The vigorous FDI into Russia is mainly motivated by its market potential and the 
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high trade barriers: tariff  and NTB. 
 
4) South America 
 
South American is also a popular region for FDI, especially Brazil.  This is 
attractive market because it is growing but they have no local brand.  Also, trade barrier in 
this region is very high.84  Their automotive industry is heavily dependent upon foreign 
manufacturers.  European and American manufacturers are the active producer in South 
America, and VW, Fiat, GM are the Big 3 in this region.   
For Fiat, South America is one of  the most important regions outside Europe.  It 
has to do with the market segment structure of  South America.  Like Europe, small 
segments such as A and B segments are the most dominant segment in South America, 
where European makers are very competitive.  Therefore, European makers have been 
strong presence in this region.  Fiat’s production volume has increasing since 90s, and 
now is the second biggest maker in Brazil, narrowing the gap with VW.  Together, VW 
and Fiat are producing 56% of  total vehicle passenger vehicle production in Brazil, which 
has been much lowered from 68.4% in 1995. 
 
<Table 1-11> Production by foreign OEMs in South America(No. of units produced) 
Country # of Makers # of Plants 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Brazil 11 20 1,463,774 1,575,777 2,360,177 3,085,618 
Argentina 9 10 285,435 338,103 319,755 507,209 
Venezuela 7 7 96,901 89,432 156,500 111,697 
Colombia 6 6 80,836 34,067 66,465 87,012 
Ecuador 1 1 26,210 19,579 6,209 0 
Chile 1 1 21,572 19,216 6,201 0 
Total 35 45 1,982,710 2,091,372 2,965,969 3,867,351 
Source: Global Insight 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
84 The tariff for CBU in Mexico is 50%, and 35% for MERCOSUR countries. 
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Appendix II. Performance Requirements in some Countries  
 
1. Canada: Auto Pact85 
 
Auto pact is a sectoral free trade arrangement, providing a duty-free trade zone 
between Canada and the US for finished vehicles and car parts.  Eligible producers (the 
US Big 3) were allowed to import parts and vehicles duty free subject to local content 
requirements (50% Canadian/US content).  Jaguar, Saab, and Volvo, were also eligible for 
this duty free treatment.  Within the introduction of  duty remission programmes, imports 
from outside the Auto-Pact area, mainly Japan, could qualify for rebates on exportation.  
Preferential tariff  treatment under the Auto Pact and the remission programmes led to a 
sharp reduction in tariff  incidence for foreign-owned car producers, with duty averages not 
exceeding 2 per cent at the time when the FTA and NAFTA entered into force.  The 
eligibility condition for this Act was; 
 
(i) The manufacturer must have produced in Canada, during the “base year” 
(ii) Production to sales “ratio requirement” 
(iii) Canadian value added requirements (the “CVA requirements”) 
 
The ratio requirement is a sort of  quantitative restriction, limiting the volume of  
export to Canada by foreign makers.  The designated minimum ratio was 75:100, but 
actually, most of  the ratios had been close to 1:1 because it was difficult for the foreign 
makers to access Canadian vehicle market cross border due to high tariff  at that time.  
The CVA requirement was a kind of  local content requirement.  To satisfy the CVA 
requirement, the manufacturer had to achieve the same level of  value added that it has 
achieved during the base year(1963/1964)  The CVA requirement included use of  locally 
made parts, certain service performed in Canada, and labor and administrative cost.  
The Canadian government adopted a policy of  issuing special remission 
order(SRO) to new vehicle manufacturers that provided for duty remission on vehicles and 
other automotive goods imported from anywhere in the world if  the manufacturers 
maintained a prescribed production-to-sales ratio and a CVA requirement.  Canada issued 
many SROs and some Asian companies, including Toyota Motor Corp. and Honda Motor 
Co., began operating assembly plants in Canada, and requested their own SRO. 
 
                                            
85 Full title of Auto Pact is Agreement Concerning Automotive Products between Canada and the United 
States.(Can.T.S. 1966, No. 14) The Auto Pact was signed on January 16, 1965 and entered into force on 
September 16, 1966.  The Pact was terminated on February 18, 2001 as Canada implemente the WTO 
decision in Canada-Autos case(WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R). 
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2. Mexico 
 
Local content requirements had existed in Mexico since 1960s.  Auto Decree in 
1962 stipulated that at least 60% of  the ‘direct cost’ of  each car should be of  domestic 
production.  However, in addition to the Auto Decree, NAFTA was also another relevant 
legislation regarding the local content.  Appendix 300-A.2 of  NAFTA established that 
Mexico could maintain the provisions of  Auto Decree until January 1 of  2004.  In 1994, 
the local content requirement of  36% under the Auto Decree was reduced to 34%, and this 
remained unchanged for a five-year period with an annual reduction of  1% to reach 29% in 
2003.  The requirement was eliminated in 2004.  
 
<Table 2-1> Phasing out schedule of performance requirements as in NAFTA 
year 
National Value Added 
Trade Balance 
vehicles Auto parts 
1994 
34 % for each of the 
first five years 
beginning January 1, 
1994 
20 % 
80.0 % 
1995 77.2 % 
1996 74.4 % 
1997 71.6 % 
1998 68.9 % 
1999 33 % 20 % 66.1 % 
2000 32 % 20 % 63.3 % 
2001 31 % 20 % 60.5 % 
2002 30 % 20 % 57.7 % 
2003 29 % 20 % 55.0 % 
Source: UNCTAD  
 
 Trade balancing requirements first was introduced in 1976 when Mexico’s balance 
of  payments deteriorated due to the severe devaluation of  the peso. It required each 
assembler to attain a trade balance within four years. Article 5 of  the Auto Decree in 1989 
stipulated that final assemblers must maintain a positive foreign exchange balance, which 
takes into account their exports of  assembled vehicles as well as parts and components 
manufactured by them or purchased from Mexican suppliers.  The total value of  new 
vehicles that a final assembler may import is determined by dividing the foreign exchange 
surplus by a factor set in Decree.86  
   
                                            
86 For 2002, this factor was 0.577, which means that for US$100 of foreign exchange surplus, US$ 173 
worth of new vehicles may be imported 
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3. Brazil 
 
 Brazil’s FDI policy started with Provisional Measure No. 1024 of  13 May 1995, 
and after revisions was established under Law No. 9449 of  14 March 1997. Benefits were 
given to manufacturers of  motor vehicles and parts, in the form of  a reduction in duties on 
their imports of  certain products, conditional on compliance with certain requirements 
regarding the purchase or use o domestic products, and with trade balancing requirements 
and other criteria which may be imposed by the Ministry of  Industry, Trade and Tourism. 
Tariff  quota was opened for the importation of  motor vehicles manufactured by certain 
foreign producers and originating in certain countries. 
 
1) Tariff  reduction 
 
For parts, components and other inputs, a reduction of 70% in 1996, 55% in 1997, 
40% in 1998 and 1999, with a minimum import duty of 2%.  For finished vehicles, a 
reduction of 50% of the applied tariff or the MERCOSUR Common External Tariff, 
whichever lower, was announced and implemented until the end of 1999. 
 
2) Local Content Requirement 
 
In general, a minimum local-content requirement of 60%, reduced to 50% during 
the first three years for “newcomers” producing automotive products, except parts, and for 
one year for “newcomers” producing automotive products, except parts, and for one year 
for “newcomers” producing auto parts. 
For capital goods there was a 1-to-1 minimum ratio between domestic products 
acquisition and imports until the end of 1997, when it was raised to a 1.5-to-1 proportion. 
For raw materials there was a 1-to-1 proportion between domestic products and imports. 
 
3) Export-Performance Requirement 
 
Until 1997, a 1-to-1 proportion between exports and imports of vehicles and auto 
pats.  From July 1998 to June 1999, for each US$ exported, companies could import 
US$1.02 in vehicles and auto parts at reduced tariffs.  From July 1999 until the end of 
1999, the proportion was set at US$1 to US$ 1.03. 
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4. Russia  
 
The full-fledged industrial policy started quite recently in Russia.  It is not until 
late 1990s that Russian government introduced the industrial development concept in the 
automotive industry.  The government tried to privatize the automotive industry, and 
gradually reduced tariff  rates on passenger vehicles.  In the mean time, Russian 
government announced Directive 135 in 1998, which outlines the guidelines for the foreign 
investor companies producing automobiles in Russia.  In 2005, the Directive 135 was 
replaced by Directive 166, which provides more favorable environment for FDI in terms 
of  production conditions including local content requirements.   
 Now that almost every major player in the global automotive industry is present in 
Russia, the government is concerned about establishing production base conforming to the 
European standards.  
 
<Table 2-2> Industrial Policy Development of Russia 
Category Directive 135 Directive 166 
Date of Enforcement Feb. 1998 March 2005 
Term of validity 7 years 8 years for greenfield 7 years for developed area 
Customs duty on 
parts and components 0~14.5% 2~14.5% 
Minimum Investment 
$1.5 billion 
(In case of joint venture with 
local partner, $1,500 million) 
None 
Output Requirement Yearly administration based on the volume of output Above 25,000 units 
Start of Production 
Requirement 
full-scale production required 
within 36 months after signing 
agreement 
Within 36 months in greenfield 
Within 18 months in developed 
area 
Local Content 
Requirement 
For 12 months, 15% 
For 24 months, 20% 
For 36 months, 30% 
For 48 months, 40% 
For 60 months, 50% 
For 24 months, 10% 
For 42 months, 20% 
For 54 months, 30% 
Source: KAMA 
 
Russia is not yet a member of  WTO as of  2010.  Since China made accession to 
the WTO, Russia remains the biggest economy not yet incorporated to the world trading 
system.  Accession of  Russia to the WTO will render more stable and favorable 
environment for the foreign investors.  
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5. India 
 
A. Import licensing 
India was applying discretionary import licensing to 715 tariff  line item, including 
cars imported in the form of  completely and semi-knocked down (“CKD/SKD”) kits.  
This import licensing scheme was abolished on April 2001. 
 
B. Local-content schemes 
Since 1995, Memoranda of  Understanding (MOU)87 have been required from car 
manufacturers seeking import licences for CKD/SKD kits on the restricted list.  The 
authorities state that the terms and conditions of  the MOU differ between companies:  
however, it was reported that such memoranda generally contain provisions to indigenize 
production. Once the MOU signing firm has reached an indigenization level of  70%, there 
will be no need for further import licenses from Director-general of  Foreign Trade.  
Consequently as and when the firms achieve 70% indigenization they would go outside the 
ambit of  the MOU automatically.. 
 
C. Trade balancing requirements 
Subparagraph (iv) is on trade balancing requirements.  There have been balancing 
requirements between the actual c.i.f. value of  imports by automobile producers in India 
and exports of  automobiles.  That is, foreign investors should meet 1:1 ratio between 
their imports and exports, with the grace period of  2 years.  Since June 1999, a new 
export-oriented Automotive Development Policy has been implemented to comply with 
WTO commitments and promote the component sectors. Tax incentives for local content 
have been phased out and no distinction is made in CKD or CBU. 
                                            
87 Public Notice No. 60 and the MOUs(Subparagraphs 3) 
(i) Establishment of actual proportion facilities for manufacture of cars, and not for mere assembly. 
(ii) A minimum of foreign equity of US$50 million to be brought in by the foreign partner within the 
first three years of the start of operations, if the firm is a joint venture that involves majority 
foreign equity ownership. 
(iii)Indigenization (i.e. local content) of components up to a minimum level of 50% in the third year or 
earlier from the date of first import consignment of CKD/SKD kits/components, and 70% in the 
fifth year or earlier.87 
(iv) Broad trade balancing of foreign exchange over the entire period of the MOU, in terms of 
balancing between the actual CIF value of imports of CKD/SKD kits/components and the FOB 
value of exports of cars and auto components over the period.  While a firm that signs an MOU 
has an export obligation equivalent to the total CIF value of the imports made by the firm over the 
period of the MOU, there is a two-year memorandum during which the firm does not need to fulfill 
that commitment.  The period of export obligation therefore begins from the third year of 
commencement of production…. 
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6. China 
 
In April 2005, the central government put KD vehicle identification rules, namely 
'Administrative Rules on Imported Auto Parts Constituting Complete Vehicle 
Characteristics’ in force, tightening restrictions on imported content of  locally assembled 
vehicles.  KD regulations apply both to PV and CV, imposing complete vehicle tariff  
(25%) rate on those parts (10%) that do not meet the new requirements.  According to 
the new KD rule, the product is regarded a complete vehicle if: 
1) automobile is assembled from imported CKD or SKD kit. 
2) body(including cab) and engine assembly are imported. 
3) body(including cab) or engine is imported in addition to 3 or more imported 
system assemblies.  
4) 5 or more system assemblies (transmission, driveshaft, non-driveshaft, frame, 
brake, steering system) are imported. 
5) total price of imported parts amounts to or exceeds 60% of manufacturing price. 
Also, Parts are regarded a complete vehicle if: 
i. parts are imported as part of an assembly system. 
ii. basic pats or sub-assemblies are imported and their number amounts to or exceeds 
the sanctioned number of parts.  The same tariff rate applies to parts if they are 
regarded complete vehicles as to complete vehicles. 
iii. if the total price of imported parts amounts to or exceeds 60% of manufacturing 
price, complete vehicle tariff rate is applied on such parts. 
 
<Table 2-3> Regulations on Imported Parts (implemented on April 5, 2005) 
Assembly Name Key Parts and Components 
Considered 
Import 
Notes A-
Type 
Parts 
Other 
Parts 
Body 
(incl. Cab) 
M-Type 
A Side Panel, Door, Engine Hood 2 
5 
If an M1-type sub-
assembly contains 
masking and press 
parts, it is considered 
import sub-assembly 
B 
Roof, Front-Wall Panel, Floor, 
Trunk Hood(0r Rear Door), 
Rear-Wall Panel, Fender 
- 
M2-Type 
A Roof, Side Panel 2 
4 B Engine Hood, Front-Wall Panel, Door, Rear-Wall Panel, Floor - 
M3-Type 
A Roof, Side Panel, Frame 2 
4 B Front-Wall Panel, Door, Rear-Wall Panel, Floor - 
N-Type A Roof, Door, Side Body 2 5 B  - 
Engine Diesel Engine A 
Cylinder, Cylinder Had, High-
Pressure Fuel Injection Pump 2 6 
Items not include: 
radiators, fans, air 
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B 
Crankshaft, Turbo Charger, 
Camshaft, Connecting Rod, 
Starter, Generator, Diesel 
Injector 
- 
filters, silencers, fuel 
tanks, and clutches 
Gasoline 
Engine 
A 
Cylinder, Cylinder Head, 
EFI(incl. ECU, Throttle Valve, 
Injector, Sensor) 
2 
6 
B 
Crankshaft, Camshaft, Fuel 
Pump, Connecting Rod, Starter, 
Generator, Turbo Charger 
- 
Transmission 
MT 
A Case, Gear, Clutch 2 
4 
1. Items not included: 
Remote control 
system. 
2. If the entire 
driveshaft’s transfer 
case is assembled then 
the sanctioned number 
of parts are reduced 
to 3 
B Axle, Gearshift Module,Synchronizer, Transfer Case - 
AT 
A Case, Clutch, AT Control(ECUModule) 2 
4 
B 
Transfer Case, Gear(or Friction
Wheel, Steel Melt), Axle,
Gearshift Module 
- 
M1-Type 
Automobile Driveshaft 
Case, Axle Shaft(incl. Constant
Velocity Joint), Steering
Knuckle, Differential Gear,
Swing Arm, Wheel Hub,
Bearing, Wheel Reduction Gear,
Suspension Spring, Shock
Absorber 
- 6  
Axle Non-Driveshaft 
Shaft(incl. trailing arm), Wheel
Hub, Bearing, Suspension
Spring, Shock Absorber 
- 4  
M2, M3, and 
NType 
Automobiles 
Driveshaft 
Case, Differential Gar, Axle
Shat, Drive Axle, Wheel
Reduction Gear, Wheel Hub,
Bearing, Shock Absorber,
Suspension Spring 
- 5 
If the suspension 
system’s front shaft 
includes a swing arm 
and steering knuckle 
then the sanctioned 
number o parts are 
increased to 6. 
Axle Non-Driveshaft 
Steering Knuckle, Shock
Absorber, Front Shaft,
Suspension Spring, Wheel Hub,
Bearing 
- 4  
Frame 
Longitudinal Member(Front Sub-
Frame and Engine Support),
Cross Member(or Rear Sub-
Frame) 
- 2   
Brake System 
Master Cylinder(or Air Control
Valve), Servo Booster, Front
Brake, Rear Brake, ABS Valve
Body, ECU 
- 4   
Steering 
System 
Power 
Steering 
Steering Gear, Steering Control
Valve, Steering Servo Pump,
Steering Wheel, Steering
Column and Joint 
- 3 Items included: 
airbags 
Other 
Steering 
Steering Gear, Steering Column
and Joint, Steering Wheel - 2 
Source: FOURIN China AUTO weekly(September 19, 2009) 
 175 
7. Indonesia 
 
In 1985’s localization policy mandated that diesel engine for commercial vehicles 
were provided by local supplier, assembled locally.  In addition, engine, transmission, 
accelerator, steering system, clutch system, brake, etc were deleted from licensing list.  
Later in 1987, tariff  barrier system was introduced instead of  import ban, and also deletion 
plan was turned into tariff  system.  In the ordinance announce on June 4, for vehicles 
produced in Indonesia, and using local contents above 60% were pronounced to be 
exempted from luxury tax. Luxury tax was for commercial vehicles and passenger vehicles 
were 20% and 35%, respectively.  
Indonesian government adopted deregulation package in 1993.  Ban on 
importation of CBU was replaced by high tariffs and surcharges, local content requirement 
scheme was replaced by differential tax treatment in favor of locally produced vehicles.  
The 1993 deregulation package also included foreign capital’s majority ownership, which 
allowed foreign firms to operate in Indonesia in the stable and predictable environment.  
 
<Table 2-4> Imports duty based on local content rate  
1993 
Local Content Rate Passenger Car Light Commercial Vehicle 
Less than 20% 100% 40% 
20% to 30% 80% 30% 
30% to 40% 60% 20% 
40% to 60% 40% 0% 
More than 60% 0% 0% 
1995 
Local Content Rate Sedans and Station Wagon 
Pick-ups, Minibuses 
and Jeeps 
Buses and 
Trucks 
Less than 20% 65% 25% 25% 
20% to 30% 50% 15% 15% 
30% to 40% 35% 10% 0% 
40% to 50% 20% 0% 0% 
50% to 60% 10% 0% 0% 
More than 60% 0% 0% 0% 
Source: FOURIN, アジア自動車産業, 2006  
 
Luxury tax was exempted by 20~35% for all passenger vehicles with displacement 
under 1,600cc and commercial vehicles under 5 ton which have localization rate over 60% 
 
1) The 1996 National Car Program 
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As a follow-up measure of  1995 New Automotive Industrial Policy, Indonesian 
Government adopted National Car Program in 1996.  This program provided for the 
attribution of  National Car company status(so-called ‘pioneer status’) to Indonesian-owned 
car makers that produce cars in Indonesia in facilities 100% owned by national industrial 
companies, or Indonesian statutory companies with all shares belonging to Indonesian 
citizens, and use trade marks created by them, and owned by Indonesian technology, 
designs and engineering on the basis of  national capacity, to be realized in phases.  
To maintain pioneer status, the company’s car must meet the following local 
content requirements: 20% at the end of  the first year, 40% at the end of  the second year, 
and 60% at the end of  the third year.  Under these conditions, National Cars are granted 
two kinds of  benefits: full exemptions from sales tax on all sales, while purchasers of  
imported sedans or other domestic sedans with 60% or less local content pay up to 35% 
tax, and domestic sedans with local content greater than 60% are subject to 20%, and full 
exemption from import duties on parts and components. 
As its joint partner to the National Car Program, KTM(Kia Timor Manufacturing) 
was established, with share ownership by Kia(30%), PT Timo Putra Nasional(TPN)(35%), 
and INDAUDA(35%). Kia Sepia was the model selected as National Car and it was 
planned to start production in 1998 in the plant near Jakarta with annual production 
capacity of  50,000 units to be expanded to 100,000 in 2000.     
In June, as local manufacturing plant construction was delayed, Indonesian 
government modified the program that when cars are manufactured by Indonesian 
nationals, though built in foreign countries, they are treated equally as National Car.  
Under this decision, 1,000 Indonesian workers were sent to Korea, and 45,000 units of  
Timor (Sepia) were imported from Korea duty free as National Car.  The National Car 
plant construction was commenced in the next year.  
However, in 1998, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concluded that the national 
vehicle concept was in violation of  the WTO Agreement.  Thus, Indonesian government 
introduced new automotive policy in 1999.  The new policy removed CKD tariff  
incentives under previous localization rates.   
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8. Malaysia 
 
1983 was the turning point for Malaysia’s automotive industrial policy.  In that 
year, the Government established Proton, the national car company, and since then 
Malaysia’s industrial policy was directly related to the promotion of  Proton.  The 
PROTON project, which was a joint-venture with Mitsubishi Motors of  Japan, began its 
production in 1985.  As it has integrated manufacturing facilities promoting linkage and 
having national brand, it was given preferential duty rates.  
Proton’s KD production increases caused large trade deficit, and the Government 
released New Local Content Policy.  Local content requirement was raised from 60% to 
80%, and tariff  was imposed on parts that Proton imported.  In 1994, Perodua and DRB-
Proton, the 2nd and 3rd National Car company were launched.   
 
Later, the local content requirements were adjusted according to the engine 
displacement or weight, mandating up to 60% for small and medium size passenger 
vehicles(including MPV) up to 1850 cc.  Under the local-content policy for the 
automotive sector, there were 30 items on the mandatory deletion list, which local 
automotive assemblers/manufacturers must source locally.  Malaysia has received an 
extension of  the phase-out period for local content requirements until December 2001.  
In requesting another two years extension until December 2003, Malaysia has agreed to 
abolish the local content rule and remove 11 products from the deletion list from 2002.  
The remaining 19 items were abolished at the end of  2003.  However, there is still 
administrative guideline encouraging the local content usage.  
 
<Table 2-5>Local content Rule of Malaysia(up to 2003)  
 
Vehicle types Local content 
required PV CV MPV 
Engine 
displacement/ 
weight 
Up to 1850cc − Up to 1850cc 60% 
Above 
1851~2850cc Up to 2500 GVW  45% 
2851cc Above 2500GVW  Deletion program 
Source: FOURIN, アジア自動車産業, 2006 
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9. Philippines 
 
The Board of  Investment(BOI) launched PCMP(Progressive Car Manufacturing 
Program) in 1973 to increase the domestic content from 15% in the first year, to 25% in 
the second year, and 35% in the third year, and progressively increasing thereafter.  
  
<Table 2-6> Details of Motor Vehicle Development Program (MVDP)  
Item Detail 
Car 
Development 
Program 
MO 136 (Dec 1987) For cars with engine displacement of 1201~2800cc, 40% of local content is required. 
MO 286 
(March 1990) 
For cars with engine displacement of 1200cc and below, 51% 
of local content is required.  
MO 68 
(Dec 1992) 
For cars with engine displacement of 1200~2800cc, foreign 
exchange is required as follows: 
- 50%(up to 1994) 
- 75%(1995~1997),  
- 100%(1998 onwards) 
MO 238 
(Jul 1994) 
Change the book value of CBU passenger vehicles 
importable from US$25,000 to US$20,000. 
MO 242 
(Dec 1994) 
Participation in CDP to ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) 
project proponents. Participants under the AIJV’s scheme 
are required 100% foreign exchange for imports of CKD units 
for assembly. 
Commercial 
Vehicle 
Development 
Program 
MO 157 
(Feb 1988) 
1. For Asian Utility Vehicle( up to 3000 GVW) 
-local content(54.86%) and foreign exchange(25%) 
2. For light Commercial vehicle (up to 3000 GVW) 
-local content(44.42%) and foreign exchange(25%) 
3. For light trucks(3001 to 6000 GVW) 
-local content(21.90%) and foreign exchange(25%)  
4. For cargo trucks or passenger buses, in accordance with 
vehicle WT, local content is required as follows: 
-6,001-9,000: 21.44% 
-9,001-12,000: 22.44% 
-12,001-15,000: 13.53% 
-15,001-18,000: 13.77% 
And 25% of foreign exchange is required from 1988 onwards. 
Motorcycle 
Development 
Program 
MO 160 
(Feb 1988) 
1. For two-wheeler vehicles, 54.95% of local content, and 
25% of foreign exchange is required. 
2. For three-wheeler vehicles, 46.64% of local content, and 
25% of foreign exchange is required. 
MO 346 (Feb 1996) 
-liberalized new entry into auto assembly industry. 
-limit on the number of assembly model was abolished.  
-mid-to-large commercial vehicle import ban was 
released. 
MO 473 (Apr 1998) 
-newly entered auto makers were not allowed to import 
SKD for maximum 1 year. 
-high technology parts were required to procure locally.  
Source: WTO, Notifications from countries (G/TRIMS/N/1/PHL/1) 
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10. Thailand 
Under Factory Act(B.E. 2535) and Investment Promotion Act(B.E. 2520), 
passenger vehicle assembly plants were required to use specified local parts or were 
encouraged to use specified proportions in order to be eligible for Board of  Investment 
rights and privileges.  For passenger cars, not less than 54% of  local parts is required;  a 
compulsory parts list amounting to 60-70% local content applies for small trucks;  trucks 
and buses must incorporate seven specified locally produced parts and reach at least 40-
50% domestic content;  and motorcycles must incorporate a local engine.  The benefits 
include import duty and excise duty exemptions for assembly plants meeting the 
local-content requirements.  If  the local content is met, differential tariffs apply 
depending on whether the vehicle is imported completely knocked down (CKD) or 
completely built-up (CBU).  Local Content Requirement was abolished before 2003.  
 
<Table 2-7>Various Local Content Requirements in Thailand  
 Application Criteria Effective Date Reference 
Mandatory 
Local 
Content  
Passenger 
vehicles 
No less than 54% of domestic 
auto parts must be used. 
18 January 
1994 
Notification of 
Ministry of 
Industry No. 1 
Vans and 
other types 
of PV 
Not more than;  
-40% of Chassis with engine,  
-45% of Chassis with engine 
and windshield,  
-50% of Chassis with engine 
and cap,  are imported 
25 
December 
1979 
Notification of 
Ministry of 
Industry 
Small vans 
and trucks 
- Local engines and parts are 
used at least 40% 
- seven local items are 
encouraged to use: radiator, 
silencer, exhaust pipes, 
battery, front-rear leaf, type 
and tube wheel, safety glass 
and front-rear drum brake 
3 May 1991 Notification of 
Ministry of 
Industry 
Local 
Content 
Ratio 
Required 
Engines for 
automobiles  
Year 1: 20% 
Year 2: 30% 
Year 3: 40% 
Year 4: 50% 
Year 5: 50% 
Year 6: 60% 
Year 7: 70% 
12 January 
1987 
Announcement 
(Office of the 
Board 
Investment) 
No. P.1/2530 and 
Board Resolution 
Transmission 
Assembly 
Year 1: 20% 
Year 2: 35% 
Year 3: 50% 
Year 4: 65% 
Year 5: 80% 
21 January 
1987 
Board Resolution 
Excise Tax PV and Pick- Not less than 60% of 2 march Announcement 
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Exemption up trucks 
with chassis 
and 
windshield 
domestic parts and 
components must be used to 
any modification 
1994 (the Excise 
Department)  
Source: WTO, Notifications from countries (G/TRIMS/N/1/THA/1) 
 
11. Vietnam 
 
During the period 1987~1994, localization requirements were used in the appraisal 
and licensing of  foreign investment projects concerning the production of  automobiles, 
motorcycles, etc.  In production and assembly of  automobiles, companies have to submit 
a plan for components and spare parts production in Vietnam to receive an investment 
license.  Five years from the starting date of  production at the latest, the project has to 
use local parts and components for a value of  no less than 5% of  the car’s ex-factory cost.  
The ratio then progressively increases so that in the 10th year, local content should be no 
less than 30% of  the ex-factory cost.  The below table shows the actual local content rates 
committed by foreign manufacturers.   
 
<Table 2-8>Commitment on Localization made by makers(2003)  
Makers 
Local contents(%) in years from starts of production 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Isuzu - - - - - - - - - 30 
Mercedes 
Benz - - - 5 - - - - - 40 
VIDAMCO - - - 5 - - - - - 35 
Suzuki - - 22.8 - - 29.6 - - - 38.2 
Ford - - - - - - - - - 30 
Toyota - - - - - - - - - 30 
Hino - - - - 10 - - - - 30 
Source: UNCTAD 
 
The Vietnamese government tries to move from simple assembly to localized 
production of  components and spare parts.  According to the Prime Minister’s decision 
ratified in December 2002, regular vehicles including commercial vehicles as well as 
passenger vehicles should have a local content of  60% or more by 2010.  This target was 
reiterated in the Governments Master Plan for Development of  Automobile Industry of  
October 2004.  It required the local content of  automobile engines to be at least 50% and 
that of  gear boxes no less than 90%.   
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12. South Africa 
 
Since the beginning of  the assembly industry to serve the demand in the domestic 
market in 1920s, the vehicle market was protected by high tariffs.  The high import tariff  
blocked the competition with imported vehicles, but there was high degree of  competition 
among domestic assemblers.  Cars were assembled locally from imported components 
mostly, and the local content level was around 20% at this period.  This led to the 
necessity of  local content rules for the local assembly industry.  Starting in 1961, a series 
of  local content requirements were introduced, and by the end of  second Phase, 
manufacturers were required to have 52% local content, as measured by the weight of  the 
local component.  Assemblers not meeting the local content requirement were subject to 
prohibitively high tariff  on the imported parts. The local content level required was 
gradually raised to 66%.    
 
<Table 2-9>Industrial Policy Development of South Africa 
Period Policy details 
Before 1960 No Local Content Requirement 
1961~1969 Local Content Requirement introduced. 
1970~1976 52% of local content was required in terms of weight 
1977~1981 66% of local content for cars were required. 
1982~1987 66% local content was extended to light commercial vehicles. 
1988~1994 Local content requirement was reduced from 66% to 50% 
1995 Motor Industry Development Program 
Source: Black(2002) 
 
From 1988, there was a change of  policy direction: from import substitution to 
export promotion.  Instead of  enforcing tight local content requirements, export was 
promoted which eased foreign exchange difficulties.  Thus, actual local content rate could 
be reduced.  In this period, the local content requirements were lowered from 66% to 
50%.  
In 1995, the government introduced Motor Industry Development Program(MIDP).  The 
main policy objective of  this program was to i) reduce the tariffs on light vehicles and 
components, with tariffs being phased down even faster than required by WTO obligations, 
ii) removal of  local content requirement, iii) duty-free import of  components up to 27% of  
the wholesale value of  the vehicle, and iv) duty rebate credits to be earned on exports of  
vehicles and components and used for duty-free import of  vehicles and components.  
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Appendix III. Panel Data  
 
<Table 3-1> FDI inflow in the motor vehicle industry(in US million $) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 392 774 1082 65 -313 253 -17 80 42 606   
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0 -75.6 69.2 151.1 51 272.3 -6.7 11.1 -166.5 129.2 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 659.6 -408.9 -592.6 0 -597.4 
Brazil             
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile             
China             
Colombia             
Czech Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 282.4 -73 887.9 -429.2 397.1 62.1 
Ecuador             
Egypt             
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73.4 -24.8 0 0 
France 90.7 237.1 310.1 -31.1 563.6 272.7 1559.1 1765.1 695.8 771.5 1053.9 440.5 
Germany 113 935.1 -946.8 -3441.3 -293 2327.8 578.5 -807.6 -1148.8 966.5 -1030.3 -461.9 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 558.5 0 650.7 273.8 496.7 563.4 444.3 792.9 
India             
Indonesia     5.41 66.33 141.88 69.40 28.27 173.49 70.45  
Italy 25.8 27.6 54.5 62.9 116.1 3635.6 159.4 1769.8 525.3 2066 -9.9 1886.5 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Korea 55.9 285.6 362.5 181.5 136.8 919.4 -5.8 400.9 -38 261.2 746.3 177.7 
Malaysia     0.06 2.84 58.68 0.47 9.20 31.03 0  
Mexico 0    2191.7 1612 1403.9 1249.9 1114.6 2466.9 2079.2 1419.9 
Netherlands 402.3 641.7 178.4 23.3 98 45.1 193.4 -160.2 -267.7 -253.4 48.4 210.8 
Pakistan             
Philippines     13.01 153.19 19.73 34.89 27.13 31.57 57.11  
Poland 58.8 341.7 193.2 465.6 279.9 279.8 55.1 387.5 766.5 937.5 391 601.2 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia             
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 -100.4 135.9 -161.6 -175 459.2 823 615.8 
Slovenia             
South Africa             
Spain 528.4 512.2 809 565.8 -1253 0 0 0 0 0 0 -341.4 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 1999.6 1073.1 -172.1 179.3 0 1065.5 650 
Thailand     16.25 59.74 70.01 124.79 806.80 474.98 1644.69  
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 140 35 74 63 
Ukraine             
UK -523.9 24.9 822.2 3951.2 5319.5 3999.3 -1293.3 -4323.4 -5317.6 -1205.5 -332.6 -483.9 
USA 298 3697 1775 37182 6456 1028 7465 5805 -39 6083 3114 -2638 
Uruguay             
Vietnam      28.69 84.36 116.91 91.95 185.42 391.43  
Total 16038.8 6702.9 3558.1 38884.3 14511.1 16308.6 11625.7 6913.7 -2493.9 12149.1 8613 2569.8 
Source: OECD, ASEAN Secretariat 
Note: ISIC (Rev. 3) 34 motor vehicle industry(341, 342, 343) 
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<Table 3-2> Number of Foreign OEMs  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 7 7 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Australia 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Austria 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 5 5 5 5 
Belgium 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Brazil 9 9 10 11 12 12 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Canada 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Chile 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
China 10 12 12 13 15 17 18 18 21 22 22 22 
Colombia 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Czech 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 
Ecuador 8 8 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 2 2 
Egypt 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 8 8 8 
Finland 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
France 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 7 7 7 7 7 
Germany 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 
Hungary 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 
India 4 6 6 9 9 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 
Indonesia 15 15 15 15 14 14 14 13 13 13 13 12 
Italy 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
Japan 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 15 14 15 13 14 14 15 14 14 14 14 14 
Mexico 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 
Pakistan 7 7 8 8 7 6 7 6 6 7 7 8 
Philippines 13 13 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Poland 9 9 10 9 9 8 7 4 4 4 5 5 
Portugal 5 5 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Romania 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Russia 0 1 3 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 8 
Slovakia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
South Africa 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Spain 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 
Sweden 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 
Thailand 15 15 14 12 12 15 15 16 16 14 14 14 
Turkey 9 9 10 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 
UK 0 9 1 1 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 
Ukraine 10 11 11 11 12 12 13 12 10 11 11 11 
USA 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 
Uruguay 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Global Insight 
 
 
 184 
<Table 3-3> Number of Domestically Owned OEMs  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China 11 12 13 13 13 19 19 19 19 21 22 26 
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Germany 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Japan 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Korea 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 
Malaysia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Global Insight 
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<Table 3-4> Percentage of VA against the output in the automotive industry 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 55.2 52.2 63.4 60.3 47.0 54.4 54.0 48.1         
Australia   62.5 53.4 60.6 59.9 60.0 48.0 49.1 45.5 43.1 40.2 38.6 
Austria 63.7  70.1 52.5 57.2 52.0 57.6 58.9 60.9 56.8 58.7 59.1 
Belgium 78.1 75.7 72.9 75.9 74.3 72.7 70.6  66.9 62.0 62.6 70.0 
Brazil   60.0 59.5 57.7 52.3 57.4 54.0 55.0 49.2 49.3 51.7 52.0 
Canada 62.8 60.5 59.2 58.0 70.0 66.8 64.7 67.7 63.5    
Chile             59.7 66.6 51.1 65.7 73.4 66.9 
China                 64.5 58.9 56.2 57.2 
Colombia           64.1 67.5 62.0 61.4 67.2 62.2  
Czech Rep. 60.2           41.2 
Ecuador 85.2 87.3 88.1 87.6 83.1 79.8 84.3 81.1 77.1 68.2 74.2  
Egypt     92.0 84.1       38.4         
Finland 45.0 40.3 39.7 40.5 40.9 38.0 43.5 42.6 34.2 29.6 34.0 39.5 
France   65.6 67.5 69.4 67.9 66.8 66.4 68.1 67.1 68.5 68.6 65.9 
Germany     68.2 65.4 62.6 66.6 64.7 67.3 64.3 64.3 65.5 
Hungary 63.7 62.3 62.2 63.9 68.2 63.6 56.4 58.8 57.4 57.0 49.7 52.5 
India       47.8 50.2 44.3 43.8 45.9 51.5 55.1 64.0  
Indonesia       53.3 40.2 62.8 84.2   72.9 78.5 86.6 81.0 
Italy 56.5 48.7 54.8 47.3 39.5 47.0 31.1 22.0 28.9 32.6 37.5 45.6 
Japan 41.4 46.0 44.7 50.0 48.3 43.2 46.0 47.2 45.3 44.4 46.5  
Korea 59.3 58.4 65.9 61.8 63.4 63.0 67.0 64.3 64.1 59.5 57.6 55.9 
Malaysia           61.2 69.9 67.7 68.6 71.1 59.8 67.4 
Mexico 85.8 86.1 85.3 85.0 85.0 85.2 85.6 85.5 64.8 74.6 74.2 74.8 
Netherlands 54.7 56.8 61.9 64.2 63.1 63.9 63.1 62.8 62.8 70.9 68.9 71.5 
Pakistan            85.6 
Philippines             
Poland   70.5 66.5 64.5 60.7 54.9 50.8 46.3 46.9 44.0 44.7 42.2 
Portugal   64.3 65.8 63.4 65.3 60.7 60.5 53.5 45.3 39.0 40.1  
Russia       100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Slovakia 74.9 61.2           
Slovenia 70.7 62.1 56.6 64.5 57.3 53.7 47.4 38.9 33.7 34.9 37.5 35.0 
South Africa  55.9  61.5         
Spain 63.1 63.0 61.7 62.6 58.5 58.3 53.8 53.1 54.2 53.0 52.5 55.7 
Sweden 78.8 76.0 77.7 78.2 82.5 77.9 77.1 73.1 61.3 67.0 63.8 67.1 
Thailand   74.5   97.4   98.4   99.5     59.8 
Turkey 63.8 65.7 76.8 72.0 79.9 82.1 61.8  62.5 64.3 59.8  
Ukraine             
UK 59.4 65.7 60.5 55.9 53.7 48.5 53.3 49.0 51.0 56.4 51.5  
USA    60.4 57.7 59.2 55.1 55.2 59.7 62.1 61.9 61.4 60.8 
Uruguay    100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0    
Viet Nam       45.7   72.4            
Source: computed from UNIDO INDSTAT 
Note: the shaded area indicates the period when local content requirements were in place.  
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<Table 3-5> Historical change in the Tariff on passenger vehicles(HS 8703) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 30 30 30 33 33 33 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Australia 27.5 25 22.5 20 17.5 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 
Austria 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Belgium 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Brazil 105 80 63 49 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Canada 8 8 7.3 6.7 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 
Chile 11 11 11 11 10 9 8 7 6 6 6 6 
China 100 100 100 100 100 100 61.9 50.7 43 37.6 30 25 
Colombia 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Czech 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 10 10 10 
Ecuador 35 35 40 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Egypt 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 
Finland 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
France 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Germany 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Hungary 43 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 15 15 10 10 
India 52 52 45 45 45 38.5 105 105 105 105 100 100 
Indonesia 200 200 200 200 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 60 
Italy 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Korea 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Malaysia 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 50 50 50 
Mexico 30 30 30 20 30 30 30 30 30 30 50 50 
Netherlands 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Pakistan     225 250 250 250 200 150 75 75 
Philippines 40 40 40 40 40 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Poland 154 154 154 154 154 154 119 119 98 10 10 10 
Portugal 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Romania 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Russia 70     30 20 20 25 25 25 25 
Slovakia 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 10 10 10 
Slovenia 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 10 10 10 
South Africa 61 61 61 61  47 42.5 40 40 40 34 34 
Spain 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Sweden 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Taiwan 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 60 60 60 60 60 
Thailand 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 80 80 80 
Turkey 33 33 30.7 28.4 24.3 21.5 10 10 10 10 10 10 
UK 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Ukraine           25 25 
Uruguay    23 23 23 23 23 35 35 35 35 
USA 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
venezuela 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Vietnam     100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: WTO, national tariff authority 
Note: highest tariff in HS 8703 
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<Table 3-6> Historical change in the Corporate Income Tax 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 30  33 33 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Australia 36 36 36 36 36 34 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Austria 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 25 25 
Belgium 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 34 34 34 34 
Brazil 25 25 25 25 33 37 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Canada 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.6 40.5 38.1 36 34.4 36.1 34.1 
Chile 35  15 15 15 15 15 16 16 16.5 17 17 
China 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Colombia 30  35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Czech 41 39 39 35 35 31 31 31 31 28 26 24 
Ecuador 25 25 32 36.3 15 25 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 25 25 
Egypt 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Finland 25 28 28 28 28 29 29 29 29 29 26 26 
France 36.7 36.7 41.7 41.7 40 37.8 36.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35 34.4 
Germany 55.1 55.9 56.8 56 52 52 38.9 38.9 40.2 38.9 38.9 38.9 
Hungary 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 17.3 
India 40  35 35 35 38.5 39.6 35.7 36.8 35.9 36.6 33.7 
Indonesia 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Italy 53.2 53.2 53.2 37 37 37 36 36 34 33 33 33 
Japan 51.6 51.6 51.6 51.6 48 42 42 42 40.9 39.5 39.5 39.5 
Korea 33 33 30.8 30.8 30.8 30.8 30.8 29.7 29.7 29.7 27.5 27.5 
Malaysia 30 30 30 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Mexico 34 34 34 34 35 35 35 35 34 33 30 29 
Netherlands 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 34.5 34.5 34.5 31.5 29.6 
Pakistan 46  30 30 35 45.2 34.7 35 35 35 35 35 
Philippines 35 35 35 34 33 32 32 32 32 32 32 35 
Poland 40 40 38 36 34 30 28 28 27 19 19 19 
Portugal 39.6 39.6 37.4 37.4 37.4 35.2 35.2 33 33 27.5 27.5 27.5 
Romania 38 38 38 38 38 38 25 25 25 25 16 16 
Russia 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 24 24 24 24 24 
Slovakia 40 40 40 40 40 29 29 25 25 19 19 19 
Slovenia 39.2 38.1 37 37.8 38.2 37.5 37.7 38 38.2 38.3 38.6 38.3 
South Africa 35     30 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 36.9 
Spain 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Sweden 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Thailand 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Turkey 44 44 44 44 33 33 33 33 30 33 30 30 
UK 22     30 30 30 30 25 25 25 
Ukraine 33 33 31 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
USA 39.6 39.5 39.5 39.4 39.4 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 
Uruguay 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 35 30 30 30 
Vietnam 25  35 35 35 32.5 32 32 32 28 28 28 
Source: OECD, national statistics office 
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<Table 3-7> Number of countries under Preferential Trade Agreements  
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Argentina 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 12
Australia 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 5
Austria 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
Belgium 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
Brazil 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 12
Canada 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5
Chile 3 7 8 8 9 9 9 10 25 41 41 42
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 13
Colombia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 8 8 8
Czech 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 39 41 43
Ecuador 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 8 8 8
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 25 25
Finland 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
France 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
Germany 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
Hungary 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 39 41 43
India 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 9
Indonesia 6 6 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10
Italy 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 6
Malaysia 6 6 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 11
Mexico 6 6 6 8 8 22 25 25 25 36 37 42
Netherlands 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Philippines 6 6 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10
Poland 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 39 41 43
Portugal 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
Romania 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8
Russia 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Slovakia 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 39 41 43
Slovenia 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 39 41 43
South Africa 4 4 4 4 4 19 19 19 19 29 29 29
Spain 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
Sweden 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
Thailand 6 6 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10
Turkey 4 19 20 20 20 21 21 23 24 37 39 40
UK 19 20 21 22 22 26 26 27 29 39 41 43
Ukraine 6 7 7 7 7 12 12 12 12 12 14 15
Uruguay 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 12
US 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 6 6 8
Vietnam 6 6 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10
Source: WTO, KOTRA 
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<Table 3-8> Perceived Corruption Index 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 5.24 3.41 2.81 3 3 3.5 3.5 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.9 
Australia 8.8 8.6 8.86 8.7 8.7 8.3 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.7 
Austria 7.13 7.59 7.61 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 8 8.4 8.7 8.6 
Belgium 6.85 6.84 5.25 5.4 5.3 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 
Brazil 2.7 2.96 3.56 4 4.1 3.9 4 4 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.3 
Canada 8.87 8.96 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.2 8.9 9 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.5 
Chile 7.94 6.8 6.05 6.8 6.9 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.3 
China 2.16 2.43 2.88 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.3 
Colombia 3.44 2.73 2.23 2.2 2.9 3.2 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.8 4 3.9 
Czech 5.37 5.37 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.8 
Ecuador   3.19   2.3 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.3 
Egypt   2.84   2.9 3.3 3.1 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.3 
Finland 9.12 9.05 9.48 9.6 9.8 10 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.6 
France 7 6.96 6.66 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.9 7.1 7.5 7.4 
Germany 8.14 8.27 8.23 7.9 8 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.2 8 
Hungary 4.12 4.86 5.18 5 5.2 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.8 5 5.2 
India 2.78 2.63 2.75 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.3 
Indonesia 1.94 2.65 2.72 2 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 2.2 2.4 
Italy 2.99 3.42 5.03 4.6 4.7 4.6 5.5 5.2 5.3 4.8 5 4.9 
Japan 6.72 7.05 6.57 5.8 6 6.4 7.1 7.1 7 6.9 7.3 7.6 
Korea 4.29 5.02 4.29 4.2 3.8 4 4.2 4.5 4.3 4.5 5 5.1 
Malaysia 5.28 5.32 5.01 5.3 5.1 4.8 5 4.9 5.2 5 5.1 5 
Mexico 3.18 3.3 2.66 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.3 
Netherlands 8.69 8.71 9.03 9 9 8.9 8.8 9 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.7 
Pakistan 2.25 1 2.53 2.7 2.2   2.3 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.2 
Philippines 2.77 2.69 3.05 3.3 3.6 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 
Poland 5.57 5.57 5.08 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 4 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7 
Portugal 5.56 6.53 6.97 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.6 
Romania     3.44 3 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3 3.1 
Russia   2.58 2.27 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.5 
Slovakia       3.9 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 4 4.3 4.7 
Slovenia         6 5.5 5.2 6 5.9 6 6.1 6.4 
South Africa 5.62 5.68 4.95 5.2 5 5 4.8 4.8 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.6 
Spain 4.35 4.31 5.9 6.1 6.6 7 7 7.1 6.9 7.1 7 6.8 
Sweden 8.87 9.08 9.35 9.5 9.4 9.4 9 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.2 
Thailand 2.79 3.33 3.06 3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.8 3.6 
Turkey 4.1 3.54 3.21 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.8 
UK 8.57 8.44 8.22 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.6 
Ukraine       2.8 2.6 1.5 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.8 
United States 7.79 7.66 7.61 7.5 7.5 7.8 7.6 7.7 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.3 
Uruguay     4.14 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.5 6.2 5.9 6.4 
Vietnam     2.79 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Source: Transparency International 
 
 
  
<Table 3-9> Value added in Motor Vehicle Industry(ISIC 34) in million $ 
million $ 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 878.5 965.1 1379.8 1150.6 496.2 662.3 558.3 307.5 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Australia n.a 2515.9 2036.5 2383.4 2560.7 2229.2 1380.4 129n.a 1441.0 1699.3 1582.4 1502.4 
Austria 1269.8 2372.1 1260.8 1013.3 1216.9 993.1 1094.2 1238.0 1592.3 1949.5 2223.6 2279.5 
Belgium 3445.0 3053.0 2383.5 2742.7 2442.8 2163.2 2067.1 n.a 2567.7 2488.8 2542.0 3226.7 
Brazil n.a 7538.5 8033.1 6877.7 3699.6 5547.3 4377.7 4463.2 4874.0 6259.7 8416.9 10621.1 
Canada 8528.9 7912.6 8525.1 8115.8 16049.0 1466n.a 12459.6 14094.6 13322.2 n.a n.a n.a 
Chile n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 45.5 71.5 41.6 89.0 138.7 97.0 
China n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 17440.4 18848.3 19373.9 25869.9 
Colombia n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 122.6 167.4 167.3 132.1 245.2 314.5 n.a 
Czech Rep. 364.2 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 1891.0 
Ecuador 35.2 24.1 46.8 71.6 21.3 16.2 53.3 53.3 37.0 24.3 44.2 n.a 
Egypt n.a n.a 183.3 298.6 n.a n.a n.a 104.8 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Estonia n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.9 1.3 2.7 3.2 
Finland 160.8 143.4 135.4 148.9 145.9 119.5 136.6 141.0 126.3 116.8 153.0 181.9 
France n.a 11673.1 10795.0 12687.9 12675.4 10888.9 10382.2 11839.7 13608.8 16407.4 15772.9 13458.8 
Germany n.a n.a n.a 37926.2 35039.3 28005.3 34161.1 33523.6 46854.0 49056.7 48724.0 56070.8 
Hungary 277.3 316.6 473.6 621.3 750.6 702.5 582.3 691.6 937.4 1132.5 1093.1 1464.7 
India n.a n.a n.a 729.2 1119.2 773.0 787.7 963.7 1645.9 2486.2 3914.9 n.a 
Indonesia n.a n.a n.a 109.3 221.4 988.7 1481.3 2185.6 1561.5 2509.6 3836.8 4100.1 
Italy 4886.8 4516.1 5748.1 4232.0 3045.2 3412.7 1965.3 1276.7 2255.4 2893.7 3494.6 5301.7 
Japan 47119.1 49807.4 42945.3 42679.8 45844.4 41377.1 40763.9 46734.9 48924.8 50705.7 56460.8 n.a 
Malaysia n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 455.8 831.8 1086.3 1046.1 1059.7 589.9 861.0 
Mexico 3969.8 5251.1 6030.7 6551.1 7494.1 9132.8 9238.9 8979.0 691n.a 6977.0 7821.7 8826.3 
Netherlands 918.6 1001.7 996.7 1160.2 1165.4 1008.0 1013.8 1074.0 1321.9 1915.8 1835.6 2388.7 
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Pakistan n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 651.3 
Philippines n.a 630.3 675.1 272.3 487.6 n.a 292.1 n.a 441.9 n.a 391.6 n.a 
Poland 834.4 891.1 793.4 888.2 859.8 713.2 930.8 682.7 947.9 1432.2 1708.9 1836.5 
Portugal n.a 699.0 66n.a 569.7 625.3 561.5 480.2 421.9 383.1 379.9 375.6 347.5 
Korea 10065.2 10939.1 12319.1 5607.1 9321.8 11461.1 12659.3 13634.5 15215.5 15649.8 18026.2 20986.8 
Romania 323.3 408.7 34n.a 280.3 235.3 260.1 356.4 488.1 100.4 142.3 n.a n.a 
Russia n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 2523.9 2659.4 2503.7 3396.6 3407.4 4577.9 
Slovakia 96.0 65.5 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Slovenia 175.9 127.5 96.0 154.3 118.7 94.7 81.9 69.8 71.7 103.4 126.8 133.0 
South Africa n.a 1027.0 n.a 874.1 1659.4 1866.0 1932.5 1635.6 2346.4 2992.1 3275.5 3320.1 
Spain 5192.8 5686.7 5327.6 5506.5 5017.2 4454.8 3649.3 3969.8 5421.7 5994.5 5679.6 6489.8 
Sweden 3446.4 3324.2 3808.1 5076.6 5142.9 4553.9 3425.7 2836.1 3639.9 5026.1 4341.7 4770.5 
Switzerland n.a n.a 275.6 273.8 298.2 286.0 290.4 288.7 351.2 n.a n.a n.a 
Thailand n.a 4105.8 n.a 1697.0 n.a 1224.7 n.a 3504.4 n.a n.a n.a 3407.9 
Turkey 1281.6 1386.2 2016.9 1473.0 1482.6 2176.7 842.3 n.a 1983.7 2969.2 2447.8 4541.2 
UK 7816.4 9703.7 9573.6 8577.3 7078.2 5295.3 6247.5 5547.0 6555.4 9105.1 766n.a n.a 
USA n.a n.a 86417.0 81386.0 96817.0 78723.0 69552.0 91035.0 97036.0 93363.0 89983.0 88977.1 
Uruguay n.a n.a n.a 43.8 26.0 25.0 23.2 23.8 15.9 n.a n.a n.a 
Viet Nam n.a n.a n.a 20.7 n.a 95.5 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Source: UNIDO 
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<Table 3-10> Output in the Motor Vehicle Industry(ISIC 34) in million $ 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 1592.7 1847.4 2174.7 1908.0 1055.5 1216.6 1034.5 639.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Australia 0.0 4025.5 3810.4 3930.1 4275.0 3713.4 2877.8 2627.8 3168.5 3945.9 3938.4 3887.4 
Austria 1993.4 2372.1 1797.4 1928.5 2128.8 1908.0 1899.4 2103.0 2616.1 3435.1 3789.3 3855.2 
Belgium 4409.1 4035.0 3271.6 3615.5 3289.0 2974.3 2928.1 0.0 3836.6 4013.2 4062.9 4606.7 
Brazil 0.0 12571.0 13490.0 11925.3 7068.7 9659.9 8099.5 8107.6 9915.7 12695.3 16282.5 20408.1 
Canada 13575.6 13086.0 14409.5 13988.2 22923.8 21945.2 19258.4 20830.0 20984.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Chile 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 76.2 107.4 81.4 135.5 188.8 144.9 
China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27034.5 31992.2 34483.0 45219.1 
Colombia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 191.3 248.1 270.0 215.1 364.8 505.8 0.0 
Czech Rep. 605.3 289.5 320.0 386.4 492.9 585.6 730.1 1039.3 1372.7 1862.2 2226.5 4585.8 
Denmark 368.1 386.7 384.4 398.8 223.2 328.1 313.7 311.4 0.0 166.7 272.8 149.7 
Ecuador 41.3 27.7 53.1 81.8 25.6 20.3 63.2 65.7 48.0 35.6 59.6 0.0 
Egypt 0.0 0.0 199.2 355.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 272.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 2.9 33.9 41.9 46.2 51.8 
Finland 357.3 355.4 341.1 367.8 356.4 314.8 313.8 330.8 369.5 394.5 450.2 460.4 
France 0.0 17788.8 15990.5 18270.0 18671.0 16300.6 15628.9 17382.9 20268.4 23942.8 22984.7 20412.7 
Germany 0.0 0.0 0.0 55621.2 53573.0 44729.4 51300.2 51774.7 69588.0 76239.5 75802.8 85591.5 
Hungary 435.2 508.4 761.3 972.6 1099.9 1104.5 1032.1 1175.6 1633.6 1988.0 2201.3 2792.2 
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 1525.4 2227.9 1743.5 1798.2 2098.3 3193.3 4508.5 6112.9 0.0 
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 0.0 205.0 550.7 1574.5 1758.4 2184.8 2143.2 3195.1 4428.9 5062.3 
Italy 8650.7 9279.3 10484.5 8946.8 7710.4 7253.3 6315.4 5814.4 7795.7 8874.6 9313.5 11622.1 
Japan 113842.7 108366.5 95998.9 85367.3 94989.8 95708.3 88522.1 98932.9 108010.7 114305.0 121495.6 0.0 
Malaysia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 744.6 1189.2 1605.0 1523.9 1490.8 986.2 1278.0 
Mexico 4628.3 6098.4 7071.0 7706.5 8811.4 10717.2 10798.9 10503.2 10670.8 9350.2 10535.5 11803.6 
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Netherlands 1680.6 1763.7 1611.4 1806.0 1846.3 1577.2 1605.9 1711.1 2106.4 2703.0 2662.6 3340.9 
Pakistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 760.7 
Philippines 0.0 630.3 675.1 272.3 487.6 0.0 292.1 0.0 441.9 0.0 391.6 0.0 
Poland 834.4 1264.2 1193.8 1376.3 1415.6 1298.1 1833.9 1476.0 2019.3 3253.4 3819.5 4349.1 
Portugal 0.0 1086.4 1003.6 898.9 957.2 924.4 793.3 789.2 846.3 974.7 937.7 347.5 
Korea 16961.6 18717.1 18700.9 9072.8 14713.7 18192.5 18900.2 21189.5 23725.0 26293.1 31287.3 37540.2 
Romania 323.3 408.7 340.0 280.3 235.3 260.1 356.4 488.1 340.1 435.2 292.5 419.0 
Russia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2523.9 2659.4 2503.7 3396.6 3407.4 4577.9 
Slovakia 128.2 107.0 37.9 40.0 34.5 42.0 50.2 75.1 114.7 214.9 224.7 227.9 
Slovenia 248.7 205.4 169.6 239.4 207.0 176.5 172.8 179.5 212.9 296.5 338.2 380.1 
South Africa 0.0 1836.1 0.0 1420.7 1659.4 1866.0 1932.5 1635.6 2346.4 2992.1 3275.5 3320.1 
Spain 8229.9 9027.5 8632.1 8793.2 8574.8 7646.0 6781.4 7481.5 10008.7 11311.1 10810.8 11647.2 
Sweden 4371.6 4373.4 4902.5 6491.4 6232.6 5849.1 4443.3 3877.7 5933.1 7503.2 6803.7 7109.4 
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 275.6 273.8 298.2 286.0 290.4 288.7 351.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Thailand 0.0 5511.4 0.0 1743.0 0.0 1244.8 0.0 3523.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 5697.8 
Turkey 2007.6 2110.8 2626.2 2045.9 1856.4 2652.2 1362.8 0.0 3174.7 4620.6 4092.7 4541.2 
UK 13166.2 14773.2 15832.7 15356.3 13187.8 10919.9 11715.9 11329.3 12846.3 16141.2 14874.6 0.0 
Uruguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.8 26.0 25.0 23.2 23.8 15.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Viet Nam 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.3 0.0 132.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
USA 0.0 0.0 143186.0 141091.0 163519.0 142851.0 125961.0 152548.0 156226.0 150777.0 146616.0 146456.5 
Source: UNIDO 
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<Table 3-11> Number of Enterprises in the Motor Vehicle Industry 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Australia 1315 1537 1490 1442 1329 1440 1540 3822 3902 4229 3920 4200 
Austria 201 218 235 225 206 193 228 237 263 271 267 279 
Belgium  n.a n.a n.a n.a 413 472 473 n.a 428 452 453 470 
Brazil n.a 2738 2650 2841 2924 2899 2861 3183 3299 3353 3355 3694 
Canada 842 887 871 817 792 1035 1028 1051 1062  n.a n.a n.a 
Chile  n.a n.a n.a n.a  n.a n.a 76 74 83 84 92 88 
China  n.a n.a n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a n.a 4357 6635 6583 7513 
Colombia  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 154 160 163 172 182 190 n.a 
Czech Rep. 453 287 342 687 288 341 385 573 513 577 473 474 
Denmark 222 219 199 198 184 182 173 158 151 138 136 134 
Ecuador 52 49 46 44 39 39 42 39 41 41 45 n.a 
Egypt  n.a n.a 44 57  n.a n.a n.a 71  n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Estonia 36 32 31 31 28 16 17 20 33 38 34 44 
Finland 281 273 279 301 289 290 285 283 281 278 276 280 
France n.a 2217 2205 2184 2168 2153 2158 2150 2198 2179 2132 2110 
Germany 1109 1072 1055 837 2308 2281 2336 2559 2284 2545 2486 2303 
Hungary  n.a n.a n.a 175 194 202 401 396 410 414 408 407 
India  n.a n.a n.a 2809 2810 2684 2736 2902 2757 3093 3069 n.a 
Indonesia  n.a n.a n.a 232 244 246 216 256 247 249 262 336 
Italy 1984 1937 2064 2263 2253 2369 2316 1945 1916 1974 2065 2041 
Japan 10648 10126 9964 10437 9771 9798 9382 9149  n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Malaysia n.a  n.a n.a n.a n.a 299 272 296 332 302 304 401 
Mexico 243 245 237 231 222 218  n.a n.a n.a n.a  n.a n.a 
Netherlands 790 585 590 900 820 700 700 750 680 555 615 655 
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Pakistan  n.a n.a n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a n.a 139 
Philippines   n.a 246 249 245 141 n.a 114 n.a 117 n.a 126 n.a 
Poland 1964 1119 1445 1710 1646 1145 1092 1070 1010 1393 1139 1217 
Portugal   n.a 469 442 392 406 402 429 408 434 463 512 509 
Korea 3070 3362 3083 2604 3011 3200 3456 3534  n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Romania 120 159 190 197 224 303 319 356 385 421 412 411 
Russia  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 2108 1602 1498 3730 3849 4075 3585 
Slovakia 30 34 33 36 19 25 34 35 39 49 54 92 
Slovenia 76 79 71 76 90 84 82 77 79 87 94 104 
South Africa   n.a 1175  n.a n.a n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a n.a  n.a n.a 
Spain 1569 1642 1648 1607 2006 2106 2123 2136 2102 2102 2137 2115 
Sweden 542 564 644 662 664 690 718 754 885 907 933 961 
Switzerland  n.a n.a 196 183 170 172 176 137  n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Thailand   n.a 1095 n.a 862 n.a 938 n.a 1151  n.a n.a n.a 1336 
Turkey 201 222 221 252 241 258 257 2026 3053 3376 4287 3993 
Ukraine  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 491 465 481 512 502 526 347 
UK 4109 2500 2726 2750 3308 2885 2948 2948 2962 3066 3162 n.a 
Viet Nam  n.a n.a n.a 92 n.a 165 217 273 261 311 377 264 
USA  n.a n.a n.a 7661 7583 7401 5998 6009  n.a n.a 6112 6079 
Source: UNIDO 
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<Table 3-12> Average Wage in the Automotive Industry 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Australia 8354.45 8562.85 7926.48 9291.28 9047.75 9899.45 9531.6 2949.06     
Austria  11622.64 10535.02 9362.17 11295.12 8246.21 6240.13      
Belgium 19629.39  23081.16 18718.27 19684.27 16439.53 17302.55 19069.87 23853.63 25632.63 24792.26 28238.27 
Brazil 33335.41 30972.17 25511.04 25267.99 24865.11 21650.93 20495.55  25400.92 28748.83 28091.97 29573.54 
Canada  8395.36 8409.76 8666.28 6142.96 6039.17 5146.43 3995.89 3885.27 4027.40 5154.97 6204.02 
Chile 15972.92 15307.9 15115.3 14480.04 15054.78 14834.81 13789.99 14367.81 16192.09    
China       3891.95 3570.60 3021.96 3662.13 5054.05 5131.85 
Colombia         1029.31 958.36 1021.55 1298.96 
Czech Rep.      3498.109 3455.42 2768.59 2485.57 2823.08 3390.00  
Denmark            116274.10 
Ecuador 2101.87 2063.97 1955.53 1879.39 1688.17 1260.066 1777.25 2616.31 2208.89 2460.44 2372.30  
Egypt   2579.67 2781.10    2033.40     
Estonia 13833.94 12044.21 10767.19 10525.89 10235.83 9219.414 10009.82 10793.11 11193.53 13135.94 13158.13 15434.80 
Finland  21207.46 18951.11 18931.35 18885.90 15651.32 15533.11 18512.31 23299.46 27169.68 28113.51 29728.75 
France 31306.42 31223.52 27186.55 30211.11 29887.79 25675.86 25294.43 27553.89 34254.58 38558.28 39370.94 43857.52 
Germany 1573.22 1533.26 1630.30 1904.72 2008.80 1799.847 2339.49 3124.52 3624.13 4049.72 4132.71 3855.01 
Hungary    836.65 961.12 1078.289 987.50 1024.27 1155.15 1109.57 1209.84  
India    311.56 635.39 701.2334 1268.55 736.30 1199.83 1035.25  1003.60 
Indonesia 12160.69 13375.22 14657.07 12731.00 10649.57 10043.66 8550.17 8673.35 10131.34 12680.97 13113.17 14357.31 
Italy 16466.65 14380.16 13316.3 13074.21 14779.84 15748.47 13925.41 13496.49 14464.05 15334.50 14506.88  
Japan 11897.42 13293.68 11630.87 7817.40 8160.48 10748.87 9883.43 10006.56 13216.22 14798.36 18231.65 713.81 
Malaysia      2446.492 3296.23 3322.63 2875.14 3956.75 3526.98  
Mexico 4129.78 4431.65 5091.2 5135.46 5989.29 7095.637   3201.05    
Netherlands 21434.48 20053.7 16630.39 16436.77 16333.16 14151.59 13841.77 15283.2 18438.35 21514.26 23667.92 1515.43 
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Pakistan             
Philippines  3708.57 3663.36 2712.10 3972.84  3701.191  3598.45  3589.06  
Poland 3559.07       2420.31 2734.15 2824.32 3144.59 1154.291 
Portugal  8766.09 7451.096 7433.40 6135.77 4841.905 5681.854 5794.47 6693.71 6617.26 6742.71 817175.20 
Korea 1415.32 1466.68 1206.44 1572.84 1295.82 1359.037 1446.481 1673.90 1291.52 1299.34   
Romania     775.37 902.4816 1181.554 1640.04 1896.43 2484.16 2456.77 3101.05 
Russia 1881.19 2084.63           
Slovakia 13431.3 8113.15 7173.20 8664.54 7344.18 5610.63 5400.23 5376.43 5906.63 6468.40 7462.54 6789.35 
Slovenia 5976.34 5306.35 5719.06 5287.03 4983.67 4952.98 3884.32 3769.71 3271.43 4249.69 8179.09 5435.23 
South Africa 15761.34 16447.28 13654.60 13692.61 13927.68 12517.31 11687.46 12520.77 14691.29 16489.62 17425.43 18163.48 
Spain 23386.51 26298.07 23107.04 17104.96 21858.31 19362.09 17334.19 20304.48 21169.37 24078.95 25127.52 27225.54 
Sweden  1714.38  3107.94  2989.66  2695.55    356.62 
Switzerland 6000.82 5303.86 6020.46 6718.90 6972.40 7736.60 5417.34 7926.71 5625.04 6903.48 7129.02 13488.90 
Thailand      371.35 438.84 548.22 847.35 1199.74 1436.32 1952.50 
Turkey 17518.26 17502.58 18577.02 20863.56 22384.44 17676.06 15896.72 17901.69 18885.92 23266.39 24679.53  
Ukraine   17974.03 17588.88 19474.97 19417.59 19061.73 23252.18  25729.01 25850.75  
UK    13481.36 12655.19 12425.12 11666.36 7279.50 5192.44    
Viet Nam    796.69  559.18      502.80 
USA             
Source: UNIDO 
 
